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JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPTION OF SHARED EXPERIENCE AS RELIGIOUS

by

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
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## CHAPTER I

### THE MAN AND THE PROBLEM

Just fifty years ago, the campus of the University of Wisconsin was crowded with leaders of the academic world gathered for the purpose of celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of that university. President Angell said to Jane Addams that day, "Dewey of all men walking on this campus today, will probably go the farthest in spite of the fact that they have combed the universities from Oxford down, for this occasion."<sup>1</sup> This judgment of John Dewey was no more extravagant than many others, favorable and unfavorable, that have been made since then.

He has been called "America's most eminent and original philosopher,"<sup>2</sup> "without question the leading American philosopher,"<sup>3</sup> and the "spokesman of modern thought."<sup>4</sup> Other thinkers have referred to him as "the greatest spokesman for

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1. Addams, Art.(1930), 149. Explanation of the system used in abbreviating titles of books and numbering articles may be found at the beginning of the bibliography at the end of this dissertation. See below, 187. When the author's name is not given, the work is by John Dewey.

2. Curti, GAT, 715.

3. Page, RGAC, 254.

4. Ayres, Art.(1923), 160.





the experimental process,"<sup>5</sup> "not only the philosopher but the prophet of the New Deal,"<sup>6</sup> and the man "in whom the spirit of revolt is more vigorous and far-reaching than in any of his contemporaries."<sup>7</sup>

At the same time that these extravagant praises were being heaped upon him, however, he was being condemned roundly. Schilpp called him "America's typical voice at the philosophical round-table,"<sup>8</sup> and others have been more outspoken.

He is the most overrated thinker of my generation....In the field of education he has made valuable suggestions. But in philosophy, when he is not incomprehensible he is utterly commonplace.<sup>9</sup>

John Dewey is THE philosopher of bourgeois democracy. More than that, he is the apologist for bourgeois "democracy" in its most developed form, in the most advanced capitalist nation on earth, the United States.<sup>10</sup>

Both the man and his thought have been controversial.

One measure of his influence upon philosophers is the number of honors that have been accorded him. Nearly every book that Dewey published after he went to Columbia University in 1904 consisted of a revision of speeches he had given on one or another foundation or lectureship. He was appointed

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5. Joseph, Art.(1930), 307.

6. Coons, ICDP, 86.

7. Thilly, Art.(1926), 529.

8. Schilpp, CE, 41, 47.

9. Newton, RY, 352.

10. Okun, JD, 1.





first Carus lecturer at the request of Mrs. Carus and after candidates had been suggested to and by a committee of the American Philosophical Association. When the Library of Living Philosophers was begun, Dewey was selected as first subject.

The religious import of Dewey's philosophy has been the subject of varied opinions. Professor Walter Horton wrote of his experiences as a student at Columbia University during the twenties in a tone that made clear his disparagement of both Dewey and his followers:

It was generally understood that there was but one true philosophy, and Dewey was its prophet. Dewey himself was less orthodox than his followers, and less outspokenly antireligious; but he was at that time still in the most positivistic and naturalistic phase of his thinking.... In the discussions among students majoring in philosophy, it was generally taken for granted that religion was no more than an interesting survival of an earlier period of mental evolution.<sup>11</sup>

More than any other philosopher, Professor John Dewey has been influential in shaping the thinking of the more advanced religious leaders of America during the last quarter-century. His influence is evident in the trend of religious education, in the practical stress of social idealism, and in the recent efforts to formulate a modern religious world-view.<sup>12</sup>

Shortly after his visit to China in 1920, where both his educational and his philosophical theories were widely acclaimed, one of the members of the Philosophy Club of Peking exclaimed that "it was a pity that when America needed a new religion that the citizens had not called upon John Dewey to

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11. Horton, Art.(1932), 182-183.

12. Haydon, Art.(1935)<sup>2</sup>, 359.





found it--instead of Mrs. Eddy."<sup>13</sup>

While these critics find religious implications in Dewey's thinking, others comment upon his "undue reticence about the problems of religion."<sup>14</sup> Garrison writes, "He has seemed to avoid with studied care any very definite commitment on the subject of religion."<sup>15</sup> Dewey admits that there is some justification for such remarks. He did not develop a religious philosophy in explicit terms until the early 1930's, when he was persuaded to give the Terry Lectures at Yale University. The product of this series of talks was his popular and influential book, A Common Faith. In 1930, three years before these lectures were given, he wrote that he had been at times personally disturbed by the differences that existed between "traditional religious beliefs" and opinions that he could himself honestly entertain. However, he did not feel then or at any other time that this was a problem of a nature to require him to modify his philosophical position, because he felt that "any genuinely sound religious experience could and should adapt itself to whatever beliefs one found oneself intellectually entitled to hold."<sup>16</sup> This is but one statement of many in his writings that opposes the possibility

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13. Addams, Art.(1930), 146.

14. Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 20.

15. Garrison, Art.(1934), 1281.

16. Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 19-20.





of experiences that are final or superior to all others.

It is evident, then, that Dewey has influenced religious theories and movements in this country at the same time that he has been criticized for his lack of a clearly defined religious philosophy. The apparent contradiction here is resolved when it is noted that he has been generous in his description of religious impulses while strongly opposed to most of the explanations offered by other philosophers to account for them. Frequently the latter elements have overshadowed the former. This dissertation will attempt to extricate the positive elements in Dewey's religious philosophy from critical comments made by him of other such theories.

#### A. "The Principle of Cooperative Association"

John Dewey's ideas have undergone considerable change since he wrote to W. T. Harris for advice about becoming a professional philosopher. Education is considered one of the cornerstones of his philosophy--a judgment with which he agrees<sup>17</sup>--and yet it was not always so. It was only after he went to the University of Michigan as teacher of philosophy and there became involved in state educational practices<sup>18</sup> that he began to develop his own unorthodox educational theories. Likewise, logic has always remained central in his mind and of greatest importance to the understanding of his

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17. Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 22-23.

18. Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 26-27.





system, and yet instrumentalist concepts developed only gradually throughout his career. While it would be impossible to give the complete story of that development here, it may do to mention that the "science of logic" formulated by an Hegelian is quite different from the "logic of science" which plays such an important part in contemporary thought as the result largely of the thinking of John Dewey. The "Principles of Instrumental Logic" which was announced as a forthcoming volume in the Library of Philosophy edited by J. H. Muirhead during the Nineties<sup>19</sup> was not the announcement of what would now be called instrumentalism but an assertion of the belief that Hegelian logic was more useful than Aristotelian because less "abstract." At the same time Dewey's social philosophy has matured only gradually. From a colleague in the department of political economy at Michigan, Dewey got the seeds of an idea that was to play an important part in his own thinking later on. The original suggestion was that there should be a transfer from absolutism to popular representation in economic affairs as there had been in politics.<sup>20</sup> The idea later developed by Dewey was to the effect that politics could never create democracy without the creation of a democratic economy. Thus Dewey's philosophy of education, his logic, and his social philosophy have all been modified to meet the needs of problems early recognized but

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19. See Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 18.

20. Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 38.





only gradually solved.

John Dewey has not, however, deviated from the "principle of coöperative association." Though he was early an Hegelian and only later an instrumentalist, the change was not so basic as to modify his opinion about the importance of "coöperative association." His own account of his change from Hegelianism to instrumentalism reveals the common element in the two theories, that social groupings and institutions are important in the formation of personality.

The metaphysical idea that an absolute mind is manifested in social institutions dropped out; the idea, upon an empirical basis, of the power exercised by cultural environment in shaping the ideas, beliefs, and intellectual attitudes of individuals remained. It was a factor in producing my belief that the not uncommon assumption in both psychology and philosophy of a ready-made mind over against a physical world as an object has no empirical support. It was a factor in producing my belief that the only possible psychology, as distinct from a biological account of behavior, is a social psychology.<sup>21</sup>

The statement, then, that human experience is social and communicable may be taken as fundamental in the thinking of John Dewey--perhaps more so than any other single statement. It is from this basic belief that the concept of "shared experience" as the ultimate goal in religious living was derived. The nature and implications of this ideal will be explored in succeeding chapters.

No other concept has remained so basic or so unchanged. As Dewey has said in answer to critics who use the ad hominem argument that the rejection of formal religion must indicate

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21. John Dewey, quoted by Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 17-18.





the presence of emotion in his thinking,

I will state that nothing untoward has happened, and that my present attitude toward theology, various creeds and philosophies of religion developed slowly and pari-passu with the general maturing of my philosophic ideas.<sup>22</sup>

Though perhaps Dewey's religious philosophy had its "coming-out party" in New Haven in 1934, it had been developed normally over a number of years. Its successive forms resemble each other in the same way as do photographs of the same child taken in successive years. John Dewey's thought has always been religious. Other aspects of Dewey's philosophy cannot, in fact, be understood unless "sharing" is comprehended. Scientific inquiry properly understood and carried on is a social act, and therefore logic is at one and the same time a method to be used in the production of shared experience and an illustration of the presence and practicality of such experience. Democracy is a statement of the political ideal implicit in the concept of shared experience, and education is effective only if it takes into consideration the social nature of children and is itself carried on community-wise. The details of Dewey's philosophy developed out of his attempt to show that experience can be shared religiously.

John Dewey's life is a brilliant record of his personal search for community experience--a search which was often successful. His short attempts at informal autobiography are practically records of associations, such as that with Jane

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22. Art.(1933)<sup>5</sup>, 394.





Addams, which was founded upon a common interest in "joint learning how to live together."<sup>23</sup>

Dewey is known internationally for his social conscience and action. He traveled and lectured in Japan in 1919, China in 1920 and 1921, Turkey in 1924, Mexico in 1926, and Russia in 1928. In every country he found and championed groups which he thought were dedicated to the project of creating personal and social freedom. The political, social and economic reforms which he advocated were easily understandable once his devotion to "the principle of coöperative association" was noted. He favored centralized economic control and decentralized political control as consonant with civil liberties and personal freedom. He supported Communism economically and opposed it politically as repressive.<sup>24</sup> Though the former aspect of his attitude was prominent enough so that he was sometimes termed a Bolshevik, the latter caused him to uphold Trotsky at the time of the Moscow Trials.<sup>25</sup>

Dewey was also active in national politics. He was active in support successively of Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, and LaFollette for president and helped to form the Farmer-

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23. Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 29. The author of this article, a daughter of John Dewey, was named after Jane Addams.

24. "To be asked to choose between Bolshevism and Fascism is to be asked to choose between the G.P.U. and the Gestapo" [quoted by Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 43].

25. Dewey served as chairman of The Commission of Inquiry into the Charges against Leon Trotsky at the Moscow Trials.





Labor Party.<sup>26</sup> He was first president of The Peoples Lobby, chairman for many years of The League for Independent Political Action, one of the leaders in the League for Industrial Democracy, influential in the formation of the American Civil Liberties Union, charter member of the first Teachers Union in New York City (withdrawing from the organization when it was "captured" by Communists), leader in forming the alternative Teachers Guild, and co-founder and first president of the American Association of University Professors.

When Sacco and Vanzetti were on trial and then when they were in prison awaiting death, Dewey worked strenuously with other liberals to prevent their execution. After the latter event, he took time from his teaching to examine and refute the report of the Lowell Commission upon which Governor Coolidge had based his denial of the appeal for pardon. Likewise, he wrote a lengthy analysis of the findings of the Seabury Commission which investigated New York City politics during the regime of Mayor Walker. And he was active in opposing the barring of Bertrand Russell from teaching at the City College of New York.

Throughout the years, Dewey has been identified with third party movements.<sup>27</sup> He has always opposed "isms" of

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26. Dewey considered LaFollette a realist who applied scientific methods to politics [Art.(1924)<sup>4</sup>].

27. Cf. Art.(1931)<sup>4</sup>, 177.





the left and right,<sup>28</sup> but near the end of the twenties he became increasingly aware of the need for planning in economic activities and came to agree with democratic socialists like Norman Thomas that in certain basic industries nationalization was necessary. Thus in Individualism Old and New (1929, 1930), he called for a collectivism which would enable citizens to achieve the individuality which the current individualism was unable to give them. In 1931 he wrote a series of articles in The New Republic advocating support of a third party candidate on the grounds that the platforms of the traditional major parties were insufficiently realistic to solve the problems facing the country.<sup>29</sup> Likewise, in 1936, while he applauded some of the things done during the preceding four years by the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, he felt that they would remain permanent parts of the law only if a third party was elected to office.

Thus it becomes clear that Dewey has been concerned in his own activities with bringing into being that kind of a society which he thinks will be characterized by "coöperative association" or "shared experience." Writing in retrospect and with characteristic modesty, Dewey blames

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28. "Wherever obscurantism and privilege flourish in the United States, Dewey's name is anathema"(Bratton, LLS, 263).

29. Art.(1931)<sup>3</sup>. The reasons given for conservatism or lack of realism were (i) association of politicians with big business men, (ii) age of the parties, and (iii) "property-mindedness" of party leaders [Art.(1931)<sup>2</sup>, 116].





this upon his associates.

I have usually, if not always, held an idea first in its abstract form, often as a matter chiefly of logical or dialectic consistency or of the power of words to suggest ideas. Some personal experience, through contact with individuals, groups, or (as in visits to foreign countries) peoples, was necessary to give the idea concrete significance. There are no ideas which are original in substance, but a common substance is given a new expression when it operates through the medium of individual temperament and the peculiar, unique, incidents of an individual life....My ideas tend, because of my temperament, to take a schematic form in which logical consistency is a dominant consideration, but I have been fortunate in a variety of contacts that has put substance into these forms. The fruits of responsiveness in these matters have confirmed ideas first aroused on more technical grounds of philosophical study. My belief in the office of intelligence as a continuously reconstructive agency is at least a faithful report of my own life and experience.<sup>30</sup>

While this statement acknowledges truthfully the obscurity of style which has plagued Dewey's career and caused many misunderstandings, it fails to recognize the equally obvious fact that Dewey, at least as much as anyone else, has established "coöperative association" as the principal ideal for life. He did this through the example of his own action and through the precept of his religious philosophy.

It is evident, then, that in the experience and the philosophy of the highly controversial figure, John Dewey, there has persisted the glimpse of a highly spiritual goal.

## B. Sources

A Common Faith, Dewey's one full-length book devoted

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30. Quoted by Jane Dewey in Art.(1939), 44-45.





to the subject of religion,<sup>31</sup> is essential for an understanding of his philosophy of religion. It attempts to extricate religious impulses from rituals and dogmas with which they have become increasingly associated. But its importance can be over-estimated if it is read without reference to the rest of Dewey's writings. The result is undue emphasis upon negative aspects of Dewey's attitude toward religion. These are also found in developed form in the great systematic works written during the fifteen-year period preceding the Terry Lectures: Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), Experience and Nature (1925, 1929), The Quest for Certainty (1929), and Philosophy and Civilization (1931). Because these books are taken to be, more nearly than any others, comprehensive surveys of John Dewey's philosophy, the comments on traditional religions and philosophies contained in them are often and mistakenly thought to be complete summaries of Dewey's opinions upon

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31. In 1930 Dewey made a distinction between "partisan interest in a particular religion" and "interest in religious experience"[Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 20]. The Terry Lectures continued this analysis. There, a religion is any of several "organized forces and institutions which have undertaken to maintain and propagate a certain form of faith and truth"(Wieman and Meland, APR, 283. Cf. ACF, 2, 3, 9, 10, 27; Bratton, LLS, 267). Religious experience, on the other hand, is "the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices"(ACF, 33; cf. 10). This terminology, though it will appear in some of the quoted material, will be ignored in the present dissertation. Reasons why Dewey should wish to make the distinction will be discovered but they will be stated in conventional ways.





religious aspects of experience.

These books reflect Dewey's fairly pessimistic attitude toward the possibility of a renaissance in philosophy which will provide an intellectual and emotional integration sufficient to the needs of today. During this period he wrote, "I do not expect to see in my day a genuine, as distinct from a forced and artificial, integration of thought."<sup>32</sup> Consequently, he was convinced that the chief task of present-day thinkers was to point out the inadequacies of current theories, "to help get rid of the useless lumber that blocks our highways of thought, and strive to make straight and open the paths that lead to the future."<sup>33</sup> Yet in spite of this conception of philosophy's function as critical rather than constructive, at least for the time being, Dewey does provide the framework for a "new synthesis." It is clear in the fields of logic, psychology, education, and ethics. The details are not so precisely delineated for religious experience, but they are there.

A careful reading of the whole body of Dewey's writings indicates the presence of a well-formulated and distinctive theory here also. Parts of it are implicit and need to be put in a different setting before they are seen in their full significance. Parts of it are brief to the point of

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32. Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 26.

33. Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 26.





obscuring the chief point. But taken as a whole, the outlines of a theory of religious experience are present. The theory is perhaps discerned most readily in the following articles: "Education as a Religion" [Art.(1922)<sup>3</sup>], "Credo" [Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>], "Psychology and Work" [Art.(1930)<sup>4</sup>], "The Future of Liberalism" [Art.(1939)<sup>3</sup>], "The Unity of the Human Being" [Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>], "The Social-Economic Situation and Education" [Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>], "The House Divided against Itself" [Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>], "The Underlying Philosophy of Education" [Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>], and "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy" [Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>]. Other articles are also important as well as the major works mentioned above. Books that are of primary importance for understanding of the topic include Democracy and Education (1916), Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Individualism Old and New (1929, 1930), Liberalism and Social Action (1935), Logic: the Theory of Inquiry (1938), and Freedom and Culture (1939). The attempt will be made here to gather materials from all these sources in order to present the positive aspects of Dewey's philosophy of religious experience.

The writings of other philosophers on the topic of Dewey's own religion have been scarce and brief. Ten years ago it could be said that there had been "nothing written which exceeds twenty-five consecutive pages in length."<sup>34</sup>

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34. Ensley, NIRD, 15.





A year after this the memorial volume in the Library of Living Philosophers<sup>35</sup> was published. Some pertinent material was included,<sup>36</sup> but there was still little systematic treatment of Dewey's theory of religious experience as such.

Most works on the subject of John Dewey's religious thought have been so external as to be practically useless for an understanding of the topic. Comments by these authors usually indicate nothing more than that their philosophies differ from Dewey's system. Whether Dewey or his critics are more nearly correct is of little concern here, since--with the exception of matters dealt with in the final chapter--the only purpose of this dissertation is to formulate John Dewey's views and make clear their implications.

Among those that are correct in their interpretations of Dewey's position, some merely state or summarize it. Among these are: Bratton, The Legacy of the Liberal Spirit; Coons, The Ideal of Control in John Dewey's Philosophy; Curti, The Social Ideas of American Educators; Hook, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait; Howard, John Dewey's Logical Theory; Ratner, Intelligence in the Modern World; Smith, The Philosophic Way of Life in America; Allport, "Dewey's Individual and Social Psychology" [Art.(1939)], Childs, "The Educational Philosophy of John Dewey" [Art.(1939)], Geiger, "Dewey's

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35. Schilpp, PJD.

36. Schaub, Art.(1959).





Social and Political Philosophy" [Art.(1939)], Hart, "Principles of Character Development in the Philosophy of John Dewey" [Art.(1929)], Randall, "The Religion of Shared Experience" [Art.(1940)], Schneider, "John Dewey's Empiricism" [Art.(1929)], and Thilly, "Contemporary American Philosophy" [Art.(1926)]. Many of these are written in sympathetic vein, though Bentley points out that Dewey has often been "crassified"--that is, acclaimed by men who have not followed him.<sup>37</sup> Inclusion in this list should not be taken to mean that criticism is lacking. Even Dewey's students have most often used his theory as nothing more than orientation for their own thinking.

Others present criticisms of varying importance. Dewey's relation to theism (belief in an existent personal God) is explored by H. N. Wieman,<sup>38</sup> who believes that Dewey is a theist, and F. G. Ensley,<sup>39</sup> who disagrees with Professor Wieman but believes that Dewey cannot logically escape theism once he has accepted coherence as a criterion of truth and self-realization as an ethical ideal. C. E. Ayres makes a religion out of science by thinking of it (and apparently also its results) as the "new certainty" and opposes all institutionalism as anti-scientific.<sup>40</sup> This is quite a

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37. Bentley, Art.(1941).

38. Wieman and Meland, APR; Dewey, Aubrey, and Wieman, Art.(1934); Wieman, Artt.(1933), (1934).

39. Ensley, NIRD.

40. Ayres, Artt.(1923), (1930), (1935).





different "religion of science" from that described below as Dewey's. R. E. Fitch presents a delightful dialogue between John Dewey and Jahweh<sup>41</sup> in which the former comes to see Jahweh as a plodding workman and the latter dubs Dewey one of his prophets. Some of these commentaries have value as succinct statements of Dewey's position and others as sources of valuable insights into his meaning. For the most part, however, the interpretation made here will be based upon statements made by Dewey himself.

### C. Prospectus

John Dewey has been pictured as a man greatly concerned about the improving of human associations. This ideal he rightly considers a religious one and calls "shared experience." The purpose of this dissertation is the description of such experience, of the way in which it may be introduced into present-day society, and of benefits which may be derived from it, personally and socially.

This chapter introduces the ideal which under the name, "the principle of coöperative association," served at one and the same time as principal foundation of the philosophy of instrumentalism and as guide for John Dewey in the conduct of his life. It was pointed out that John Dewey's biography appears disconnected until presented in terms of this

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41. Fitch, Art.(1943).





principle. More important than this, however, was the revelation that other parts of Dewey's philosophy are to be understood as products of this religious demand for communal living. In the chapters to come, this will be made clearer.

Chapter II takes as its subject the relationship between science and "shared experience." The former is often considered the most fundamental concept in Dewey's thought. It becomes important, then, to discover what its relation is to religious ideals, and particularly to shared experience. Science, it becomes clear, is a specific way of dealing with experience; it is defined as a method of direction and as synonymous with intelligence. It is the technique by means of which confusion and chaos are eliminated from experience in favor of desired and coherent ends. The relationship between means and ends is so close, however, for instrumentalism that the two cannot be separated and, in fact, are interchangeable. As end, science is immediately appreciated, desired for itself. As end, science has characteristics that delineate it as the source of all that is good. As end, science is "shared experience," the religious ideal.

In Chapter III, personal unity is described as the goal of religious experience. It is seen to involve character changes that are truly educative, so much so that Dewey has spoken of "education as a religion." These elements of personal growth and integration are dependent upon use of





scientific means of controlling experience so as to introduce sharing into it. When a person becomes scientific in his thinking and acting, he is radically changed. He becomes healthier, freer, more socially conscious, creative and appreciative. These are the personal benefits to be gained from use of intelligence.

Socially also, as is pointed out in Chapter IV, there are advantages. Personal integration depends upon social order which can be realized only through application of intelligence. Science is able to defeat divisive tendencies in today's society, tendencies that are chiefly the product of confining intelligence to physical and industrial problems to the exclusion of personal and social ones. Use of science means the creation of a "community" that is more than mere name. It is a community in which class and national barriers will be transcended, coercion eliminated, and democratic and moral impulses liberated. Both socially and personally, the advantages of intelligence are manifest.

The final chapter clarifies this thesis as it relates to religious experience by making clear the relation of dogma to intelligence. Dogma results whenever unscientific methods are used; it is the contradictory, then, of shared experience. And just as nature is experience dealt with intelligently, so the supernatural is experience treated unintelligently. Religiously, the significance is that all personal and social ills are the results of dogmatic





techniques.

The problem raised at this point is whether institutions may ever discard dogma in favor of science. The question arises because Dewey, in his Terry Lectures, seems to bind institutionalism and dogmatism inextricably together. It is discovered, however, that this is unjustified even if Dewey's own principles are accepted. Scientific thinking and activity is corporate in its very nature and so the ideal is "a communion of scientists," an institution which practices the sharing of experience by being intelligent "groupwise." As a matter of fact, Dewey envisages this possibility, particularly when he is talking about schools, and it is easy to suggest--on the basis of Dewey's own philosophy--some changes that might make churches more intelligent.

The picture that is given in these pages of John Dewey's religious philosophy is optimistic and yet realistic. It is a philosophy of science which brings to light the religious possibilities of intelligence. It is a philosophy of education which pictures character growth as the aim of all education. It is a social philosophy which pictures the communicating and cooperating group as the unit of inquiry. Finally, it is a philosophy of religion which dares to make spiritual development central to all experience.

Throughout this dissertation, with the exception of parts of the final chapter, the views stated are those of





John Dewey. This does not mean, however, that every statement is directly ascribable to him. It means, rather, that the writer is reporting religious theories that may be found in Dewey's writings or that are, to his mind, implied by other views to be found there. Dewey's "undue reticence" about religion, commented on above, has been the source of much misunderstanding. This dissertation should, by making explicit the religious significance of instrumentalist theories, greatly clarify Dewey's position. Not only is John Dewey's religious position stated more completely and more explicitly here than in his own works, but also it is presented in less technical and more common language. This has been done so that understanding will be more general and ambiguity will be reduced. When technical terms are retained, they will be carefully defined. The result should be a re-formulation and extension of Dewey's philosophy of religion.

of behavior. But means and ends are so organically related that science becomes the goal also. Consequently, this chapter will focus attention upon behavior and the officers it fills. In later chapters the religious implications of acceptance of "shared experience" as an ideal will be worked out. The basis for Dewey's philosophy of religion will, though, be given in the present one.

#### A. "Immediate Experience"

In A Common Faith, as in all other writings, Dewey





## CHAPTER II

### SCIENCE AND SHARED EXPERIENCE

"The principle of coöperative association" was one that Dewey accepted at the very beginning of his career as a philosopher and retained throughout his life; thus, it is a clue to his theories of inquiry, society, and education. The same principle may serve to introduce Dewey's conception of religious experience. In this chapter the starting point, the method, and the goal of religion will be described. Dewey points out that religion is a striving for a particular goal, "shared experience." As the name indicates, the view is an empirical one. The method by which a person may become religious is also clearly stated; it is the method of science. But means and ends are so organically related that science becomes the goal also. Consequently, this chapter will focus attention upon science and the offices it fills. In later chapters the religious implications of acceptance of "shared experience" as an ideal will be worked out. The basis for Dewey's philosophy of religion will, though, be given in the present one.

#### A. "Immediate Empiricism"

In A Common Faith, as in his other writings, Dewey





demands that standards originate in experience.<sup>1</sup> His starting-point is "immediate experience,"<sup>2</sup> which is pulsating, on-going, active.<sup>3</sup> What is experience? As Dewey points out, it is what James called a "double-barrelled" word.<sup>4</sup>

Like its congeners, life and history, it includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine--in short, processes of experiencing. "Experience" denotes the planted field, the sowed seeds, the reaped harvests, the changes of night and day, spring and autumn, wet and dry, heat and cold, that are observed, feared, longed for; it also denotes the one who plants and reaps, who works and rejoices, hopes, fears, plans, invokes magic or chemistry to aid him, who is downcast or triumphant. It is "double-barrelled" in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality.<sup>5</sup>

This is obviously the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of the infant as described by James. At the same time it is all differentiations which appear within the confusion and order it.

This is different from the common philosophical use of this word. Experience, according to Dewey, is not primarily intellectual, a subject-object relation. "Experience is much more than consciousness."<sup>6</sup> It is full of feeling, an

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1. ACF, 9, 14, 70-71; EN, 38.

2. Mack, AIE, 51-68.

3. EN, ch. 1.

4. James, ERE, 10.

5. EN, 8.

6. Art.(1927)<sup>8</sup>, 61.





agent-patient relation,<sup>7</sup> one of "doing-undergoing-doing."<sup>8</sup> Man is "primarily a being who acts and makes."<sup>9</sup> Experience is "the intercourse of a living organism with its physical and social environment,"<sup>10</sup> and if experiencing is not limited to mental activity, it is even truer that it is more extensive than "brain action."<sup>11</sup> It is organic and subject to the laws of action and reaction (to borrow terms from physicists) or action and passion (to borrow, as Dewey does, from Spinoza's language).

Experiencing is just certain modes of interaction, of correlation, of natural objects among which the organism happens, so to say, to be one....Experience means primarily not knowledge, but ways of doing and suffering.<sup>12</sup>

Experience is not an object of contemplation but a locus of action.<sup>13</sup>

7. EN, 21-23, 238-240; EEL, 6-7; LOG, 68.

8. Art.(1939)<sup>8</sup>, 532.

9. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 474.

10. Schilpp, CE, 44.

11. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 36. Dewey practically identifies himself as a behaviorist while claiming that this theory does not entail rejection of the existence of mind. "The main thesis of Experience and Nature is that human experience is intelligent (including, of course, misintelligent) and emotional behavior" [Art.(1927)<sup>8</sup>, 62].

12. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 37. The opposite view commits the "idealistic fallacy," the view that things are just what they are experienced to be. [Cf. Thilly, Art.(1926), in summary of Dewey's position here.] Inclusion of these non-cognitive experiences is the basis for terming his theory "unsophisticated realism" or "critical empiricism" [Thilly, Art.(1926), 530], "immediate empiricism" (Mack, AIE, 51-68; Dewey, IDP, 226), or "naive realism" [Ayres, Art.(1923), 158].

13. Cf. QC, 196-197, and throughout.





This theory of the origin of religion has import for the remainder of Dewey's religious position. If religious striving begins in immediate and chaotic experience, it is just as true that it comes to rest only when confusion is replaced by order. Personal unity and freedom are not present in the beginning; they are ideals rather than facts to begin with. This is readily seen.

In the first place, self-hood is a less ultimate category than is experience. Experience is often and correctly understood to be mental or intelligent, but there is no self to "have" the experience unless that self has been distinguished from experience as a part of it, directive yet participant. "Experience can be said to be mine only when it is specifically halted in its process and is being reflected upon in its relationship to myself."<sup>14</sup> "Dewey insists upon the seamless character of experience. To be aware of oneself is merely a part of the total circuit of awareness. It is an event belonging to a larger whole."<sup>15</sup> Experience of one's self is relatively sophisticated; it is an interpretation of experience. Dewey quotes with relish A.E. Singer's warning: "Did we start with an immediate fact of consciousness and construct a world? Then let us now begin with the world and construct a fact of consciousness."<sup>16</sup>

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14. Schilpp, CE, 44, reporting Dewey's view.

15. Allport, Art.(1939), 269, describing Dewey's psychology after changes made in 1894.

16. Art.(1918)<sup>5</sup>, 31.





Experience does not belong to individuals but individuals to experience.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, if experience is the starting point, the self is not unitary existentially. Like all "wholes," personality is "an imaginative, not a literal, idea."<sup>18</sup> The self is an hypothesis; as such it is an ideal which partially governs experience.<sup>19</sup> It is not directly experienced, but it can be imagined and may be accepted as a fruitful concept.<sup>20</sup> In fact, personal integrity is one of the most profound of religious aims. The "unity of the human being" is one phrasing of the religious ideal given by Dewey.<sup>21</sup>

Just as personal unity is an ideal toward which religious activity works, so also is personal freedom. That seemingly most private act of all, choice, is affected by circumstances and is important just because it makes a difference to the rest of experience. The usual doctrine of "free will" is an argument for irresponsibility.<sup>22</sup> "An 'adjustment' possesses the will rather than is its express product."<sup>23</sup>

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17. Cf. Dewey's comments on Professor M.R. Cohen at a memorial dinner for the latter: "The stream of the past which is passing through him"[Art.(1928)5, 20]; "this living stream, into the current of which Morris Cohen was taken up, of which he became a part and which through him has passed on into the lives of so many others of us"(17).

18. ACF, 18; cf. HNC, 38.

19. ACF, 19.

20. ACF, 19. Cf. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 472.

21. This will be examined below, Ch. III, A.

22. QC, 250.

23. ACF, 19.





I sometimes wonder whether all human theorizing would not be furthered by an agreement wholly to eliminate the word "will," at least for a generation or two. It is a popular term, having no place even in psychological science save as something to be analyzed, as presenting a problem. Back of the question of execution of purposes lies that of their formation.<sup>24</sup>

The question of personal freedom is not a question of freedom of "will." It is a practical question of the ideal relationships of a man with environing forces. Experience derives its importance for human beings not from its present existence or characteristics, but from its future possibilities.

Events are not dealt with as such, but are changed into objects, that is, into events as related to objectives. "Objects are the objectives of inquiry."<sup>25</sup> It is with objects that human beings deal. "Experience...is primarily what is undergone in connexion with activities whose import lies in their objective consequences--their bearing upon future experience."<sup>26</sup> Experience is composed of objects, i.e., "things that object."<sup>27</sup> Religious experience, therefore, is not experience which viewed by itself is different from other experiences, but is experience which eventuates in certain types of future events,<sup>28</sup> namely, sharing. Freedom is the ordering of objects so that coherent ideals may be reached.

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24. Art.(1927)<sup>9</sup>, 115.

25. LOG, 119.

26. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 20.

27. Art.(1939)<sup>8</sup>, 543.

28. ACF, 12-17; Art.(1935)<sup>5</sup>, 194.





Religion begins, therefore, in immediate experience; it is marked at its start by disorder. But it establishes as its ideals the creation of personal unity and freedom. The problem for the religious person is the attainment of these goals given the tools and materials at hand. Religious advance is recorded in the transition from confusion to coherence.<sup>29</sup>

#### B. "Intelligence in the Modern World"

Experience is the starting point for religious endeavor; yet it is also the home of all the obstructions that make difficult the realizing of religious ideals. Within experience men may discover all the materials and methods for control of themselves and society; "science takes its departure of necessity from the qualitative objects, processes, and instruments of the common sense world of use and concrete enjoyments and sufferings."<sup>30</sup> But chaos also originates here; as a matter of fact, in our culture there are tendencies which are strong in the direction of disorder, both social and personal.<sup>31</sup> In spite of difficulties which arise from this last fact, salvation lies, not in the rejection of any part of experience, but in the selection of the proper approach to it.

There is an adjustment of means to consequences in the activities of living creatures, even though not directed

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29. LOG, 105.

30. LOG, 71.

31. EN, ch. 2; LOG, 107-108.





by deliberate purpose. Human beings in the ordinary or "natural" processes of living come to make these adjustments purposely.<sup>32</sup>

The problem becomes one of selecting the method consonant with ideal aims. Science is the only avenue to a truly religious "shared experience." It is defined in terms of its method rather than its conclusions. "Science is not a great encyclopaedia, but a reliable technique; not a body of conclusions, but a series of explanations."<sup>33</sup> Scientists, according to Dewey's description, are not a small group of specialists but a cooperating group of inquirers working toward attainment of shared ideals. The society which they form is not a mechanical and external arrangement of forces but a spiritual communion making coherent imagination a likelihood. Means are organically related to ends, and science is the only means which promotes rather than defeats religious ideals.

Science is nothing other than "creative intelligence." Put in the broadest terms, scientific method "is but systematic, extensive, and carefully controlled use of alert and unprejudiced observation and experimentation in collecting, arranging, and testing evidence."<sup>34</sup> The scientific attitudes are "open-mindedness, intellectual integrity, observation and

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32. LOG, 19.

33. Schneider, Art.(1944), 87. Cf. ACF, 38-39.

34. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 12.





interest in testing...opinions and beliefs."<sup>35</sup>

On its negative side, it [the scientific attitude] is freedom from control by routine, prejudice, dogma, unexamined traditions, sheer self-interest. Positively, it is the will to inquire, to examine, to discriminate, to draw conclusions only on the basis of evidence after taking pains to gather all available evidence. It is the intention to reach beliefs and to test those that are entertained, on the basis of observed fact, recognizing also that facts are without meaning save as they point to ideas. It is, in turn, the experimental attitude which recognizes that while ideas are necessary to deal with facts, yet they are working hypotheses to be tested by the consequences they produce.<sup>36</sup>

#### Science

is honesty and integrity of mind applied to the adjudication of problems and questions. It takes into account the past, the present and the future of any situation. It takes into account everything that is relevant to the situation, no matter how new or strange, and refuses to take into account anything that is not relevant to the situation, no matter how old or "sacred" it may claim to be. "Science" sometimes fails to be all of that. Then it ceases to be "science," and becomes dogmatism. But the essence of science is found in the application of analytic and integrative intelligence to the tasks of understanding and ordering the world.<sup>37</sup>

As method, it is the living spirit that actuates the formation and testing of beliefs in all subjects. As method, it is undeviating respect for the authority of evidence obtained from first-hand experience, is constant attention to the need of experimental activity to institute the observations that have the force of evidence, and is high valuation of ideas as means of interpreting and organizing the facts authenticated by controlled observation. Only as the living spirit of dealing with all subjects, engrained in all the procedures of learning, can science create the values inherent in it.<sup>38</sup>

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35. Art.(1934)<sup>4</sup>, 242.

36. Art.(1938)<sup>2</sup>, 31.

37. Hart, Art.(1929), describing Dewey's educational theories.

38. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 481.





"The scientific attitude and method are at bottom but the the [sic] method of free and effective intelligence."<sup>39</sup>

Creative intelligence is, then, science; a description of the one describes the other also.

I define logical theory as an account of the procedures followed in reaching decisions [that are] the outcome of inquiry, comparison of alternatives, weighing of facts; [in which] deliberation or thinking has intervened.<sup>40</sup>

Science and intelligence are synonymous. While intelligence develops gradually out of a biological matrix,<sup>41</sup> it soon asserts its independence. Finally, it is conceived normatively. It then is opposed to the misuse as well as the lack of inquiry. Dewey refers to "misintelligent" dealings with experience,<sup>42</sup> calls dogmatic any method which does not live up to scientific standards,<sup>43</sup> and refers to tendencies opposing spiritual growth as "miseducative."<sup>44</sup> There are, then, degrees of success in applying intelligence to problematic situations, and intelligence or science is a standard to keep before oneself. What are the prominent features of intelligence?

Thinking is unique in that it uses present experience

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39. Art.(1938)<sup>2</sup>, 38.

40. Art.(1924)<sup>5</sup>, 561-562.

41. LOG, ch. 2.

42. Art.(1928)<sup>7</sup>, 62.

43. See Hart, Art.(1929).

44. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 54-58.





as a clue to the nature of future experience. Anticipation and prediction are the new qualities involved.<sup>45</sup>

When water is an adequate stimulus to action or when its reactions oppress and overwhelm us, it remains outside the scope of knowledge. When, however, the bare presence of the thing (say, as optical stimulus) ceases to operate directly as stimulus to response and begins to operate in connection with a forecast of the consequences it will effect when responded to, it begins to acquire meaning--to be known, to be an object.<sup>46</sup>

The method is described over and over in these terms. Intelligence is "the observation of consequences as consequences,"<sup>47</sup> "use of the given or finished to anticipate the consequence of processes going on,"<sup>48</sup> "a method which proceeds on the basis of the interrelations of observable acts and their results."<sup>49</sup> In every case the scientific attitude is one which views natural events as members of a causal series, as conditions and consequences. It is based upon "a logic relative to consequences rather than to premises."<sup>50</sup> The names applied to the process of viewing facts as clues or symbols of what is to come are knowing,<sup>51</sup> ideation,<sup>52</sup>

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45. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 61.

46. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 48.

47. PIP, 12. Cf. QC, 224; EN, 258, 278.

48. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 21. Cf. LOG, 12.

49. PIP, 36.

50. Art.(1924)<sup>5</sup>, 571. Italics in original.

51. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 61, 48.

52. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 21.





intelligence,<sup>53</sup> and science.<sup>54</sup>

Science does not involve the substitution of a narrow method for one which is more comprehensive or more inclusive.

Though

the method we term "scientific" forms for the modern man (and a man is not modern merely because he lives in 1931) the sole dependable means of disclosing the realities of existence,<sup>55</sup>

the exclusiveness is not one of subject-matter but of method. Any process may be approached scientifically, intelligently. Experience is a whole in which every event occurs and stands in relationship to others; science deals with all experience.

Intelligence is not merely a matter of prediction, however; it is much more activist than this would make it. In addition to this primarily intellectual function of science, there is a practical side to scientific activity--or, rather, the whole process is permeated with practicality when seen in its entirety. Not only must predictions be made; action must be intelligent in selecting a course of action which will bring about desired consequences, in effecting "a working connection between old habits, customs, institutions, beliefs, and new conditions."<sup>56</sup> A "suggestion becomes an idea when it is examined with reference to its functional

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53. PIP, 12; Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 21.

54. PIP, 36.

55. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 24.

56. LSA, 50.





fitness."<sup>57</sup> "Intelligence, as distinct from the older conception of reason, is inherently involved in action."<sup>58</sup> Experiment alters "a physically antecedent situation in those details and respects which called for thought in order to do away with some evil."<sup>59</sup> "Action is a necessary part of intelligence--namely, action that changes conditions that previously existed."<sup>60</sup> "Knowledge is always a matter of the use that is made of experienced natural events."<sup>61</sup> "Every intelligible statement contains within itself...the conditions of its own rectification, provided we carry out the experiments it indicates."<sup>62</sup> Events in the present are objectified intellectually by considering their relationship to the realization of ideal possibilities. "To be reasonable is to recognize things in their offices as obstacles and as resources."<sup>63</sup> Meanings are "rules for using and interpreting things."<sup>64</sup> "Every universal, like any rule, is a formulation of an

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57. LOG, 110.

58. ACF, 79. Cf. LOG, 34; ch. 9.

59. EEL, 31. Cf. LOG, 104-107.

60. Art.(1934)<sup>6</sup>, 307. Cf. LOG, 13.

61. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 47. Italics in original.

62. Art.(1921)<sup>2</sup>, iv.

63. Art.(1908)<sup>1</sup>, 60. "To treat knowledge as an end in itself is equivalent to isolating it from activity"[Art. (1938)<sup>5</sup>, 481].

64. EN, 188.





operation to be performed."<sup>65</sup>

Science is broader than generally thought. When Dewey asks for a scientific approach to human problems, he is not asking for the application of laboratory methods now used in the physical sciences.

If in this connection I have emphasized physical knowledge, it is not (as I have said many times) because the latter is the only kind of knowledge, but because its comparative maturity as a form of knowledge exemplifies so conspicuously the necessary place and function of experimentation; whereas, in contrast, beliefs in moral and social subjects are still reached and framed with minimum regard for experimental method.<sup>66</sup>

It is not held that the particular techniques of the physical sciences are to be literally copied--though of course they are to be utilized wherever applicable--nor that experimentation in the laboratory sense can be carried out on any large scale in social affairs. It is held that the attitude of mind exemplified in the conquest of nature by the experimental sciences, and the method involved in it, may and should be carried into social affairs.<sup>67</sup>

"The scientific attitude...is a quality that is manifested in any walk of life."<sup>68</sup> Science is not divided into "pure" and "practical" disciplines, nor is what is commonly regarded as "pure science" better than other experimental thinking.<sup>69</sup> Special sciences are merely illustrative of science, not definitive.<sup>70</sup> Science is "a method which is followed by the

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65. Art.(1936)<sup>5</sup>, 283. Italics in original.

66. Art.(1939)<sup>8</sup>, 527.

67. Art.(1934)<sup>6</sup>, 306.

68. Art.(1938)<sup>2</sup>, 31.

69. Art.(1938)<sup>2</sup>, 29-31.

70. Art.(1938)<sup>2</sup>, 38.





wider body of persons who deal intelligently and openly with the objects and energies of the common environment."<sup>71</sup>

Intelligence, then, should play an important part in an ideal society--in, for example, forming states<sup>72</sup> and handing down legal judgments.<sup>73</sup>

A human society would use scientific method, and intelligence with its best equipment, to bring about human consequences. Such a society would meet the demand for a science that is humanistic, and not just physical and technical.<sup>74</sup>

In this way, science would create and sustain social values.<sup>75</sup>

Science is a cooperative endeavor in which initiative is directed toward social ends and ideal elements are introduced into a common experience. Science is creative intelligence, the search for coherence. It eschews mechanical and routine activities in favor of reasonable effort. It is fundamental because there is no substitute for intelligence; intelligence comes first, and other things are added afterwards.

The hope for the liberal mind and the liberal college is not in the spread of liberal beliefs, but the hope for the spread of liberal ideas is in the development of the liberal mind.<sup>76</sup>

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71. Art.(1938)<sup>2</sup>, 29.

72. PIP, 33.

73. PIP, 7-8.

74. ION, 138.

75. Art.(1934)<sup>4</sup>, 240-241; Art.(1935)<sup>1</sup>, 122. See Ch. IV, below.

76. Art.(1924)<sup>1</sup>, 282.





Intelligence is the one means which can bring into existence spiritual ideals. Without science religious hopes remain pious sentimentalities. But, further than this, the method is so organic to the ideal which it seeks that the latter cannot be understood apart from the former. The rest of this chapter investigates this claim and its effect upon religious aims.

### C. "Ends and Means"

Science is an instrument which may be used in bringing about desired consequences; it is a means. Means are so organically related to ends that the latter can be adopted intelligently only when the available means have been discovered. Ideals are useless in directing behavior unless they can be attained. "Ends that are incapable of realization are ends only in name. Ends must be framed in the light of available means"<sup>77</sup>; the alternative is "a sign either of insanity, immaturity, indurated routine, or of a fanaticism that is a mixture of all three."<sup>78</sup> The nature of the present determines the nature of the ideal future. Human beings must work toward ends which though not assured are for the most part attainable. Accordingly, there are no absolute standards; each one must be tested by relating it to the rest of

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77. SSE, 59. Cf. LOG, 9-10, 167, 496-503.

78. TOV, 44.





experience.<sup>79</sup>

Intelligence is valuable for what it can do, is important because it makes possible the attainment of ideals. Actually, morality and sciences such as psychology develop side by side because one is concerned with the nature of ends and the other with realization of those same ends. "Psychology must needs be born as soon as morality becomes reflective."<sup>80</sup> The major question is not whether psychology is to be used but whether the psychology which is used is adequate to the needs and facts with which it is concerned. Likewise, teachers are not to be divided into two groups, one of which employs "mechanical considerations" while the other "does not, appealing to higher ends"; all teachers use material means to realize their purposes. The ones who are acquainted with the limits and advantages of specific methods act "freely, clearly and effectively" while others act "servilely, superstitiously and blindly."<sup>81</sup> This is as it should be. The distinction made so often and referred to above makes physical things sub- or anti-moral.<sup>82</sup> This helps to prevent evils from being overcome because it obscures the fact, new in history, that means have been developed for overcoming

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79. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 13.

80. Art.(1900)<sup>1</sup>, 122. Cf. 120; TOV, 62-63.

81. Art.(1900)<sup>1</sup>, 114.

82. The "gap" between lower physiological functions and higher cultural ones results from divorce of ends and means [Art.(1929)<sup>8</sup>, 66].





them.<sup>83</sup>

The low estimate put upon science, the idea that because it is occupied with the natural world it is incapacitated from exercising positive influence upon values to which the adjectives "higher" and "ideal" (or any adjectives having favorable connotation) can be applied, tends to restrict and deflect its influence.<sup>84</sup>

Not only is it futile to try to extricate oneself from the web of material objects and so achieve a life free from mundane considerations; it is also this sort of wishful thinking which causes so many people to fail to get full value from the world in which they are irrevocably placed. Moral activity must use physical and economic objects in the attainment of spiritual ideals. This is denied or questioned only because psychological analyses are so incomplete.<sup>85</sup> "Values do not cease to be values when they are minutely and accurately measured. Acts are not destroyed when their operative machinery is made manifest."<sup>85</sup> No end is absolute. But, even further, ends and means exist in the same natural world,<sup>86</sup> in experience. This gives to experience its great value, and it also points out the basic weakness in those criticisms of science which minimize its importance because it is "merely" a means. Means exist in the same "continuum" as ends and influence those ends; divorce of the two makes practice less

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83. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 15.

84. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 10.

85. Art.(1900)<sup>1</sup>, 118.

86. TOV, 36-37.





ideal and ideals less practicable. Means and ends are, in fact, interchangeable.<sup>87</sup> Any event can be an end under given circumstances. That same event may, under the same or different conditions, at the same or at another time, be the means to the attainment of something else. Acceptance of science as a method for the realization of religious living, therefore, imposes restrictions upon the form which that goal may take. It does not make the task impossible. In spite of a general impression to the contrary, Dewey is quite concerned with the nature of ideals.

Though science, a method, is the central concept in John Dewey's interpretation of experience, he "is primarily interested in intrinsic values,"<sup>88</sup> if they are considered as means to later enjoyment or ends-in-view as well as sources of immediate enjoyment.<sup>89</sup> "Use...is for the sake of some consummation or enjoyment."<sup>90</sup>

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87. TOV, 43; ETH, 250-251, 230; EN, 367-386, 397; Art. (1922)<sup>1</sup>, 328.

88. Smith, PWLA, 86-87. In the following discussion, "valuation" as a type of valuing is ignored. Though it is important to a full understanding of Dewey's theory of value, it is concerned with instrumental values, those which are not the source of immediate appreciation, direct enjoyment. See, e.g., Art.(1922)<sup>1</sup>, 332-333; QC, 236; TOV, 36-39; LOG, 172-174.

89. TOV, 42-43. The distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values often leads to the further conclusion that the latter are absolute; this is false. All values are conditioned and have consequences.

90. LOG, 63. Cf. 66, 174-180.





There are cases where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth with no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of itself. The end is the present activity, and so there is no gap in the mind between means and end. All play is of this immediate character. Purely aesthetic appreciation approximates this type. The existing experience holds us for its own sake, and we do not demand that it takes [sic] us into something beyond itself.<sup>91</sup>

"The most significant factors in conduct are general patterns of desire and appreciation."<sup>92</sup> Religious values are desired in this immediacy, as intrinsic.

Values<sup>93</sup> are directly<sup>94</sup> experienced. Appreciation is not intellectual. "The experience of value is itself... primarily an affecto-motor one,"<sup>95</sup> "not a judgment or knowledge of value."<sup>96</sup> The consummatory experience is not necessarily the product of intellectual activity. Man's "activity is first of all an expression of emotion."<sup>97</sup> Even

91. IEE, 21. Cf. TOV, 37-39; LOG, 166-167. Especially clear on the presence of appreciation in the value situation is Art.(1923)<sup>1</sup>, esp. 617. Cf. ACF, 48, 87.

92. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 301.

93. This matter is very complex. Dewey gives six meanings for the word "value" and seemingly admits the claims of still another in Art.(1922)<sup>1</sup>, 329, 329n.

94. Dewey points out several other meanings of "immediacy" as that word is applied to perception of values [Art.(1925)<sup>4</sup>, 324].

95. Art.(1925)<sup>4</sup>, 327. See also Art.(1922)<sup>1</sup>, 329n., 330-332, 336; Art.(1925)<sup>4</sup>, throughout; LOG, 172.

96. Art.(1925)<sup>4</sup>, 326n. Cf. Art.(1918)<sup>4</sup>, 256-258; Art.(1922)<sup>1</sup>, 326; ETH, 228, 201; QC, 258.

97. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 474.





the scientist is such only because he desires a tool which will enable him to attain direct enjoyments that are not themselves intellectual, though the use of science will often alter considerably the nature of the experiences that are appreciated.<sup>98</sup>

Values are directly experienced, and they are events which are objectified in the light of certain needs or desires of individuals, who are themselves objectified from similar events. Enjoyment, then, is perfectly natural or is something which occurs only within the bounds of experience. Furthermore, values are not restricted to any narrow realm within that sphere--anything may at one time or another serve as a value.<sup>99</sup> The object is enjoyed when it satisfies certain requirements of the individual. Values<sup>100</sup> occur as a part of the stream of events and the method, both of which are experience.<sup>101</sup> It is for this reason that values are interpreted as objective.<sup>102</sup> Values are not the creation of

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98. See below, Chs. III, IV.

99. Art.(1925)<sup>4</sup>, 313-321. Values are not only "here," but they are also "everywhere here"(Smith, PWLA, 88-89, reporting Dewey's views).

100. Strictly speaking, values are not things but qualities of things [Art.(1923)<sup>7</sup>, 617].

101. Art.(1922)<sup>1</sup>, 327.

102. Note Dewey's approval of Scudder Klyce's (Klyce, UNI) argument for the objectivity of values: A "statement is itself an objective fact" to be verified by real action [Art. (1921)<sup>2</sup>, v]. Even his critics admit that Dewey asserts the objectivity of values "in a sense"[see, e.g., Brightman,





a subject and thus subjective, for they are just as closely related to experience as is that subject himself. Nor are values completely--or solely--objective in the sense that they exist as such before they stand in some relation to the needs of an individual who in light of those needs objectifies the value which until then has been merely an event. Every man is in integral relationship with other man and nature, and Dewey throws up his hands in horror at the thought that his critics would interpret him to mean that man exists apart from his relations to other events and objects.<sup>103</sup> Mind is not "an isolated world by itself" because its interests affect its surroundings.<sup>104</sup>

The consequence of this analysis is that Dewey's humanism has none of that feeling of human isolation present in some other humanistic views.

It has become a cheap intellectual pastime to contrast the infinitesimal pettiness of man with the vastnesses of the stellar universes. Yet all such comparisons are illicit. We cannot compare existence and meaning; they

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Art.(1936), 320]. Dewey contends, however, that values are not objective in the sense that they exist before human beings realize purposes that they have in mind (QC, 215). Dewey objects to phrasing the problem in terms of subjectivity and objectivity on the grounds that this assumes an introspectionist psychology (EEL, 345). He elaborates his position in Art.(1927)<sup>5</sup>, 3-4, in the statement that criticisms of instrumentalism as subjective indicate that the critic has been unable to view instruments in the new way that is required by pragmatists. Instruments are not used only for private advantage or to satisfy animal needs.

103. Art.(1933)<sup>5</sup>, 394.

104. IEE, 92; cf. 16, 19-20.





are disparate. The characteristic life of man is itself the meaning of vast stretches of existences, and without it the latter have no value or significance. There is no measure of physical existence and conscious experience because the latter is the only measure there is for the former. The significance of being, though not its existence, is the emotion it stirs, the thought it sustains.<sup>105</sup>

Values which are directly appreciated by men include natural objects as well as human ones. However, the highest human values are to be found in the process of participating intelligently in society, in sharing experience.

#### D. "Shared Experience"

Writers who summarize Dewey's theory describe shared experience as central in his thinking. "The key notion of Dewey's philosophy is 'shared experience'."<sup>106</sup> "'Communication' is in truth the controlling conception in Dewey's thought."<sup>107</sup> "Communication" is equivalent, in this comment, to "shared experience"; the former is the source of transformation of biological factors to social, awareness to inquiry.<sup>108</sup> Dewey's "deepest and most insistent note is that of community."<sup>109</sup> He has spoken of "'shared experience' as the greatest of human goods."<sup>110</sup> Shared experience is intelligence

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105. Art.(1927)<sup>1</sup>, 538.

106. Smith, PWLA, 93.

107. Randall, Art.(1940), 109. See Dewey, Art.(1921)<sup>2</sup>, iv.

108. LOG, 42, 45-47.

109. Smith, PWLA, 82.

110. Randall, Art.(1940), 109.





considered as end rather than as means. Science as method is recognized easily, but the values inherent in the technique--other than those of problem-solving--are not generally known. The prominent features of this "shared life and shared experience"<sup>111</sup> have now to be delineated. They are the traits of religious living.

(1) Shared experience involves a social ideal because the group is always devoted to common aims. "A society is a number of people held together because they are working along common lines, in a common spirit, and with reference to common aims."<sup>112</sup> "Shared experience" is "a common, or mutually participated in, consequence."<sup>113</sup> What is needed is a unity of purpose rather than conformity to some external authority. Purposes develop in answer to problems, and since the latter are common to the whole group so must be also the former. Communities develop from this fact. Dewey refers to "communication--the making of something common."<sup>114</sup> "Effectively united in a common cause man would be able to achieve control over the factors of good and ill in human life; in concerted effort there is strength."<sup>115</sup> Intelligence

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111. RIP, 211.

112. SS, 11.

113. LOG, 53.

114. LOG, 46. Italics in original.

115. Summary of Dewey's position given by Coons, ICDP, 89.





is a social philosophy which takes its

point of departure from the objective fact that human acts have consequences upon others, that some of these consequences are perceived, and that their perception leads to subsequent effort to control action so as to secure some consequences and avoid others.<sup>116</sup>

The normative characteristic of the situation is noted by T. V. Smith when he says, "Thinking may be regarded as a process whereby the real is budged...toward the ideal."<sup>117</sup> As he remarks, man's only hope of making "differential gain" lies in the use of intelligence. "Whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious."<sup>118</sup> This point of view, as will become apparent below, means that fully intelligent social ideals will provide for cooperation rather than competition. This will increase individuality.

(2) Shared experience involves social discussion or communication because this is essential to intelligence. The values of shared experience are both found in and promoted by communication. T. V. Smith describes the view as recognizing that "men are sheer animals but for what they can elicit from one another through fruitful intercourse."<sup>119</sup>

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116. PIP, 12. Notice that the relationship between science and society is described such that the latter is secondary or derivative. "The perception of consequences which are projected in important ways beyond the persons and associations directly concerned in them is the source of a public"(39).

117. Smith, PWLA, 84-85. Cf. ACF, 51, 17, 33; Wieman and Meland, APR, 280; Ensley, NIRD, 121-122.

118. ACF, 24.

119. Smith, PWLA, 96. Cf. LOG, 43-44.





Science is furthered through the "free initiative, invention and enterprise of individual inquirers"; yet it is just as integral a part of scientific method that it is "collective activity, cooperatively organized,....a public and open method,"<sup>120</sup> "constant exchange and mutual reinforcement."<sup>121</sup>

No scientific inquirer can keep what he finds to himself or turn it to merely private account without losing his scientific standing. Everything discovered belongs to the community of workers. Every new idea and theory has to be submitted to this community for confirmation and test. There is an expanding community of cooperative effort and of truth.<sup>122</sup>

Ideas are not private in any ultimate sense.

Report, communication, is not a bare emission of thoughts framed and completed in private soliloquy or solipsistic observation. The entire operation of individual experimentation and soliloquizing has been influenced at every point by reference to the social medium in which their results are to be set forth and responded to.<sup>123</sup>

Proof, as conceived by Dewey, is social.

By knowledge as grounded I mean belief in relation to evidence that substantiates it. Now the simplest distinction that can be drawn between objects of knowledge in this sense and mere matters of opinion and credulity, or even of thought however internally self-consistent and formally valid, is the distinction between the socially confirmed and the privately entertained. Opinion and theory as long as they are uncommunicated, or as long as, communicated and shared, they are unconfirmed in conjoint behavior are at best but candidates for membership within the system of knowledge.<sup>124</sup>

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120. PM, 107. Cf. LOG, 19.

121. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 317.

122. ION, 154.

123. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 174.

124. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 173. Cf. LOG, 490.





Intelligence is a social effort made possible and fruitful by communication.<sup>125</sup> The "brotherhood of man" is a real possibility because transportation and communication have been so improved as to make this "one world." Inquiry which is carried on by a group of investigators is different in kind from that which might conceivably be done by one person in isolation; the improvement is provided by communication. "The common needs and aims demand a growing interchange of thought."<sup>126</sup> The activity that is goal-related is and can be undertaken only in a group, directly or indirectly. Though an individual may work by himself, he has been conditioned by the group of which he is a member to recognize problems and solutions in certain specific ways; his analysis of experience is determined largely by analyses going on around him; furthermore, he must report his findings to the group once he is through with his experimentation. It is the group, then, which is the unit in problem-solving.

(3) Shared experience involves social action which is a cooperative endeavor toward common ideals.

Language...compels one individual to take the standpoint of other individuals and to see and inquire from a standpoint that is not strictly personal but is common to them as participants or "parties" in a conjoint undertaking.<sup>127</sup>

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125. LOG, 42.

126. SS, 11.

127. LOG, 46.





The group is cooperative for the minimum reason that it is confronted with common problems and must work out these problems collectively. All inquiry is group activity. Collectivity or corporateness is a fact in the world today.<sup>128</sup> The issue, thus, is not between individualism and collectivism, as commonly thought, but between capitalism and socialism; they are to be judged on how well they recognize collectivism as a fact and realize democracy or individuality as ideals.<sup>129</sup> In discussing the origin of states, Dewey indicates that the common interest involved "required for its maintenance certain measures and rules, together with the selection of certain persons as their guardians, interpreters, and, if need be, their executors."<sup>130</sup> The technique is always a group one. One of the two criteria of a good state is "the degree of organization of the public which is attained."<sup>131</sup> Gabriel points out that Ward and Dewey were "democratic collectivists"<sup>132</sup> because they thought the group formed into a state was a vehicle for the creation rather than merely the destruction of values, as was then commonly thought by individualists. As for the project of "unifying" science, Dewey says, "Detailed specific common standpoints

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128. ION, 35-50, 74-120; Art.(1927)<sup>6</sup>, 301-302.

129. Coons, ICDP, 95.

130. PIP, 17.

131. PIP, 33.

132. Gabriel, ADT, 376.





and ideas must emerge out of the very processes of co-operation."<sup>133</sup> "To bring about unity of the scientific attitude is, then, to bring those who accept it and who act upon it into active cooperation with one another."<sup>134</sup>

There are religious values to be found in this collective activity. "Character development...needs the chance to practice and conserve its gains through experiences in actual areas of social and personal responsibility."<sup>135</sup> The change introduced by patterns of association may, of course, be either for better or for worse. The "unity [of a human being] and its breakdowns must be sought for in the interactions between individual organisms and their environment, especially that of human association."<sup>136</sup>

Disruption of the unity of the self is not limited to the cases that come to physicians and institutions for treatment. They accompany every disturbance of normal relations of husband and wife, parent and child, group and group, class and class, nation and nation. Emotional responses are so total as compared with the partial nature of intellectual responses, of ideas and abstract conceptions, that their consequences are more pervasive and more enduring.<sup>137</sup>

Personal disaster is a consequence of isolation. Specifying this, though, provides basis for locating communication and

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133. Art.(1938)<sup>2</sup>, 34.

134. Art.(1938)<sup>2</sup>, 33.

135. Hart, Art.(1929), 116.

136. Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 829.

137. Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 833.





common striving as causes of health. "The individual comes to himself and to his own, only in association with others."<sup>138</sup>

"The best and deepest moral training is precisely that which one gets through having to enter into proper relations with others in a unit of work and thought."<sup>139</sup>

(4) In shared experience a community is formed. This is the result of communication.

There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common.<sup>140</sup>

"A community is constituted by those who communicate with one another, who agree with one another in action because they share in a common understanding."<sup>141</sup>

Social sciences recognize that associated life is not a matter of physical juxtaposition, but of genuine intercourse--of community of experience in a non-metaphorical sense of community.<sup>142</sup>

"When we turn to the social, we find communication to be an existential occurrence involved in all distinctively communal life."<sup>143</sup> The problem is to rid experience of any factor that "limits the contacts, the exchanges, the communications,

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138. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 11.

139. MPC, 8-9.

140. DE, 5.

141. Art.(1927)<sup>4</sup>, xxi.

142. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 34-35.

143. PC, 87.





the interactions"<sup>144</sup> that are present. Leaders have the duty and task of "giving articulate and effective form to the common impulses" toward "fellowship."<sup>145</sup> "In every interaction that involves intelligent direction, the physical environment is part of a more inclusive social or cultural environment."<sup>146</sup>

Values of participation in a community based upon mutual understanding and common striving are many and of a high order.

The central values are social, values of love, of participation. Participation has degrees of completeness, implying in the ideal case full realization by one individual of the joys and sorrows of another.<sup>147</sup>

The shared values are those of "reciprocal committal and mutual faith."<sup>148</sup> The possession of this understanding, commitment, and faith, which is made possible through a community of experiences with others, makes a radical difference. It allows for more effective activity in the direction of the common goal, for the possibility of increased understanding of others who also belong to the community, and for self-knowledge made possible through the understanding

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144. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 228.

145. Art.(1945)<sup>1</sup>, xx. Municipal Boards of Education are "the middleman of our educational organization, and like the middleman in other fields they divide instead of bringing together"[Art.(1915)<sup>1</sup>, 180].

146. LOG, 20.

147. Hartshorne, BH, 46, paraphrasing Dewey.

148. Art.(1927)<sup>4</sup>, xxi.





and agreement of others.<sup>149</sup> Social psychologies exist,

but we are far from having reached the point in which it is seen that the whole difference between animal and human psychology is constituted by the transforming effect exercised upon the former by intercourse and association with other persons and groups of persons.<sup>150</sup>

This "transforming effect" is profound. There is not only "a common spirit"; there is also a "growing unity of sympathetic feeling."<sup>151</sup> In speaking of the work Jane Addams had done at Hull House, Dewey referred to her insistence that sharing in activities "was not a matter of doing good to others as beneficiaries; those who took part had more to receive than to give."<sup>152</sup>

Social progress lies in creating communities. When Dewey opposes rugged individualism as "ragged,"<sup>153</sup> he means that it prevents identification with publics.<sup>154</sup> Social organization on a larger scale is to be developed only through the gradual expansion of the groups or "publics" with which individuals identify themselves. To organize on a national or international plane and expect immediate identification

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149. Art.(1927)<sup>4</sup>, xxi.

150. Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 825. "The whole ground for the difference between a sensation and an emotion seems to lie in the absence or presence of a response coming from another human being"[Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 831].

151. SS, 11.

152. Art.(1945)<sup>1</sup>, xix.

153. LSA, 33, 38.

154. RIP, 137.





is unrealistic. The latter method becomes mechanical, while the former is "vital and dynamic."<sup>155</sup> Class barriers, economic exploitation, nationalistic provincialism, and other effects of the basic disunity in today's culture will be removed, not when science has been fully accepted, but in the process of introducing it into society.

Dewey's description of shared experience recognizes "the office of religion as sense of community and one's place in it."<sup>156</sup> A community is comprised of persons who so appreciate the character and actions of other people with whom they are striving toward common and social goals, mutually agreed upon, that they discover emotional ties existing between themselves and these other individuals with whom they are cooperating. The community morality is based upon genuine interest in others and includes sympathy, trust and commitment.

(5) Shared experience involves personal growth because the individual identifies himself with the common goal as well as with other persons who are working with him toward its attainment. The communicant or participant is changed in making the goal his ideal. In accepting a social goal and social unity as the ideal, the individual contributes to his own unity. Personal growth is limited by the degree of unity present in the environment of the person concerned. Ident-

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155. Art.(1945)<sup>1</sup>, xvii-xviii.

156. HNC, 330.





fication involves the emotions. Science is not unemotional; it is trained emotionalism. Personal emotions may become entangled with group efforts and aims.

When the individual is busily engaged in using his talents, understanding his work, and having pleasant social relations with foreman and fellow-worker, then he is, as the saying goes, "identified" with his job. He likes his work, he is absorbed in it, he is productive.<sup>157</sup>

In this way the group aim becomes a part of the personality of the worker.

This is ego-involvement rather than task-involvement. The involvement which is made possible through acceptance of a common end means that the break between society and the individual is not a sharp or clear-cut one. The function of this process of identification with goals is illustrated well by Leighton in his report of life in Japanese-American relocation centers. According to his summary, the Nisei were asked to pick cotton on nearby ranches to help save the crop but very few responded because they were expected to donate all wages above sixteen dollars a month to a community trust fund, to be used for the common good. This was, however, too vague and distant a goal for them. They argued about whether the work should be done, while the cotton stood in the field. At this point the schools asked to be allowed to pick and use the money for school improvements. As soon as this request was granted, church groups, recreational societies, and other

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157. Allport, Art.(1945), 122.





community units became interested and worked out arrangements on the same basis. The project was a success.<sup>158</sup>

"Non-participation in the direction of the world done by men and women breeds indifferent, routine, and passive minds."<sup>159</sup> "Character development...needs creative expansion through imaginative living in realms untrod by the feet of man."<sup>160</sup> This is offered by the ideal of shared experience, which "demands the fullest possible development of personality in all--irrespective of birth, wealth, creed, or race--through coöperative association with others, and mutual understanding and consent."<sup>161</sup> There is "a psychological factor involved, that of modifying the attitudes of workers by making them feel that they have some participating share in a large scheme of development'[sic]".<sup>162</sup> "A new and effective morale" can be expected from experience in which human associations play an important part.<sup>163</sup>

The fact that participation effects a change in the participant means that the process is educative.

Education...is a process of social interaction carried on in behalf of consequences which are themselves social--

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158. Reported in Allport, Art.(1945), 123-124.

159. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 58.

160. Hart, Art.(1929), 116, presenting Dewey's view.

161. Dewey and Watson, Art.(1937), 333.

162. Art.(1930)<sup>4</sup>, 338.

163. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 32. Association means nothing except in reference to specific modes [Art.(1938)<sup>8</sup>, 164].





that is, it involves interactions between persons and includes shared values.<sup>164</sup>

"The purpose of the public school is to concentrate upon the fundamental elements in the community of our national life."<sup>165</sup> Especially notable in the history of American schools has been the way in which they have served as a source of sympathy for immigrants.<sup>166</sup> Education in shared experience is the "socialized strand in educational philosophy,"<sup>167</sup> which Dewey has developed over a period of several decades. Political<sup>168</sup> and economic<sup>169</sup> arrangements may also serve as educative in the same way as may schools.

In becoming intelligent, individuals transform their characters. Not only are techniques made more successful, but also ends are tested by their practicality, coherence, and social promise. The intelligent adoption and pursuit of ideals improves habitual practice, character.

(6) Finally, shared experience broadens and deepens the life of appreciation. It does so by revealing the way in which persons and objects are related to the religious ideal.

True interests are signs that some material, object, mode of skill (or whatever) is appreciated on the basis

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164. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 290.

165. Art.(1923)<sup>2</sup>, 452.

166. Art.(1923)<sup>2</sup>, 449.

167. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 33n.

168. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 228.

169. Art.(1928)<sup>4</sup>, 3; Art.(1931)<sup>5</sup>, 205.





of what it actually does in carrying to fulfillment some mode of action with which a person has identified himself. Genuine interest, in short, simply means that a person has identified himself with, or has found himself in, a certain course of action. Consequently he is identified with whatever objects and forms of skill are involved in the successful prosecution of that course.<sup>170</sup>

Devotion to an ideal is "catching" to the extent that any means used in arriving at that objective will themselves be "imbued with all the emotional force that attaches to the ends proposed for action, and...accompanied with all the excitement and inspiration that attends the struggle."<sup>171</sup>

Means are transformed as a result of their use in moral and spiritual enterprises. This means that nature is seen as related to religious strivings. Persons recognize that they are "children of nature through an evolutionary pedigree."<sup>172</sup>

If the business of morals is not to speculate upon man's final end, and upon an ultimate standard of right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology and psychology to discover all that can be discovered of man, his organic powers and propensities. If its business is not to search for the one separate moral motive, it is to converge all the instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, education, economics and political science upon the construction of intelligent methods of improving the common lot.<sup>173</sup>

But it is not only, or even primarily, physical objects which

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170. IEE, 43.

171. LSA, 51. "The significance of geography is that it presents the earth as the enduring home of the occupations of man"(SS, 16). Every action of a sculptor in chipping stone takes on the meaning of the finished work of art because it is a necessary precondition (IEE, 26-27).

172. Smith, PWLA, 101.

173. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 21. Cf. ACF, 45-47, 76.





are enhanced in value.

This "constant, continuous intercommunion of both persons and goods"<sup>174</sup> results in "new and better experience," namely, "free interaction of individual human beings with surrounding conditions, especially the human surroundings."<sup>175</sup> Dewey argues that the experience of sharing is so attractive that, once it has been had, it will provide motivation to govern further behavior. "Vested prejudices, class interests are deeply rooted, but not as deeply rooted in the nature of things as the joy of discovery and communication."<sup>176</sup> The values of human association are self-generating and self-perpetuating. Fellowship means that men will not only have friends but will be friends. In such a world men could drop so many of their defenses that they would stand revealed to one another as the supreme objects of desire and enjoyment.<sup>177</sup>

Shared experience will also call for spiritual self-examination of such a nature that it will cause increased perceptivity. The most mundane activities may become meaningful in new ways.

Fellowship with others in a genuine community is a need for all men.

Men so crave the expansion and reinforcement which come from the agreements of understanding that they tolerate

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174. Art.(1917)<sup>3</sup>, 65.

175. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 227.

176. Art.(1924)<sup>1</sup>, 282.

177. Smith, PWLA, 93, summarizing Dewey's position.





and invent all kinds of substitute semblances. Surrender to a passing contagion of emotion; the deliberate working up of a common fear and hate (as in war); respect for external conventions; the repetition of formulae of religious creeds and political platforms; familiarity with like circumstances, however trivial; conjunction in an undertaking wherein each at bottom is pursuing his own private gain; servile docility in dragooning opinions; fanatic imposition of fidelity to the same phrases and symbols: all these serve as such substitutes for real understandings.<sup>178</sup>

Dewey finds the "worth and dignity of men and women, residing in human nature itself, in the connections, actual and potential, that human beings sustain to one another in the natural environment."<sup>179</sup> The religious ideal is creation of a community of

the humbleminded in all ages and places who live in the sense of the infinite ties, a few perceived but most of them obscure, which bind them to their fellows, to the soil, to the air and to the light of day, and whose strength to suffer and to enjoy is renewed daily by contact and by intercourse.<sup>180</sup>

As one critic wrote of this social religion,

life...achieves its richest significance when human beings undertake and undergo things together, with that conscious interplay of finding out each other's interests and views that attends a community of purpose. "Communication," in the sense of the power to use a vehicle of joint understanding, a common language, is the prerequisite of such shared and mutually directed activity; "communication," in the deeper sense of learning from joint experience with others how to enrich one's own understanding of things and to increase one's insight into the values to be found in living together in the human scene, is that perfected activity, that highest

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178. Art.(1927)<sup>4</sup>, xxi11.

179. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 9.

180. CE, I, 82.





possible functioning of human powers, toward the achievement of which all human action should aim.<sup>181</sup>

Shared experience is, then, the religious ideal.

Sharing is a complex project in which the following are essential parts:

- (i) A social ideal. The religious goal is social because basic problems are group problems. Personal unity demands social unity.
- (ii) Social discussion. Communication is an example of sharing and a prerequisite of further sharing because it is needed in the solving of group problems.
- (iii) Social action. Cooperation is required in order to fulfil common purposes, and at the same time it is an illustration of sharing.
- (iv) Community. In the process of communicating and cooperating with others who accept the same goal, there is identification with those other workers and the creation of a community spirit. Identification (participation, sharing) involves mutual commitment and faith as well as appreciation of one another's joys and sorrows.
- (v) Personal growth. At the same time there is identification with the religious ideal such that its characteristics become character traits.
- (vi) Appreciation. All persons and things are viewed in relation to the religious ideal and thus take on some of its attractiveness.

These characteristics are so integrally bound together that even this enumeration falsifies them somewhat. The analysis is given, however, in order to clarify the nature of the ideal.

It is important to note that shared experience, the religious ideal, is nothing other than intelligence or science viewed as end rather than as means. Intelligence is a method

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<sup>181</sup>. Randall, Art.(1940), 109.





which not only establishes community life as an ideal but also exemplifies it in daily practice. A description of science provides a prospectus of the spiritual life at its fullest. The illustration given here of the religious ideal is not final. It will vary with improvements in inquiry. Intelligence is self-corrective; it discards methods that fail to contribute to the solving of problems and adds new techniques that prove more successful.<sup>182</sup> "Shared experience" is science viewed as end, but this end is "end-in-view," not "close."<sup>183</sup> The scientific method is not the ultimate one. Although even Dewey himself appears at times to consider science a dogma,<sup>184</sup> he does so only to emphasize the fact that method is more primary than are conclusions. Methods are fluid and change to meet the requirements of problems as they arise. The religious ideal, therefore, is not presented as unchanging and fixed. It is an ideal which is attainable and which will benefit all reaches of experience when achieved.

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182. LOG, 5.

183. LOG, 158.

184. "Everyone...must be dogmatic at some point in order to get anywhere with other matters"[Art.(1927)<sup>8</sup>, 57]. Cf. QC, 223-253.





### CHAPTER III

#### THE COMMUNICANT

John Dewey's religious position has been sketched briefly. The religious ideal is the ordering of experience by means of intelligence. Use of intelligence is a social affair and a process in which individuals achieve spiritual goals. This is done in communicating with other persons faced with the same or similar problems, cooperating in working out solutions for those common problems, deciding upon common goals, and participating in the group effort to reach such goals. The use of intelligence is seen, thus, to be an end as well as a means, and the end is a religious one because it enhances personal and social values. In the present chapter, the personal benefits to be gained from acceptance of intelligence or science as a goal will be described, and in the next chapter the gains of society will be assessed.

##### A. "The Unity of the Human Being"

Once one is concerned with the positive features of religious life, one sees that they are strikingly personal. Human beings, as users of intelligence, are of prime importance for spiritual living.

The religious is "morality touched with emotion" only when the ends of moral conviction arouse emotions that





are not only intense but are actuated and supported by ends so inclusive that they unify the self.<sup>1</sup>

The "unity" of human beings is the goal which must be kept constantly in mind. Before personal unity or integrity can serve as an ideal or hypothesis directive of religious experience, however, specific content must be given to the common phrase, "the unity of the self." There are three assertions contained in this phrase as it is used by John Dewey.

First, the phrase, the unity of the human being, is a statement that a person cannot be understood when atomized.<sup>2</sup> This is one application of a general rule; the particular is known when its relations have been disclosed.<sup>3</sup> Dewey considers traditional empiricism to have become as sterile as its opponents because it forgot this principle. It falsely assumed that explanation was to be made by discovering component parts; the weakness lay in an inadequate conception of science. "Particularistic absolutism," which was the result, is as dangerous as any other type of absolutism. Explanation is the process of locating and describing a context.

Second, the "unity of the self" is also a rejection of dualism in any form--whether separating soul and body, body and mind, structure and function, brain and the rest of the

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1. ACF, 22.

2. Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 819; HNC, 38.

3. See below, Ch. IV, A.





body, central and autonomic nervous systems, or organism and environment.<sup>4</sup> The two dualisms which have been most dangerous are the first and the last of these. The former was the source of much religious dogmatism. The latter is one that is current today; the fight against it has only just begun. Either one forces acceptance of an intellectualistic philosophy and a passivistic religion. Human nature, though not now fully integrated, is at least potentially one.

Third, the "unity of a family or of a nation or of any social group lies in the fact that all members of the group are working together." In its positive sense, the "unity of the self" has this same meaning.<sup>5</sup> Thus unity signifies personal integration. It is a goal rather than a fact<sup>6</sup> and is to be achieved in the same way as any other personal change, by modifying the total situation of which the person is a part. This total situation cannot become so disorganized as

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4. Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 818-819.

5. Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 819-820.

6. Although in 1886 Dewey believed the self to be a unifier as well as--or in back of--the active and observable unity, according to Allport [Allport, Art.(1939), 267], eight years later he repudiated soul psychology. "If the stream of thought can run itself in one case (thought), the stream of thought may administer itself in the other (conduct)" [Art.(1894), 34On.]. For the next half century Dewey was concerned with learning details of this administration. The soul is consistently regarded as "a superstitious encumbrance" (EN, 294). Cf. Art.(1906), 40. It may be wondered whether Dewey's treatment of the self is adequate. Allport's conclusion is probably sufficiently restrained: "He deals...more adequately with the progressive shifts in personality than with its stability of structure"[Allport, Art.(1939), 276].





to completely shatter the personalities of its members, but its imperfections can seriously disrupt normal participation in society. Growth is to be effected through "allegiance to inclusive ideal ends."<sup>7</sup>

Unity is not achieved at the present time. There are divisive tendencies in western culture that prevent--or at least hinder--personal integration. Personality, as product of social influences,<sup>8</sup> is fractionized, distorted, partial. "The basic problem of present culture and associated living is that of effecting integration where division now exists."<sup>9</sup>

According to Dewey's analysis of personality as it exists in our society, social influences fall into certain recurrent patterns. One of these, and one of the most important, is the presence of competitive practices. "Competitive tendencies in human nature are stimulated to an excessive degree."<sup>10</sup> Our economics is one of scarcity, and so its symbol (money) suggests many of the faults present within it. It is a condemnation then when Dewey says, "We are living in a money culture. Its cult and rites dominate."<sup>11</sup>

Emphasis upon acquisition has intensified the motives which oppose to the greatest extent the tenor of all

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7. ACF, 24.

8. See below, Ch. IV, A.

9. LOG, 79.

10. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 57.

11. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 270. The "industrial and technological phase of our life...is...central and dominant"[Art.(1928)<sup>1</sup>, 273].





deliberate religious and moral teachings and created a state of ethical confusion and conflict.<sup>12</sup>

There is at large in the world today an idea that there is "an intimate relation between moral qualities and material reward."<sup>13</sup> This is so wide-spread that "materialism" is frequently used to signify an ethical theory rather than a metaphysical one,<sup>14</sup> though usually not very precisely. The present condition is not uncaused, of course. The "present over-zeal for material goods and prosperity may be the fruit of long ages in which man has been starved and oppressed."<sup>15</sup> If so, it can be understood even though not condoned. "Not till we have questioned the worth of a dominantly money-civilization shall we have a religion that is more than sentimental and verbal, and achieve an integrated life."<sup>16</sup>

This "materialistic" ethics is not, however, the only influence playing upon men. At the same time that they live and formulate their ideas in accordance with the standards of a competitive and acquisitive society, men are also taught that cooperative efforts and brotherly motives are required for social intercourse. This is also a strong

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12. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 55.

13. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 48.

14. "Devotion to the economic phase of life is materialism, and...so judged our civilization is materialistic"[Art.(1928)<sup>1</sup>, 274].

15. Art.(1928)<sup>2</sup>, 325.

16. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 271.





influence, and the combination of the two creates ambivalent attitudes.<sup>17</sup> "Never before in history has mankind been so much of two minds."<sup>18</sup> Dewey mentions "the most marked trait of our present state--namely, its inner tension and conflict."<sup>19</sup>

#### Individuals

are torn between the ethical and religious principles which instill regard for the common and public good, and conditions of economic life which compel exclusive regard for private good.<sup>20</sup>

We are living in a "house divided against itself."<sup>21</sup>

There are at least two resultant traits of modern society worthy of note. First, there is pessimism about human nature borrowed from past failures in integrating personalities and controlling society. An "integrated outlook and attitude"<sup>22</sup> has been thought impossible of achievement. "The chief intellectual characteristic of the present age is its despair of any constructive philosophy."<sup>23</sup> Order is "a courtesy name for the present chaos."<sup>24</sup> One important

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17. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 57.

18. ACF, 1.

19. Art.(1928)<sup>1</sup>, 257. See this article, throughout, for development in detail of the theme.

20. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 65-66.

22. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 33.

21. Title of Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>.

23. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 33.

24. Art.(1934)<sup>10</sup>, 60.





aspect of the situation is that the disorder is in part intentional. There is active opposition to change.<sup>25</sup> For example, the specialization to be mentioned is a technique used by "status quoticians" who hope to confine changes to small areas and so break up experience that radical influences will be less pervasive. The second characteristic of social arrangements and thinking today is specialization which allows the creation of logic-tight compartments within individuals and makes their interactions with their surroundings less thoroughgoing and hence less fruitful. This aspect may well be investigated in greater detail since it throws light on several pertinent matters.

Specialization has frequently been noted as one of the traits of Western society since the time of the industrial revolution. It is closely linked with improvements in methods of production and distribution, but it also is introduced as a reaction to certain intellectual needs. Dewey shows the similarity of this attitude to power politics, which abandons

hope of intrinsic cooperation and vainly attempts to secure harmony by assigning to unrelated powers such places and boundaries that each will at least prevent the undue encroachment of others.<sup>26</sup>

The same thing is done in intellectual life, where every type of activity--art, science, religion, industry and commerce, morals, politics--is to carry on its business

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25. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 476.

26. Art.(1927)<sup>4</sup>, xxiv.





apart.<sup>27</sup> "In our theory of life, we think by a policy of division and segregation and external checks to achieve order and wholeness."<sup>28</sup> This attitude is to be opposed everywhere. Religious experience, to mention but one example, "does not denote anything that can exist by itself or that can be organized into a particular and distinctive form of existence. It denotes attitudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal."<sup>29</sup>

The result of specialization is the "misintelligent" separation of theory from practice. Social scientists and philosophers confine themselves to "specialized fact-finding and isolated theorizing" to the exclusion of the execution of policies, and "practical executives in business and government" formulate policy unthinkingly.<sup>30</sup> This is a danger for scholars who insist upon intellectual liberty because, "paradoxically enough, a high degree of intellectual freedom in a narrow and technical line is in effect a restriction of intellectual freedom."<sup>31</sup> Freedom in a library, study, or laboratory is no substitute for freedom

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27. LOG, 508.

28. Art.(1927)<sup>4</sup>, xxiv.

29. ACF, 10.

30. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 66. Cf. LOG, 72-73, for background of the bifurcation.

31. Art.(1924)<sup>1</sup>, 281. This statement is extended to serve as basis for condemnation of splitting curriculums into subjects (WOEC, 4-5, and throughout).





in society. The isolation of science and philosophy from society has been so complete, however, that it is often taken to be a definitive aspect of these procedures. The fault has been partly the scholars'.

A cause for the aloofness of philosophy, and of the failure of the enormous achievements of modern science to make any serious impression upon general habits of thought and belief is that an unconscious protective reaction has led them into technical vocabularies and, except where discoveries have some obviously desirable practical application, into remote channels of effort.<sup>32</sup>

This specialization is particularly dangerous because it means that the control of social activities is not subjected to intelligent formulation and criticism.

Specialization is also the cause of substitution of training for education. Technical skill is given to individuals who are unable as a result of their training to see the reason for their activity.<sup>33</sup> "They thus readily become later in life passive instruments in execution of the plans and desires of others, perpetuating one of the evil features of our economic system."<sup>34</sup> "If the boy is to become an efficient workman he must comprehend his work in all its relations to science, to art, and to society in general.... The young workman who understand his trade in its scientific relations, its historical, economic and social bearings, will

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32. Art.(1924)<sup>1</sup>, 281.

33. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 270; WOEC, 10-11, 16-21, 26-30.

34. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 301; cf. Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 70-72.





take a higher view of his trade, of his powers and duties as a citizen, and as a member of society."<sup>35</sup> The opposite effect is fostered today by the separation of vocational and classical high schools. The former train the student for a job in industry without providing him with an understanding of the relation of the industry to the rest of the culture, his job to that of other workers, and so on; the latter teach "culture" as something which exists unrelated to the activity of these economic workers. Dewey strongly opposes this tendency.

There is at least a possibility of increasing on the part of every worker his sense of the meaning of the activities that he is carrying on, so that more of his own ideas, thinking, will go into it.<sup>36</sup>

There are other forms which fractionization takes. For example, dividing schools into separate rooms and giving teachers specialized functions makes difficult or prevents "the unity and wholeness of the child's development."<sup>37</sup> The same thing applies on a different level to teacher education.<sup>38</sup> "Pure" science is separated from "applied" science.<sup>39</sup> Jane Addams reflected John Dewey's attitude when she referred to

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35. Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 72, quoting ex-superintendent of Chicago schools Cooley's summary of statement by Kerschensteiner, superintendent of Munich schools.

36. Art.(1930)<sup>4</sup>, 340.

37. Art.(1903)<sup>4</sup>, 433.

38. Art.(1904)<sup>1</sup>.

39. LOG, 489.





"those invisible walls which so stubbornly separate one academic department from another. There is nothing in all creation like it, excepting the unbreakable division between the different departments of the United States Government."<sup>40</sup>

Most social institutions are now so organized that workers in them lack purpose and intelligent perspective. Both in school and in industry external demands upon attention lead to divided attention--effort sufficient to satisfy requirements (and no more) is expended upon the imposed task, and the rest of the energy is spent in day-dreaming.<sup>41</sup> Specialization is a prime evil; it is that lack of unity which is posed as the original problem for spiritual effort.

This specialization--and especially the separation of theory and practice--has been closely related historically to the separation between economic and value concerns<sup>42</sup>--with subsequent refusal to control the former and failure to control the latter. There are many present analysts who consider the weaknesses of our present society to spring from the introduction of machinery and science. This is frequently noted by Dewey, but he terms the attitude superficial.<sup>43</sup> Instead, "the evils center about the principle of private

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40. Addams, Art.(1930), 144.

41. IEE, 7-13.

42. Art.(1946)<sup>2</sup>, 4-5.

43. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 271.





labor for private gain."<sup>44</sup> "What stands in the way is not a machine age, but the survival of a pecuniary age."<sup>45</sup> Put in this way it is manifest that the difficulty lies in the ways of thinking which govern the uses of science and machinery rather than in the presence of these two innovations. "The machine is harnessed to the dollar."<sup>46</sup> Science is essentially social, but economic control has been private. This privacy of control has meant that the advance of science met determined resistance from the representatives of established institutions who felt their prestige was bound up with maintenance of old beliefs and round their class-control of others being threatened.<sup>47</sup>

The general conclusion must be that opposition rather than lethargy is what prevents social order from replacing the present chaos. The opposition is from vested economic interests. Specialization and fractionization are seen as intended substitutes for world order.

Science is endured and even highly approved as long as it is confined to providing more effective means for accomplishing results that are in harmony with the inherited scheme of cultural values. It is distrusted and feared when it threatens to influence and to alter the old system of ends, instead of limiting itself to supplying better means for realizing them.<sup>48</sup>

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44. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 59.

45. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 271. Cf. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 484-485, and Coons, ICDP, throughout.

46. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 271.

47. Art.(1945)<sup>2</sup>, 4-5.

48. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 476.





The resistance has been, for the most part, not against the introduction of machinery, but against the adoption of new social beliefs which are consonant with the fact of industrialization. This, then, results in further personal disorganization and hypocrisy.

Nothing gives us Americans the horrors more than to hear that some misguided creature in some low part of the earth preaches what we practise--and practise much more efficiently than anyone else--namely, economic determinism.<sup>49</sup>

The whole result has been to foist the blame upon science.

"'Natural' science has been identified with physical science in a sense in which the physical is set over against the human."<sup>50</sup> The only reason that this seems reasonable is that the restrictions placed upon use of science prevent such reasonable use of the new instrument as it might itself devise.

The present section has located the problems of religious experience as being personal. At the present time social arrangements and beliefs are of such a nature as to continue and increase fractionization of persons. What is required is personal unity in a harmonious society. This merely specifies the problem.

The conception of a social harmony of interests in which the achievement by each individual of his own freedom should contribute to a like perfecting of the powers of all, through a fraternally organized society, is the

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49. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 270; cf. this article throughout.

50. Art.(1945)<sup>2</sup>, 6.





permanent contribution of the industrial movement to morals--even though so far it be but the contribution of a problem.<sup>51</sup>

### B. "Education as a Religion"

Current attitudes prevent the establishment of social order and the achievement of personal unity. Attitudes, accordingly, are of primary importance in the consideration of these problems. Education is concerned with changing attitudes and is religious in as far as it can introduce integrated, socialized persons. Human relationships and institutions are modifiable, and science, both in its specific findings and in its general method, is an addition to experience which will make possible the creation of new beliefs and arrangements for the fuller exploitation of human potentialities.<sup>52</sup> In this process it aids in the construction of a social philosophy--a "system of general ideas used by men to justify and to criticize the fundamental conditions under which they live."<sup>53</sup> The change will come about through the establishment of an education which, by being more realistic and scientific, will promote greater individuality than has been the case hitherto.

There is only one way out of the existing educational confusion and drift. That way is the definite substitution of a social purpose, controlling methods of teaching and

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51. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 15.

52. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 23-24.

53. FC, 23.





discipline and materials of study, for the traditional individualistic aim. And, in the schools as in society generally, that change will signify more genuine development of individuality for the mass of individuals. For, in the first place, it signifies the substitution of methods of inquiry and mutual consultation and discussion for the methods of imposition and inculcation.<sup>54</sup>

"Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature."<sup>55</sup> Education is "a process of discovering what values are worth while and are to be pursued as objectives."<sup>56</sup>

Integration or adjustment is possible, but it must be brought about in certain specific ways. Thus,

to expect thoroughgoing character conversion in adult life of a man who comes from a narrow family and journeys toward a patriotic grave for a typical state is in all truth to expect a miracle.<sup>57</sup>

"Belief in a sudden and complete transmutation through conversion and in the objective efficacy of prayer, is too easy a way out of difficulties."<sup>58</sup> It is superstitious. What is needed is education, "the process of realization of integrated individualities."<sup>59</sup> The change is an intellectual one forced upon us by changes in cultural facts. It is a "transitional unbalance," and a "sane equilibrium" may be

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54. ESO, 8.

55. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 223.

56. SSE, 74.

57. Smith, PWLA, 99, summarizing Dewey's position.

58. ACF, 47.

59. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 291.





achieved again.

The prodigal may return to his father's house bringing with him a wisdom gathered in his own experience, not with mere reiteration of precepts forced upon him from without.<sup>60</sup>

The education which will adequately solve this problem is education in scientific method. "A community wherein cooperative intelligence is steadily used in behalf of promotion of a shared culture will eliminate this deep division in life."<sup>61</sup> Education will make possible the integration of cultural values with "the purposes of the common life."<sup>62</sup>

The chief problem is one of making life more meaningful to the individual.

It is our social problem now, even more urgent than in the time of Plato, that method, purpose, understanding, shall exist in the consciousness of the one who does the work that his activity shall have meaning to himself.<sup>63</sup>

This can best be done by allowing personal needs, drives, interests, and abilities to determine the nature of the education. The integration must use, then, those energies and interests available to the individual; otherwise the desired advance is impossible and only wishfully sought. The nature of the mind and of thinking are relatively unknown, but it

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60. Art.(1928)<sup>2</sup>, 325.

61. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 65-66.

62. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 65-66.

63. SS, 21.





should be possible to indicate in at least general terms what capacities are present and relevant to religious living. Dewey mentions "instincts" or "impulses" which are present in children and which might be utilized by this religious education. The needed type of person will be created by the fullest development of the normal "interest in conversation, or communication; in inquiry, or finding out things; in making things, or construction; and in artistic expression."<sup>64</sup> At another point the interests to which one may appeal in education are given as interest in learning how to use one's physical body,<sup>65</sup> in learning how to use tools,<sup>66</sup> in thinking,<sup>67</sup> and in establishing personal relationships.<sup>68</sup> In still another place Dewey writes, "The two dominant impulses of youth are toward activity and toward some kind of collective association."<sup>69</sup>

The presence of these impulses points the way to realistic personal integration. These interests are proved existent by the actual behavior of children, and it is doubtful whether there is any empirical meaning to them except as

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64. SS, 45; cf. 42-45.

65. IEE, 67-74.

66. IEE, 74-81.

67. IEE, 81-84.

68. IEE, 84-88.

69. Art.(1934)<sup>7</sup>, 58.





they serve to describe personal activity and allow predictions of future action. The whole approach, however, reminds one that personality exists only in interaction with its environment and develops in response to frustrations imposed upon its striving to meet felt needs. "Intelligence becomes a power only as it is integrated into a system of wants, of effective demands."<sup>70</sup> "Needs, wants and desires are always the moving force in generating creative action,"<sup>71</sup> and even in more theoretical realms, "a philosophic faith, being a tendency to action, can be tried and tested only in action."<sup>72</sup> The evoking and creating of interests are matters of personal growth. Interest "is the antithesis of emotional seizure, existing only when an adjustment is well coordinated, when conflict--and hence emotion--are virtually absent."<sup>73</sup> The potentialities of religious living are those of personal experience itself.

The religious problem is that of realizing these possibilities; a guide must be presented for making experiences religious. No better point could serve as start than the problems imposed by an industrial society in which

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70. Art.(1934)<sup>6</sup>, 307.

71. LSA, 89.

72. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 35.

73. Allport's summary of Dewey's psychology, Art.(1939), 268. Note that emotional "seizures" only are opposed by interests. The latter must be fully integrated with emotions of a healthier nature.





specialization is an important fact and one that causes personal disintegration.

Since mental and moral disorder is due to splitting up the whole personality, and to exaggerating some of the split-off fragments, suppressing or minimizing other parts, the recognition by science of the integral and total constitution of personality is of great educational and social value. Unless we recognize it in theory, we shall not strive to realize it in practice.<sup>74</sup>

Lack of integration is overcome only in a new synthesis of the total situation, personal and environmental. This is adjustment, which involves

changes in ourselves in relation to the world in which we live that are...inclusive and deep seated. They relate not to this and that want in relation to this and that condition of our surroundings, but pertain to our being in its entirety. Because of their scope, this modification of ourselves is enduring....There is a composing and harmonizing of the various elements of our being such that, in spite of changes in the special conditions that surround us, these conditions are also arranged, settled, in relation to us.<sup>75</sup>

The adjustment is not an adjustment to, but an adjustment of prevailing conditions--personal, social, and physical.<sup>76</sup>

Modification of beliefs and surroundings is a religious matter, and thus education in science is religious education.

"It is possible to approach the subject of religious instruction in the reverent spirit of science."<sup>77</sup> Dewey

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74. Art.(1929)<sup>4</sup>, viii.

75. ACF, 16.

76. Psychology becomes religious because religious experience involves permanent and basic modification of personality and psychology is a means to this change. See, e.g., Art.(1903)<sup>1</sup>.

77. Art.(1903)<sup>2</sup>, 66.





asserts, "I have enough faith in the depth of the religious tendencies of men to believe that they will adapt themselves to any required intellectual change."<sup>78</sup> What is needed, more specifically, is "faith in promotion of shared values and devotion to a constantly growing and valid method of experimentation."<sup>79</sup> This is made possible by certain forms of association and community life, and education is the means of promoting these forms.<sup>80</sup>

The true object of faith is science or intelligence; "there is such a thing as faith in intelligence becoming religious in quality."<sup>81</sup> Therefore, education (in the broad sense of inculcating intelligence rather than the narrow one of existing institutions<sup>82</sup>) is the only adequate religion. "Growth itself is the only moral end."<sup>83</sup> Its hopes cannot be completely justified, but compared with other objects of faith, it is ascertainably valuable.<sup>84</sup> Some "faith that

78. Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 20. "Powerful present enemies of democracy can be successfully met only by the creation of personal attitudes in individual human beings"[Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 223].

79. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 66. "Cooperation--called fraternity in a classic French formula--is as much a part of the democratic ideal as is personal initiative"(FC, 22).

80. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 291.

81. ACF, 26; cf. 57, 79.

82. Art.(1922)<sup>3</sup>, 65.

83. RIP, 177.

84. Art.(1922)<sup>3</sup>.





outruns sight" is necessary,<sup>85</sup> and

there have been many worse objects of faith and hope than the ideal possibilities of the development of human nature, and more harmful rites and cults than those which constitute a school system.<sup>86</sup>

Making religious growth an educational matter does not, in spite of the individualistic strand in American education, make religion private. The teacher is a person occupied with other persons. His aims and methods are "practical, are social, are ethical, are anything you please--save merely psychical."<sup>87</sup> Though it is true that "all behavior proceeds through individual human beings,"<sup>88</sup> it is equally true that the distinction between individual and society is a false one.<sup>89</sup> Because an individual can be dissociated from any group, it is wrongly thought that he can be separated from all groups.

Apart from unconditioned reflexes, like the knee-jerk, it may be questioned whether there is a single human activity or experience which is not profoundly affected by the social and cultural environment.<sup>90</sup>

"The genuine problem is that of adjusting groups and individuals

85. The progress of science has depended upon formulations of hypotheses that required a radical change in the structure of the whole corpus of scientific knowledge [Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 478-479].

86. Art.(1922)<sup>3</sup>, 64.

87. Art.(1900)<sup>1</sup>, 117.

88. PIP, 17; cf. 75.

89. See Ch. IV for discussion of social aspects of religion.

90. Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 825.





to one another."<sup>91</sup> The conflict between liberalism and conservatism is always concretely embodied as "a struggle between groups and classes of individuals,"<sup>92</sup> between haves and have-nots. One commentator summarized this by saying that for Dewey,

selfishness is never pure egoism, but at worst small-groupism. Indeed, the whole line of thought makes possible a continuity of understanding between egoism<sup>93</sup> and altruism, between selfishness and unselfishness.

If education is religious, both must be considered social.

There are ambivalent attitudes toward education. On the one hand education is accepted as a cure-all, but on the other hand human nature is considered to be unchanging and unchangeable.<sup>94</sup> Dewey's own position is much closer to the former of these attitudes. Philosophy of education is, at least, the most important branch of philosophy.<sup>95</sup> The most powerful interests and institutions with which twentieth century men concern themselves are economic. Therefore, particularly pertinent today is "a reorganization of the economic system, a reconstruction in which education has a great part to play."<sup>96</sup>

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91. PIP, 191. Cf. 186-191, 13-14; Beach, GST, 204.

92. PM, 96.

93. Smith, PWLA, 97.

94. Art.(1922)<sup>3</sup>, 63.

95. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 475.

96. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 68.





It is at this point that the connection between the changes in the existing social order that are necessary to realize our traditional American ideals and the work of education becomes evident. Legislation and administration are the direct and overt means by which social arrangements are changed. But change in the minds of great numbers of people, change in their habits of thought, in their beliefs, their desires and purposes, their hopes and fears, are prerequisites of change effected by political means. These necessary preliminary changes are brought about by education.<sup>97</sup>

Salvation is by education.

Given a faith in education, "the first act...is a conviction of sin and act of repentance as to the institutions and methods which we now call educational."<sup>98</sup> Education as a present institution is not ideal, but it possesses within itself the principles and potentialities which will have to be used for the creation of a better world. Progress is possible only through gradual change of human beings and their institutions, a change which is effected most readily through various educative processes.

Education is confined to changes within experience. It can never expect help from beyond experience. Both human beings and their ideals are to be found in experience. "The course and material of experience give support and stay to life, and...its possibilities provide all the ends and ideals that are to regulate conduct."<sup>99</sup> The materials and methods

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97. Art.(1936)<sup>2</sup>, 328.

98. Art.(1922)<sup>3</sup>, 65. Cf. Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 70.

99. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 21. Cf. Art.(1924)<sup>1</sup>, 280.





for making experience religious are found within experience, but at the same time inadequacies and problems are also experienced. As another observer writes, "Spiritual experience starts with the assumption that the world is unsatisfactory and human nature as it is, is unideal."<sup>100</sup> The whole enterprise is one of selecting some eventualities as desirable and rejecting others as unwanted. Dewey's description of religious experience has been described as "bringing to birth in concrete form of these goods that are 'relatively embryonic'."<sup>101</sup>

Education is the means by which changes are made in human nature, and the process involves changes in economic and social institutions and arrangements. Education is humanitarian in the long run. For example, the movement for federal aid to education is the obverse of prior movements to outlaw child labor.<sup>102</sup> The emphasis upon social institutions should not be interpreted as meaning that the change is institutional and not personal. Human beings and institutions are bound together inextricably and, as has been pointed out above, men can be separated from an institution, but not from all institutions. "Social cannot be opposed in fact or in idea to individual. Society is individuals-

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100. Radhakrishnan, Art.(1944), 19.

101. Wieman and Meland, APR, 280.

102. Art.(1917)<sup>3</sup>, 61-62. Cf. Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 69.





in-their relations. An individual apart from social relations is a myth--or a monstrosity."<sup>103</sup> Personal integration, then, involves social change.

The picture of spiritual living which results from this whole approach is one of personal growth through the creation and maintenance of ideals.

Success and failure are the primary "categories" of life; achieving of good and averting of ill are its supreme interests; hope and anxiety (which are not self-enclosed states of feeling, but active attitudes of welcome and wariness) are dominant qualities of experience.<sup>104</sup>

In the act of passing judgments and making choices, something is done to alter the state of things.<sup>105</sup> "Only action can change things in the direction of unity and stability."<sup>106</sup>

Valuation involves specifically a change in the relation between the value and the valuer. This modification is

a change from relative distance or absence to possession and presence; from insecurity to security, from unreadiness to readiness, from de facto appropriation or assimilation to an assimilation recognized to be the fruit or end-term of the activity--the choice and preference--of the subject.<sup>107</sup>

Mere contemplation is never religious; it always requires to be supplemented--or rather, completed, by action.

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103. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 291. Cf. PIP, throughout.

104. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 13.

105. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 13.

106. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 472.

107. Art.(1925)<sup>4</sup>, 325.





Religion has often been considered a type of relaxation, an undisturbed rest, a release from responsibilities. But this "eternal sleep" is unattainable in religion as in other fields--as is recognized even in religious experience, "wherever religion is not hopelessly at the mercy of a Frankenstein philosophy which it originally called into being as its own slave."<sup>108</sup> Religion is concerned with morality and "all moral judgments are about changes to be made."<sup>109</sup> In one of the most pregnant sentences in all his works, Dewey, borrowing from the language of Aristotle, says, "The philosophy which tries to escape the form of generation by taking refuge under the form of eternity will only come under the form of a by-gone generation."<sup>108</sup>

Reverting to the religious interpretation of education, it is clear that the same type of statement can be made about it. Notice, for example, Dewey's condemnation of teachers that are "tired" and retiring and inactive in Teachers Union and American Association of University Professors activities.<sup>110</sup> This activism points to a life which is dynamic and developing. The action involved is not completely determined by ends that are fixed and final. If it were, it would be the action possible in a "block universe." The activity

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108. Art.(1908)<sup>1</sup>, 79.

109. Art.(1908)<sup>1</sup>, 64.

110. Art.(1928)<sup>6</sup>, 3.





then would be nothing but technical efficiency. "Such action is mechanical (or becomes so), no matter what the scope of the preformed end, be it the Will of God or Kultur."<sup>111</sup>

It is for this reason that Dewey considers his conception more idealistic than most of the traditional idealisms have been, for it refuses to take for granted the end or ends toward which it is striving.

An unedified idealism which pictures the universe as already dominated by mind or intelligence does not require further intelligent action. A theory of the cosmos in which good is already existent does not require further moral endeavor on the part of human beings. Such idealism--not all idealisms are of this sort--is "a narrow pragmatism."<sup>112</sup>

Morality is made necessary when values are not present or assured, and it is made profitable when those same values are considered attainable through the use of intelligence. Dewey's religious activism<sup>113</sup> is directed toward alteration of social arrangements and institutions in order to meet the needs of a new perspective upon man. Religion makes a difference. Commenting on Santayana's discussion of poetry and religion, Dewey admits that both are imaginative but says the difference is just as important as the similarity; the difference is that "poetry is called religion when it intervenes in life."<sup>114</sup>

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111. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 63.

112. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 29.

113. Wieman and Meland, APR, 280.

114. ACF, 17-18.





The religious ideal is the unification of human beings around goals that are intelligent and social. This ideal can be achieved only through education in science and its application to the greatest problems with which men are confronted. It is a slow and often a tedious process. It occurs within experience and uses whatever materials are available--from personal impulses that are innate in individuals to institutional arrangements that exist in present-day society. The goal that the educator has in mind is the creation of socialized intelligence which will integrate the individual within himself and within society. The communicant is spiritualized at the same time as is the community to which he belongs. The result is religious because it involves character changes.

### C. "Freedom and Culture"

There are many changes to be noted in men who have become intelligent, unified, integrated. These changes are signs of growth and important events in spiritual biography. In this section the problem will be to determine the way in which full acceptance of scientific method changes the "scientist" or the use of intelligence changes the "participant." Dewey's "psychology is devoted to showing that shared experience is possible and how, and his ethics is devoted to portraying its beauty and reward."<sup>115</sup> The

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115. Smith, PWLA, 93-94.





following are features of personality which appear or are augmented in a scientific society.

Personal health is improved. Health is a very important matter. The teacher's "whole end and aim" is the health of the students with whom he works, and teachers and doctors are among the most important of workers because of the directness of their concern with health.<sup>116</sup> Full acceptance of science will spread the range of use of medical discoveries already made and the range of those still to be made,<sup>117</sup> but this is not the half of the story. Health is a matter of the whole of human beings, not just their bodies; the psychical, mental, emotional, or spiritual elements in health are increasingly to the fore in health research. Here intelligence is relevant.

Science...has made the control of natural forces for the aims of life so inevitable, that for the first time man is relieved from overhanging fear, with its wolflike scramble to possess and accumulate, and is freed to consider the more gracious question of securing to all an ample and liberal life.<sup>118</sup>

Science is today only partially integrated into our culture; its benefits are more extensive than its use.

It is because, alas, engineering makes only a formal and not a real connection between physics and the practical workingmen in the mills that our industrial problem is an ethical problem of the most serious kind. The question of the amount of wages the laborer receives, of the purchasing power of this wage, of the hours and conditions

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116. Art.(1900)<sup>1</sup>, 116; Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>.

117. Art.(1942)<sup>1</sup>

118. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 13-14.





of labor, are, after all, secondary. The problem primarily roots in the fact that the mediating science does not connect with his consciousness, but merely with his outward actions.<sup>119</sup>

Science, as the source of personal unity, has a unique contribution to make.

Participation in a cooperative activity will arouse the interests and emotions of all people and increase their happiness. Emotions cannot remain unchanged while intelligence is being used.

The idea that people have ever been emotionally indifferent in the degree in which they are intellectually aroused is contradicted by the facts of all productive intellectual activity.<sup>120</sup>

Feeling may be static, but interest is dynamic, it is always "taking interest."<sup>121</sup> In speaking, at the celebration of his seventieth birthday, of his own career, Dewey said, "One of the conditions of happiness is the opportunity of a calling."<sup>122</sup> Following the lead of one's interests causes one to be happy.

The emotional accompaniment of the progressive growth of a course of action, a continual movement of expansion and of achievement, is happiness;--mental content or peace, which when emphatic, is called joy. Persons, children or adults, are interested in what they can do successfully, in what they approach with confidence and engage in with a sense of accomplishment. Such happiness or interest is not self-conscious or selfish; it is a sign of developing power and of absorption in what is being done.<sup>123</sup>

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119. Art.(1900)<sup>1</sup>, 111.

120. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 315.

121. IEE, 16.

122. Art.(1930)<sup>6</sup>, 177.

123. IEE, 35-36.





This happiness is more complex than mere pleasure,<sup>124</sup> or, put in other words, it is pleasure of activity rather than pleasure from contact.<sup>125</sup> Happiness is but one part of "a new morale of confidence, control, and security."<sup>126</sup>

Faith in the varied possibilities of diversified experience is attended with the joy of constant discovery and of constant growing. Such a joy is possible even in the midst of trouble and defeat, whenever life-experiences are treated as potential disclosures of meanings and values that are to be used as means to a fuller and more significant future experience.<sup>127</sup>

Science increases health through improving morale and bringing happiness; it does this by making direction of experience possible and meaningful. Religion is thus "joyful emancipation."<sup>128</sup>

But even this is not the whole story. Science is co-operative activity, and this fact also is related to healthiness. The tragedy today is that "the individual is lost in this chaos of impersonal, uncontrolled forces."<sup>129</sup> Present insecurity reduces both efficiency and happiness.<sup>130</sup> The restricted use of science has created selfishness, and "unbridled selfishness, in the long run, spoils all the fun of

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124. IEE, 35.

125. IEE, 12-13.

126. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 24.

127. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 27-28.

128. HNC, 331.

129. Coons, ICDP, 62.

130. Dewey and Watson, Art.(1937), 343.





the game and makes impossible that deep feeling of satisfaction known to the creative, socialized mind."<sup>131</sup> The correction of this situation is made by taking an interest in, understanding, and controlling industrial and political affairs.<sup>132</sup> This social control, especially of industry, will release emotional energies of individuals.<sup>133</sup> Emotions are expansive rather than restrictive in a cooperative and scientific society. Such emotions are necessary to and present in health. Health, therefore, is bettered by adoption of scientific discoveries but--even more so--by acceptance of science or intelligence as a way of life. The improvement is in the direction of society and in the integration of personal emotions.

Individuality, unity, freedom, and resourcefulness are introduced and increased with use of science. Personality is capable of great changes. "The ultimate refuge of the stand-patter in every field, education, religion, politics, industrial and domestic life, has been the notion of an alleged fixed structure of mind."<sup>134</sup> Human beings are radically changed through use of scientific method. Fully intelligent living results in "that release and utilization of

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131. Coons, ICDP, 55, stating Dewey's view as expressed in DE.

132. ION, 51-73.

133. ION, 134-135, 142-143.

134. Art.(1917)<sup>10</sup>, 273.





individuality which will bring it to full maturity."<sup>135</sup>  
 The goal is to "educate every individual into the full stature of his possibility."<sup>136</sup> Individuality is activity that "calls for positive virtues--energy, initiative and originality"<sup>137</sup> in place of "the colorless, negative virtues of obedience, docility, and submission."<sup>138</sup> Incentive is increased when the individual has a specific job to do.<sup>139</sup>

Most of all the use of a socialized intelligence enables one "to project new and more complex ends."<sup>140</sup> "The essence of...[intellectual] individuality is to set up ends and aims."<sup>141</sup>

Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action, is the pragmatic lesson.<sup>142</sup>

The mind is then "creative, socialized." Creativity is not allied to initiating ideas and activities to the exclusion of executing those plans and projects. "Only when, and as the...[method] becomes clear during the serial process of

135. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 72.

136. RIP, 186.

137. SOT, 298.

138. SOT, 297.

139. SOT, 296-299.

140. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 63.

141. Art.(1929)<sup>7</sup>, 180. Cf. LOG, 78.

142. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 63.





execution does the project and guiding aim and plan become evident and articulated."<sup>143</sup>

Responsible intelligence will be substituted for "routine and caprice,"<sup>144</sup> either one of which is a "division of energies."<sup>145</sup>

Only when an activity is monotonous does happiness cease to attend its performance, and monotony means that growth, development, have ceased; nothing new is entering in to carry an activity forward. On the other hand, lack of normal occupations brings uneasiness, irritability, and demand for any kind of stimulation which will arouse activity--a state that easily passes into a longing for excitement, for its own sake.<sup>146</sup>

Intelligence can be introduced<sup>147</sup> and will bring with it "the spirit of reasonableness, fostered by social organization and contributing to its development."<sup>148</sup> The removal of bonds will not lead to licentiousness because authorities are being removed only in favor of intelligence and, when accepted as sole standard, the latter will be an "intelligence under bonds" imposed by "the necessity of doing well

143. Art.(1929)<sup>7</sup>, 182.

144. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 63.

145. IEE, 13.

146. IEE, 35-36.

147. Throughout his writings, Dewey remains unconcerned about intelligence as a capacity and individual differences in intelligence. "Individual differences in capacity are of far less consequence than is the fact that everyone can be taught to think more effectively than he does"[Allport, Art. (1939), 277n., stating Dewey's position]. Cf. Dewey, Art. (1935)<sup>1</sup>, 124; Art.(1934)<sup>4</sup>, 242.

148. LSA, 31.





this business, of making the right difference."<sup>149</sup>

The relationship between freedom and individuality is close.

Freedom consists in a trend of conduct such as causes choices to be more diversified and flexible, more plastic and more cognizant of their own meaning, while it enlarges their range of unimpeded operation.<sup>150</sup>

Dewey refers to "the very heart of actual freedom: freedom of thought."<sup>151</sup> Intelligence is the ability to use the present for the purposes of the future. "Inference, the use of what happens to anticipate what will--or at least may--happen, makes the difference between directed and undirected participation."<sup>152</sup> It measures the extent of one's "ability systematically to enlarge...control of the future."<sup>153</sup> This is precisely what is meant by freedom. Speaking of the influence of knowledge on people, Dewey says, "It must operate through their own ideas, plannings, observations, judgments."<sup>154</sup> Knowledge is sociological until internalized; then it becomes educational, psychological. It is obvious that at the present time, individuals in America are not free in this

149. Art.(1908)<sup>1</sup>, 56.

150. Art.(1928)<sup>3</sup>, 261.

151. Art.(1928)<sup>3</sup>, 269. Cf. QC, 250; Schneider, Art.(1944), 92.

152. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 22.

153. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 21.

154. SSE, 76. Cf. EN, 128. "People must have a hand in saving themselves; they cannot and will not be saved from the outside"[Allport, Art.(1945), 123].





sense. "Such phenomena as the Ku Klux Klan<sup>155</sup> and legislative activity to regulate science<sup>156</sup> show that the belief in liberty of thought is still superficial."<sup>157</sup>

Denial of reasonable freedom and attendant responsibility to any group produces conditions which can then be cited as reasons why the members of the group cannot<sup>158</sup> be entrusted with freedom and be given responsibility.

Social conditions will be changed readily once individuals have entered "into the ethical kingdom"<sup>159</sup> and become fully intelligent.

The problem of the constant remaking of the social order by making it more reasonable through embodying in it more and more definite knowledge, and the effort to build rationally controlled, intelligent and responsible persons is one and the same problem.<sup>160</sup>

Intelligence carries with it an implicit responsibility to use it rightly. The result is "a kind of individual freedom that is general and shared and that has the backing and guidance of socially organized intelligent control."<sup>161</sup>

The unity or integration of human beings is, then, greatest when they are intelligent. Whereas routineness is

155. Cf. Art.(1928)<sup>1</sup>, 259; Art.(1934)<sup>8</sup>, 11.

156. The reference is to "teachers' oath" laws [Art.(1934)<sup>8</sup>, 11], which were vigorously opposed by Dewey.

157. PIP, 51.

158. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 10.

159. Art.(1900)<sup>1</sup>, 111.

160. Beach, GST, 205, summarizing Dewey's thought.

161. PM, 101. Cf. 94, 105, 169-170.





"division of energies," "interest means a unified activity,"<sup>162</sup> activity that "involves growth or development."<sup>163</sup> Interest, self-direction, and integration go hand in hand. Efficiency, happiness, and social consciousness are the results. "Becoming active within the publics to which we belong, we find our own well-being."<sup>164</sup> Individuality is increased.

But increased individuality does not mean acquiescence in "ragged individualism." The relationship between the individual and his society is faulty because at the present time it is external and mechanical. The greatest evil in American life is "externalism." "The direct pursuit of happiness always ends in looking for happiness in possessions [sic]."<sup>165</sup> The workingman's job has no meaning to him, and he is forced, because of this, to motivate himself with private goals. He worries about wages when he could be concerning himself with ways of improving society as well as himself.<sup>166</sup> In Allport's words, individuals are implicated but do not participate, they are task-involved but not ego-involved.<sup>167</sup> In 1930, Dewey became one of the first of the many who have acclaimed

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162. IEE, 15.

163. IEE, 41.

164. Allport, Art.(1939), 286.

165. Art.(1930)<sup>6</sup>, 180.

166. Art.(1900)<sup>1</sup>, 111.

167. Allport, Art.(1945), 122.





the personnel studies at the Hawthorne plant of the Westinghouse Electric Company. Although they had been carried on for only a relatively short period when he wrote, he pointed out that they suggested that the worker takes an interest in his work just in so far as an interest is taken in him.<sup>168</sup>

As the Hawthorne experiments indicated, it was not only efficiency which was improved under changed personnel conditions; personal happiness and friendliness and energy were also increased markedly.<sup>169</sup> The Hawthorne experiments lead to general conclusions that have been substantiated in many other ways. Non-participants are recognized as "reactive," that is, aggressive, hostile, competitive.<sup>170</sup>

People who dislike a certain food are resistant to pressure put upon them in the form of persuasion and request; but when the individual himself as member of a group votes, after discussion, to alter his food-habits, his eagerness to reach this goal is independent of his personal like or dislike.<sup>171</sup>

The change required in participants is a moral one.

The self should be wise or prudent, looking to an inclusive satisfaction and hence subordinating the satisfaction of an immediately urgent single appetite; it should be faithful in acknowledgment of the claims involved in its relations with others; it should be solicitous, thoughtful, in the award of praise and blame, use of approbation and disapprobation, and, finally, should

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<sup>4</sup>  
168. Art.(1930)<sup>4</sup>, 339. Later findings of this project substantiate the prediction in spectacular fashion.

169. Roethlisberger and Dickson, MW, 255-604.

170. Allport, Art.(1945), 126.

171. Allport, Art.(1945), 125, reporting Lewin, Art.(1944), 195-200.





be conscientious and have the active will to discover new values and to revise former notions.<sup>172</sup>

Harmony between individual and environment is closely tied to harmony within each.<sup>173</sup> Personal aims are bound up with social aims, and the two will be furthered mutually by the introduction of science. "Only through the development of individuals in their voluntary cooperation with one another can the development of individuality be made secure and enduring."<sup>174</sup>

At the same time that social aims are freely accepted, the quality of work becomes better. In a genuine community, quality is the standard rather than quantity: "quality of work done--the genuine community standard of value."<sup>175</sup> The decision to do work well is, of course, an ethical one; a community, then, must be an environment which is able to effect profound changes in character. As a matter of fact, this is so. It illustrates that character is formed not so much by formal teaching as by everyday occurrences. Morality is influenced by all acts, not just a few special ones.<sup>176</sup>

Moral education of our children is in fact going on all of the time, every waking hour of the day and three hundred and sixty-five days a year. Every influence that

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172. ETH, 315. Italics in original.

173. Art.(1939)<sup>8</sup>, 55ln.

174. Art.(1939)<sup>3</sup>, 10.

175. SS, 13. Cf. Dewey and Watson, Art.(1937), 335.

176. Hart, Art.(1929), 115, summarizing Dewey's position.





modifies the disposition and habits, the desires and thoughts of a child is a part of the development of his character.<sup>177</sup>

"Character, in short, is something that is formed rather than something that can be taught as geography and arithmetic are taught."<sup>177</sup> Quality of work will be improved because the worker will identify the work as his, the responsibility as his, and the product as his. A scientific community makes no distinction between individual and society; therefore, each one has a proprietary interest, a deep interest, in everything that occurs and affects any part of "his" society.

Values of human association, sharing, and participation become increasingly evident in communities become scientific. To extend its range is "to humanize science,"<sup>178</sup> to introduce action designed to increase human values.

Study with others under equalizing conditions or work with others for results that are to be shared discovers to one social aptitudes in himself and unsuspected abilities and attractions in others. Social feelings and capabilities arise out of democratic education, and the making of goods, once the means are achieved and secured, seems less important than the making of men.<sup>179</sup>

Community, its creation and its preservation, is seen to be the source of highest enjoyment for the individual and is therefore sought at all costs. "The final issue of empirical method is whether the guide and standard of beliefs and conduct lies within or without the shareable situations of

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177. Art.(1934)<sup>7</sup>, 7.

178. Art.(1945)<sup>2</sup>, 8-9.

179. Smith, PWLA, 91, extending remarks by Dewey.





life."<sup>180</sup>

Appreciation will be possible toward a far greater number of objects, also. Individuality brings "calm, repose, and a sense of beauty."<sup>181</sup> Dewey speaks of "the peculiar well-being and rest in excitation, vitality in peace, which is characteristic of aesthetic enjoyment."<sup>182</sup> Human associations will be available as objects of appreciation, and this is highly important. But, in addition, whole areas of experience that have hitherto been considered "material" or "economic" will be seen to be related to the achievement of the highest ideals and therefore valuable.

Having had an experience of the meaning of certain technical processes and forms of skill there develops an interest in skill and "technique": the meaning of the result is "transferred" to the means of its attainment.<sup>183</sup>

Aesthetic appreciation is consummatory but not only that.

Anyone who reflects upon the commonplace that a measure of artistic products is their capacity to attract and retain observation with satisfaction under whatever conditions they are approached, has a sure demonstration that a genuinely aesthetic object is not exclusively consummatory, but is causally productive as well.<sup>184</sup>

Many objects of traditional appreciation are displaced because they are unrealistic, only the objects of "the untethered

180. EN, 38.

181. Art.(1930)<sup>6</sup>, 181.

182. Art.(1929)<sup>8</sup>, 69.

183. Art.(1929)<sup>7</sup>, 177. Cf. Art.(1928)<sup>2</sup>, 322; LOG, 42; QC, 306; Allport, Art.(1939), 284n., referring to Dewey, LOG.

184. Art.(1929)<sup>6</sup>, 7. Cf. Ames, Art.(1944), throughout.





flight." But, on the other hand, there is no claim that values are only economic. There is, in fact, no clear distinction between the economic and the ideal.<sup>185</sup>

Intelligent persons are, then, radically different. In creating a scientific society, men alter their own characteristics. "Whatever men make, they remake themselves in the process."<sup>186</sup> But at the same time, the nature of the change is such that the dichotomy between the individual and his society is seen to be false. Personality results from and affects broad reaches of experience.

Character development must be rooted in real experiences; it implies participation in wide ranges of real experiences; it needs broadening contacts with work, and play, and social interests; it needs creative expansion through imaginative living in realms untrod by the feet of man; it needs integration through the cultivation of analytic and constructive thinking; it needs the chance to practice and conserve its gains through experiences in actual areas of social and personal responsibility.<sup>187</sup>

Persons become, through full use of intelligence, healthy and creative individuals who freely choose the task of remaking society into a community of like-minded people who can appreciate to a greater extent the capabilities and actions of each other.

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185. See below, Ch. IV, B.

186. Smith, PWLA, 91.

187. Hart, Art.(1929), 116.





## CHAPTER IV

### THE COMMUNITY

Religious experience is any activity--whether connected with the historical religions or not--that makes possible personal integration. The "unity of the human being" is to be kept constantly in mind as a spiritual goal. The only effective means to this goal is the introduction of intelligence into the life of the individual. This would free him from external forces which have hitherto controlled his life, give him greater enjoyment from association with other people and from manipulation of physical things for religious purposes, and create for him a coherent social ideal.

At the same time, however, that the religious ideal is personal, it is also social. Personal unity, it has been mentioned, requires integration into a group of persons. It is this aspect of religion with which the present chapter will deal. The sharing of experience which is necessary to spiritual growth is social--participation with others in a common enterprise which demands scientific inquiry. "When persons arrive at an understanding, they come to agreement, and agreement is committal to a common cause: it is reciprocal





engagement and mutual confidence."<sup>1</sup> Society cannot be escaped, but it can be modified. Present modes of interaction can be replaced by others more conducive to religious living. Shared experience is the religious ideal stated in social terms. It demands the establishment of a community, a goal which is practicable as well as worthy.

#### A. "The Social as a Category"

Dewey's description of religious experience has a strong social cast, and so it is not surprising when he presents the idea that all experience, whether human or otherwise, is "social." "Associated or conjoint behavior is a universal characteristic of all existences."<sup>2</sup> Taking his position with respect to the relative merits of analysis and synopsis, Dewey illustrates his dependence upon Hegelian ways of thinking. The products of analysis (essences, data, etc.) are not ultimate or real.<sup>3</sup> A thing is what it does, and therefore is to be known "socially," that is, through the history of its interactions with other things.

To assume that anything can be known in isolation from its connections with other things is to identify knowing with merely having some object before perception or in

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1. Art.(1927)<sup>4</sup>, xxi.

2. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 161. Cf. LOG, 66-67.

3. As one of Dewey's critics wrote with respect to his psychology thirty years ago, the crucial point in the argument is whether sensations are real elements or products of analysis [Brown, Art.(1917), 246-247].





feeling, and is thus to lose the key to the traits that distinguish an object as known.<sup>4</sup>

"Science does not concern itself with the individualities of things. It is concerned with their relations."<sup>5</sup> The more its interactions, the more real (as opposed to potential) and knowable it is.<sup>6</sup> Every type of experience is investigated by unraveling threads of relatedness. Science puts facts "into coherent forms"<sup>7</sup> and seeks a "coherent and self-luminous system of meaning."<sup>8</sup> This does not mean that the relations that are discovered are or must be internal; external relations are not only conceivable but discoverable.

In spite, however, of the fact that all experience is associated, human relationships are of a unique type and therefore it is useful to distinguish human society from other forms. "By the social as a distinctive mode of association is denoted specifically human forms of grouping."<sup>9</sup> Consequently, as a category "the social is set apart from other categories such as the physical, the vital or organic, and the mental."<sup>10</sup> Dewey urges recognition of the social as a

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4. QC, 267. Cf. LOG, 511.

5. Art.(1928)<sup>3</sup>, 265.

6. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 162-163; QC, 267.

7. PM, 211. Cf. 212-215; LOG, 156-157.

8. EEL, 90.

9. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 163-164.

10. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 165.





category and states that it has not been generally so accepted as yet. He is not thinking in terms of a "group mind,"<sup>11</sup> for this would be nothing more than a reduction of social forms of association to mental ones; what he wants is an examination of social groupings and activities on their own terms. He thinks the effects of such a study would be far-reaching. The objective biological approach of Jamesian psychology--and he might add, the functional approach of his own--"led straight to the perception of the importance of distinctive social categories, especially communication and participation."<sup>12</sup> This perception will force a working over of much of current philosophizing, and, what is more, "the next synthetic movement in philosophy will emerge when the significance of the social sciences and arts has become an object of reflective attention."<sup>13</sup>

The social is "continuous with and inclusive of the categories of the physical, vital and mental."<sup>14</sup> Social phenomena "incorporate within themselves things associated in the narrower way which we term the physical" (tools, natural resources), organic (sex drives), and mental (thinking). But they also take the physical (wood to house), vital (sex to love), and mental (individual to citizen)

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11. PIP, 69-74.

12. Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 25-26.

13. Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 26.

14. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 167. Cf. LOG, 491-492.





up into a wider and more complex and delicate system of interactions so that [they] take on new properties by release of potentialities previously confined because of absence of full interaction.<sup>15</sup>

Language is the source of this transformation.<sup>16</sup> Though the social is not the whole of reality,<sup>17</sup> it is "the richest, fullest and most delicately subtle of any mode actually experienced"<sup>18</sup> and therefore the nearest thing to an ultimate methodological category.<sup>19</sup>

It is also true and worth reiterating that social affairs are natural; i.e., they may be known scientifically.<sup>20</sup> Their character is revealed more adequately in this experimental technique than in any other. A naturalistic ethics will not reduce man to animality because societies and men are just as natural as organic and physical things.<sup>21</sup> There is some reason for maintaining the opposite position, since historically the physical aspects of reality were first subjected to the scientific method, a factor which has led to "the tacit identification...of the natural sciences with the purely physical"<sup>22</sup> and has been the chief argument against calling

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15. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 169. Cf. 169-171.

16. LOG, 44, 46-47, 56, 57.

17. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 177.

18. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 164. Cf. 177

19. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, throughout, but esp. 177.

20. LOG, 487.

21. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 175-176.

22. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 165.





the social natural. In education, for example, the work done "in the name of science" has been largely concerned with the impersonal aspects of education and has "reduced personality as far as possible to impersonal terms" because they lend themselves most readily to factual and statistical treatment; a "non-social philosophy is implied" which when acted upon "becomes practically anti-social."<sup>23</sup> The sole recourse is to the extension of science so that human concerns are subjected to it. Only then may it be expected that direction of cultural and personal matters will be as successful as physical control is today.

The associations that are present in human society cannot be wholly escaped.

"Socialization" of some sort--that is, the reflex modification of wants, beliefs and work because of share in a united action--is inevitable. But it is as marked in the formation of frivolous, dissipated, fanatical, narrow-minded, and criminal persons as in that of competent inquirers, learned scholars, creative artists and good neighbors.<sup>24</sup>

But there is choice as to which associations will occur; the whole project is, therefore, a moral one. Religion, like education, "since it requires a choice of one type of character, experience, and social institutions, involves a moral outlook,"<sup>23</sup> "moral in the broad sense of concern for what is

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23. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 290.

24. PIP, 70. Notice, however, that though all personal acts have social conditions and consequences, some persons are incompletely socialized because their motives are anti-social. Cf. above, Ch. III, C, and below, IV, C.





good."<sup>25</sup> The practical conclusion is, then, that a truly religious philosophy must aid in decisions that will promote personal spiritual growth through modifying surrounding conditions.

Personality, as the most important event in experience, is social. Man, as an agent-patient, is part of what might be called the "stream of experience." As agent he acts upon a world in which he is continuous with other events, and as patient he is its product. The boundaries are not clear-cut between what is personal and what is not. "The boundaries by which we mark off a human being as a unit are very different from the energies and organization of energies that make him a unified human being."<sup>26</sup> The philosophy of religious experience must concern itself with persons both as agent-patients and as seekers of unity, because understanding of the former process makes the latter intelligible and helps to bring control into it. Personal integrity is a function of integration with the surrounding medium.<sup>27</sup> Personality is its actions-- or what are better termed its interactions.

Men are shaped by social influences which play upon them. This has only recently been generally acknowledged, as is evidenced by the general nature of causes currently assigned. Words such as heredity and environment are used vaguely and

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25. EN, 28.

26. Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 820. Italics in original.

27. Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 824.





without specific content. The idea that social beliefs are explained by the "boobery" of people is too general to be of value.<sup>28</sup> Biographers refer to chance contacts, casual meetings, genius and natural depravity--"practical synonyms for God and the devil--good and bad forces which control us and which we cannot modify."<sup>29</sup> In spite of the imperfection of present explanations, they are placing an increasing emphasis upon social forces that change human nature. "Admission that men may be brought by long habit to hug their chains implies a belief that second or acquired nature is stronger than original nature."<sup>30</sup> The basis of human concern for social institutions lies in the effects they may have upon human nature.<sup>31</sup> The democratic faith is individual in that it asserts the right to self-realization but social in that it recognizes "that this end for individuals cannot be attained save through a particular type of political and legal institutions."<sup>32</sup>

Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-around growth of every member of society.<sup>31</sup>

The emotional factor in conduct is found to be quite

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28. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 271.

29. Art.(1933)<sup>5</sup>, 63.

30. FC, 8.

31. RIP, 186.

32. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 292. Cf. HNC, 60-63, 260.





constant by anthropologists. This means that differences in ethical conceptions from one society to another must be accounted for on the basis of "change of institutions and in intellectual changes--theological, philosophical, scientific."<sup>33</sup>

The variation both between and within cultures is so great that it cannot be accounted for on the basis of similarities between persons.<sup>34</sup> Human nature in its actually observable state is "created by the whole body of occupations, interests, skills, beliefs that constitute a given culture."<sup>35</sup> In discussing education, Dewey points out that

the deeper and more enduring education, that which shapes disposition, directs action, and conditions experience, comes not from formal educational agencies but out of the very structure and operation of institutions and social conditions.<sup>36</sup>

Likewise, freedom is achieved by discovering "what kind of culture is so free in itself that it conceives and begets political freedom as its accompaniment and consequence."<sup>37</sup>

The self is always directed toward something beyond itself and so its own unification depends upon the idea

33. Art.(1927)<sup>2</sup>, 32-33; cf. Art.(1927)<sup>7</sup>, xvi-xvii. The more popular view is to describe human progress in terms of gradual emancipation from social control. This is probably made plausible by "reading in" present-day standards upon early groups where they are inappropriate.

34. FC, 18-20.

35. FC, 7; cf. Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 824-827.

36. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 35.

37. FC, 6. Note that this is the opposite belief from that most frequently voiced in American history, according to which establishment of democracy is the one prerequisite given for cultural advance (cf. Gabriel, ADT, generally).





of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe.<sup>38</sup>

"The sense of wholeness which is urged as the essence of religion can be built up and sustained only through membership in a society which has attained a degree of unity."<sup>39</sup>

The self is not separate from its environment. "Everything of a practical nature is regarded as 'merely' personal, and the 'merely' has the force of denying legitimate standing in the court of cosmic jurisdiction."<sup>40</sup> This distorts the facts. Men do not stand in merely a subject-object relationship with their surroundings; if they did, they might be able to become independent of that environment as their knowledge increased. But they stand in an agent-patient relation and cannot escape interaction with their physical and social surroundings.

The experience of a living being struggling to hold its own and make its way in an environment, physical and social, partly facilitating and partly obstructing its actions, is of necessity a matter of ties and connexions, of bearings and uses. The very point of experience, so to say, is that it doesn't occur in a vacuum; its agent-patient instead of being insulated and disconnected is bound up with the movement of things by most intimate and pervasive bonds. Only because the organism is in and of the world, and its activities correlated with those of other things in multiple ways, is it susceptible to undergoing things and capable of trying to reduce objects to means of securing its good fortune.<sup>41</sup>

Men are products of the society in which they live.

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38. ACF, 19.

39. ION, 64.

40. Art.(1908)<sup>1</sup>, 54. Cf. EN, 277, 278.

41. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 14-15.





This is not the whole truth, however. Personality is also social because it has social consequences. The publicity of personality is also taken for granted in educational efforts. Educators assume that personality changes and in such a way as to make a difference. It is--or should be--the aim of every person to become more intelligent, to develop a "soul."

To say emphatically of a particular person that he has soul or a great soul is not to utter a platitude, applicable equally to all human beings. It expresses the conviction that the man or woman in question has in marked degree qualities of sensitive, rich and coordinated participation in all the situations of life.<sup>42</sup>

For Dewey, intelligence and action are not separated, and therefore any personal change that influences society is educational.

We want that type of education which will discover and form the kind of individual who is the intelligent carrier of a social democracy--social indeed, but still a democracy.<sup>43</sup>

Education, since it is the spearhead of the attack upon existing imperfections, is especially vital in society. It "is the concern of the whole of organized society in a way in which other governmental services (unless that of public health) are not."<sup>44</sup> For this reason it is obvious to anyone concerned with social and personal improvement that "education

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42. EN, 294.

43. Art.(1918)<sup>3</sup>, 335.

44. Art.(1915)<sup>1</sup>, 179. "Perhaps there is none who is more intimately concerned with aiding production of sound individual human beings than the physician"[Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 835].





should be organized about a social center and oriented toward social ends."<sup>45</sup> The teacher is to be regarded as a "social worker."<sup>46</sup> "In collective problems, the habits that are involved are traditions and institutions."<sup>47</sup> Unless liberals develop some way of organizing for action their program will go by default.<sup>48</sup>

Human beings are to be viewed primarily as doers, as participants. Factors of belief, initiation, and formulation are inescapably though not solely personal, and progress will not be made without them. Social problems are personal problems with consequences that are relatively far-reaching. There cannot be "a society really worth serving unless it is constituted of individuals of significant qualities."<sup>49</sup> Institutions are not organized in a vacuum; they are products of human activity which appear in order to fulfil purposes with respect to human needs. "Political facts are not outside human desire and judgment. Change man's estimate of the value of existing political agencies and forms, and the latter change."<sup>50</sup> Any reform must be thought correct by the

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45. Art.(1934)<sup>10</sup>, 68. Cf. Art.(1923)<sup>2</sup>, 449; ACF, 80.

46. Art.(1923)<sup>2</sup>, 453.

47. LSA, 50.

48. LSA, 91.

49. DE, 142.

50. PIP, 6.





reformers or it will fail.<sup>51</sup> Personality is public with respect to the consequences that flow from its activities.

If personality is public, moral and religious concerns are social. Just as moral conceptions and practices cannot be separated in early societies from manners and economic, domestic, religious, legal and political relations, so this is impossible in our society today.<sup>52</sup> The proper procedure in social investigation is, then, to discover the context and background of human needs and purposes. While there are certain constancies in human nature, notably those concerned with organic drives and operations, "the actual 'laws' of human nature are laws of individuals in association"<sup>53</sup>; while certain needs and relations remain fairly constant, "the conditions under which the needs are expressed and satisfied and the relations of man to man are sustained, undergo immense modifications."<sup>54</sup> Social progress, then, is not made by removing human beings from the bonds of social or physical existence but by re-ordering their beliefs and actions toward one another. Social control involves "regulating the doings and results of some individuals in order that a larger number of individuals may have a fuller and deeper experience."<sup>55</sup> The

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51. Art.(1900)<sup>1</sup>, 109.

52. Art.(1927)<sup>2</sup>, 31-32.

53. LSA, 41.

54. Art.(1927)<sup>2</sup>, 33; cf. Art.(1929)<sup>8</sup>, 67.

55. PIP, 194.





antithesis of "individual" is not society but particular social groups, and it is more realistic to think of the setting as containing several groups than to think of it as one person against several combined. "Adjustment is not a matter of response to a stimulus but of reestablished rapport within one's environment."<sup>56</sup> Religious experiences are found in this same social setting, discussion of which includes some of the most brilliant portions of John Dewey's writings. What does an empirical survey of social experience reveal with respect to religious possibilities for persons living in contemporary Western civilization?

#### B. Science and Machines

A realistic social philosophy, just because it is concerned with the achievement and preservation of what is good, must take note of the presence of important causative factors in the culture involved. "Any social conception remains formal and abstract which is not applied to some particular society existing at a definite time and place."<sup>57</sup> "Knowledge of the relations of cause and effect in the historical world can alone save us from living in a dream-world."<sup>58</sup> "We cannot separate power to become from consideration of what already

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56. Allport, Art.(1939), 270.

57. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 34.

58. Art.(1927)<sup>9</sup>, 115.





and antecedently is."<sup>59</sup>

The secret of success--that is, of the greatest attainable success--is for the organic response to cast in its lot with present auspicious changes to strengthen them and thus to avert the consequences flowing from occurrences of ill-omen.<sup>60</sup>

Failure to consider conditions of the attainment of ideals means inevitably that the moralist has lost touch with those portions of reality that are most significant for his task, for physical and economic factors are the means used in accomplishing ideal ends. "The effective control of...[men's] powers is not through precepts, but through the regulation of their conditions."<sup>61</sup> He must recognize that "morals is not a theme by itself because it is not an episode nor department by itself."<sup>62</sup> All experience is relevant. "A reality which is not in any sort of use, or bearing upon use, may go hang."<sup>63</sup>

What is needed now is a re-examination of the conditions of morality in light of recent cultural changes. In politics, those who have faith in the national tradition of democracy will desire to slough off whatever social changes have rendered inapplicable and to reinterpret the essential ideas in terms of present life.<sup>64</sup>

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59. Art.(1928)<sup>3</sup>, 264. Cf. Art.(1928)<sup>1</sup>, 255.

60. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 22.

61. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 25.

62. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 31.

63. Art.(1908)<sup>1</sup>, 61.

64. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 50-51.





In education, theories are required that have "definite reference to the needs and issues which mark and divide our domestic, economic, and political life in the generation of which we are a part."<sup>65</sup>

Our educational undertakings are left without unified direction and without the ardor and enthusiasm that are generated when educational activities are organically connected with dominant social purpose and conviction.<sup>66</sup>

"Humane liberalism in order to save itself must cease to deal with symptoms and go to the causes of which inequalities and oppressions are but symptoms."<sup>67</sup>

As long as morals occupies itself with mere ideals, forces and conditions as they are will be good enough for 'practical' men, since they are then left free to their own devices in turning these to their own account.<sup>68</sup>

In today's world the important causative influences socially are "physical science and technological industry."<sup>69</sup> They both illustrate the way in which men's aims may be achieved through the use of intelligence. Because of this and because they are accomplished facts they may inform anyone who is interested in effecting social changes.

Those who accept the idea that education is a social operation must, if their acceptance is sincere, consider how family life, the church, the production and distribution of goods, agriculture, the means and modes of

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65. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 35-36.

66. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 34. Cf. WOEC, 23-30.

67. Art.(1939)<sup>3</sup>, 9.

68. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 24.

69. Art.(1928)<sup>2</sup>, 313. Cf. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 14-15.





amusement and recreation, ends and means in politics, have been affected by the development of science and technology, these being the two great causal forces at work.<sup>70</sup>

Industry and technology should not be thought of in isolation. They are products of the application of science to certain areas of life. "Manufacturing, railways, electric transportation, and all the agencies of daily life, represent just so much applied science."<sup>71</sup> The industrial revolution has affected all of life; economic activity cannot be separated from the many kinds of social action.

Technology includes, of course, the engineering arts that have produced the railway, steamship, automobile, and airplane, the telegraph, telephone, and radio, and the printing press. But it also includes new procedures in medicine and hygiene, the function of insurance in all its branches, and, in its potentiality if not actualization, radically new methods in education and other modes of human relationship. "Technology" signifies all the intelligent techniques by which the energies of nature and man are directed and used in satisfaction of human needs; it cannot be limited to a few outer and comparatively mechanical forms.<sup>72</sup>

The results of this transformation are far-reaching, both for good and for ill.

On the one hand, as has so frequently been pointed out by moralists who wish to solve present-day problems by a reversion to past techniques, science and technology have caused chronic insecurity, which has become "such a factor in the lives of the majority of men and women that the

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70. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 52.

71. SOT, 230. Cf. LOG, 75-76, 489.

72. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 24-25.





insecurity and the fear it engenders have come to be counted as the chief motives which drive men to work."<sup>73</sup> They have brought about a state in which finance-capitalism and nationalism are the two chief obstacles to "the good life."<sup>74</sup> This deplorable state of affairs has not been caused by scientific ways of thinking, but by private control of this essentially public technique.

If there are to obtain more equable and comprehensive principles of action, exacting a more impartial exercise of natural power and resource in the interests of a common good, it will be because members of a class can no longer rest content in responsibility to a class whose traditions constitute its conscience, but are made responsible to a society whose conscience is its free and effectively organized intelligence.<sup>75</sup>

On the other hand, degrading circumstances and evil conditions are no more widespread than before. The new factor that has been added by science and industrialization is recognition of these evils as evils.<sup>76</sup> Even in the last twenty-five years progress is shown by the fact that things uncriticized earlier are now criticized.<sup>77</sup> This is, of course, a major improvement that more than offsets the appearance of insecurity, for it

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73. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 54. Cf. LSA, 60.

74. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 30; Art.(1934)<sup>1</sup>, 269; PM, 174-175. In 1920 Dewey was most intrigued among Chinese politicians by Governor Chen of the northern government, who supported administrative self-government and centralized economic control. Sun Yat Sen was placed second because he was a nationalist and only incidentally republican (CJU, 39-41).

75. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 26. Cf. PIP, 61-62.

76. Art.(1928)<sup>2</sup>, 322-323.

77. Art.(1924)<sup>1</sup>, 282.





is the first step in overcoming that insecurity and its resultant anxiety.

Though "practically all political and social affairs are bound up with economic questions,"<sup>78</sup> economic determinism is not a full explanation of changes in manners and morals.<sup>79</sup> Economic values are not superior to others as values,<sup>80</sup> nor are economic ends the "only things which bring people together."<sup>81</sup> The depression of the 1930's had as one healthy effect a questioning of material values.<sup>82</sup> It often happens that "forms of social cooperation and participation are shunted aside and deformed by a predominant economic force."<sup>83</sup> But not always. The current sharp line between the economic and the moral<sup>84</sup> should be destroyed. Integration cannot be achieved without including economic factors.

Such integration would involve changes in many areas of life. Dewey maintains that it is "popular fear of anything sounding like materialism" that prevents men from recognizing, for example, that the human body is "the most wonderful of

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78. SOT, 229. Cf. FC, 5.

79. Art.(1927)<sup>2</sup>, 32.

80. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 296.

81. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 297.

82. Art.(1934)<sup>7</sup>, 58.

83. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 297. Cf. Art.(1928)<sup>6</sup>, 4-5.

84. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 14-15; LOG, 77-78. Teachers cannot, for example, ignore their economic status and surroundings [Art.(1928)<sup>6</sup>, 4-5].





all structures of the vast universe"<sup>85</sup> and thus seeing that it is to be included in religious living. Spiritual living is enriched by the inclusion of physical interests.<sup>86</sup> In a radio broadcast over WEVD in 1936 Dewey made plain his theory that social values will be created by the control of economic power through scientific means. Both liberty and equality are ideals suitable to contemporary America as well as the original colonies, but each has been distorted by reactionary groups such as the Liberty League and the National Association of Manufacturers. "The demand for a new social order is in fact a demand for the existence of economic and political conditions that will allow the realization of the old democratic ideas."<sup>87</sup>

Critics are apt to look only at the inhuman aspects of industrial society, but it also creates values and influences character.<sup>88</sup> "Economic changes have brought about a closer interdependence among men and strengthened the ideal of mutual service."<sup>89</sup> Nor is this all. Among the advantages gained from industrialization are

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85. Art.(1918)<sup>2</sup>, xv.

86. Cf. LOG, 57; Bawden, Art.(1945), 159.

87. Art.(1936)<sup>2</sup>, 328. Cf. 327-328. "Professor Dewey and his disciples seem to be pretty well satisfied with the ideal and program of 'democracy in education and education in democracy'"(Macintosh, PR, 302).

88. Art.(1934)<sup>7</sup>, 58; LSA, 89-90.

89. SOT, 230. Cf. Art.(1936)<sup>2</sup>, 328.





the increase in toleration, in breadth of social judgment, the larger acquaintance with human nature, the sharpened alertness in reading signs of character and interpreting social situations, greater accuracy of adaptation to differing personalities, contact with greater commercial activities.<sup>90</sup>

It will be noted that most of these results are personal ones. The control over nature which is made possible by the use of scientific method enables men to develop into different persons.

To invent and to manipulate machinery awakens new powers. It gives one, on a scale however small, a magic touch of control, and this breeds new respect for self and a sense of power that seeks further control and a sense of dignity that wishes not merely to have goods but also to be somebody.<sup>91</sup>

Positively, the insight offered here is "a vision of a day in which the natural sciences and the technologies that flow from them are used as servants of a humane life."<sup>92</sup>

This is the grandest project of our day. Tolstoy's picture in War and Peace of men unable to control their destinies has become antiquated. J. W. Coons suggests that Dewey is adding here to Bacon's prospectus of human control. Whereas the "first modern" spoke of control of man over man and control of man over nature, Dewey envisages a third type of control--"the controlled use of all the resources of the science and technology that have mastered the physical forces

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90. SS, 9. Cf. Art.(1928)<sup>2</sup>, 324.

91. Smith, PWLA, 91.

92. ION, 55.





of nature."<sup>93</sup> By this is meant scientific control of social and personal events as well as physical. This would remedy the present situation in which technology has advanced so rapidly and under such poor direction that it has out-run its usefulness; extension of science to matters of human concern would return technology to its rightful place as servant of human needs and goals. This is perhaps the most realistic social aim which is presented today.

### C. "Science and Society"

The creation of a community is made possible in human experience by the use of science in social problems, and the shared experience of such a community is the greatest value open to human beings. The present section will attempt to describe the outstanding traits that appear or are amplified in a scientific society, a community. The assumption here is acceptance of intelligence as the sole method of social action.

The choice of intelligence as the preferred method of action implies, like every choice, a definite moral outlook. The scope of this choice is so inclusive that the moral implication outlines, when followed out, an entire ethical and social philosophy.<sup>94</sup>

Dewey "fain would set all intelligence to work for human good."<sup>95</sup> Intelligence is not only the source of the values

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93. Coons, ICDP, 36-38.

94. Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 316.

95. Smith, PWLA, 81.





to be mentioned, but also the criterion by means of which they are to be judged. Institutions and groups are to be known by their functions, i.e., their purposes and consequences, rather than by their origin and structure.<sup>96</sup> Since every organization will embody purposes common to its members, the sole test that will adequately judge the group will be the coherence of that goal and the effectiveness of the group in realizing it.

Scientific social action is different from non-scientific activity. The individuals in a scientific community are closely bound together, but freely so. Communication is increased and improved in social and scientific inquiry.

We find communication as an existential occurrence involved in all distinctively communal life, and we find that communication effects meaning and understanding as conditions of unity or agreement in conjoint behavior.<sup>97</sup>

The communication, as this statement suggests, makes possible "shared experience," agreement, cooperative activity, and unity of purpose for the group. One might go even further and say that experience is not truly mental until it is socialized. "The mental is empirically discernible only where association is manifested in the form of participation and communication."<sup>98</sup> If intelligence is social activity, then experience is not even mental until social. Furthermore,

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96. Cf. PIP, throughout.

97. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 172.

98. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 171.





intelligence, since it is in its very nature action directed toward coherent ideals, is present only in improving society.

Thinking and its results....are not candidates merely for reception into the social status quo, the received and established order of associated behavior, they are rather claimants for a changed social order to be effected in the very action which they promote and by which they are to be tested.<sup>99</sup>

Thus a "scientific" society is constantly changing in order to meet new problems and is meeting them in ways that require full communication among all its citizens. It possesses "the publicity, the cooperativeness, the common and gratuitous sharing which are inherent in the scientific method."<sup>100</sup>

Barriers between social groups are removed as intelligence is introduced. This change is complex because there are now several barriers. "Everything which bars freedom and fullness of communication sets up barriers that divide human beings into sets and cliques."<sup>101</sup> Social and economic classes are eliminated. They have been made possible by the use of scientific techniques for private rather than public ends. Their elimination is necessary before science can be fully integrated into the culture. Vested economic interests today oppose fuller use of science and its methods which "are hostile to this end of private and competitive gain and so are resisted as subversive of law and order."<sup>100</sup>

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99. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 174-175.

100. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 62.

101. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 225.





The dead inertia of custom and habituation counts for much. But resistance is active and often aggressive. These facts point to class interests which fear the free play of critical inquiry and constructive invention in social institutions.<sup>102</sup>

Once classes have been abolished, an artificial limitation upon science will have been removed.

Likewise, nationalism will be transcended in a society that is consistently scientific. While scientific advances have brought the world together and made interdependence a fact, out-moded ways of thinking have caused that interdependence to be a source of fear rather than a means to social benefits.

Isolated and excessive nationalism renders international interdependence, now existing as a fact, a source of fear, suspicion, antagonism, potential war. In order that interdependence may become a benefit instead of a dread evil and possible world-wide catastrophe, educators must revise the conception of patriotism and good citizenship so that it will accord with the imperative demands of world-wide association and interaction.<sup>103</sup>

The League of Nations did not remove nationalistic ways of thinking but merely attempted a transfer of nationalistic feelings to other agencies.<sup>104</sup>

While classes and nations are being removed as social barriers, the methods of coercion and persuasion, partly causes and partly results of unscientific methods of direction, will also be discarded. On the international scene,

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102. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 61.

103. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 69.

104. Art.(1932)<sup>2</sup>, 32.





aggression is frequently the result of that same use of science for economic gain that causes the creation of social classes.<sup>105</sup> Nationally, party politics represents an attempt, not at broad cooperation, but at confusing issues and voters in order to benefit personally.

Symbols are significant only in connection with realities behind them. No intelligent observer can deny, I think, that they are often used in party politics as a substitute for realities instead of as a means of contact with them.<sup>106</sup>

All of these ways of keeping people apart result from failure to use scientific methods, and they in turn are obstacles to the acceptance of those methods. "Science makes men friends."<sup>107</sup>

Just in as far as science is introduced into social activities, direction of those activities is made possible. Intelligence is a means of direction rather than of contemplation.

Intelligence has descended from its lonely isolation at the remote edge of things, whence it operated as unmoved mover and ultimate good, in order to take its seat in the moving affairs of men.<sup>108</sup>

Increased ability to direct their own actions and bring into being desired consequences has the advantage of giving to men a feeling of security and confidence. It is significant that

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105. "All political foreign aggression in China has been carried out for commercial and financial ends, and usually upon some economic pretext"(CJU, 17).

106. LSA, 72.

107. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 226.

108. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 11.





G. W. Allport wished to dedicate his important Chairman's Address to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues<sup>109</sup> to John Dewey, who, "more than any other scholar, past or present, has set forth as a psychological problem the common man's need to participate in his own destiny." Gone is the reason for unrest, fear, chauvinism, provincialism, and aggression.

It is true that the use of science in investigating physical matters has not led to this feeling of security. However, the difficulty lies in the fact that use of the method is not more general than it is. "Science has been limited to things remote from human life, so that its results touch human life only through the medium of some mechanical application rather than directly."<sup>110</sup> The discovery of atomic energy and use of atomic bombs could have been predicted on the basis of the half-hearted acceptance of science. "Our failure to use in matters of direct human concern the scientific methods which have revolutionized physical knowledge has permitted the latter to dominate the social scene."<sup>111</sup> Physical concerns will dominate our culture until science is introduced as the exclusive method of direction; then they will be returned to their proper position. Within the realm of

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109. September 16, 1944, at Columbia University; Allport, Art.(1945), 117.

110. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 60.

111. Art.(1945)<sup>2</sup>, 4.





social concerns, intelligence is required as exclusive.

Economic determinism has seemed coherent during the past few generations because economic concerns were, in so many ways, primary for great numbers of people in Western civilization. Reasoning has been used for selfish purposes. The techniques were scientific while the goals were not. This has led to a marked change in attitudes toward and morals in business.

When industry and finance are managed autocratically and for private pecuniary gain rather than as cooperative enterprises for mutual service, political democracy, in a society so dominated by industry and finance as is our own, is inevitably degraded to something formal, external, more or less mechanical, and hence comparatively easily manipulated by those who have material prosperity as their goal.<sup>112</sup>

Property values have exceeded human values and selfishness has displaced social interests in what is predominantly a material or economic culture. The only relief is science.

A scientific community is democratic. Sidney Hook claims that growth toward a democratic ideal is considered central by Dewey in his philosophy of education.<sup>113</sup> This is true; yet as was hinted above, democracy cannot be achieved until science has been introduced.

Democracy was conceivable only with a changed conception of the intelligence that forms modern science and the want that forms modern industry. It is essentially a changed psychology.<sup>114</sup>

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112. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 58.

113. Hook, EMM, 8.

114. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 15





Democracy cannot be adequately regarded as a formal arrangement of individuals or as a set of rules embodied in a constitution. Democracy is founded upon the

belief that liberty is the means as well as the goal and that only through the development of individuals in their voluntary cooperation with one another can the development of individuality be made secure and enduring.<sup>115</sup>

"The ideal of democracy demands the fullest possible development of personality in all...through cooperative association with others."<sup>116</sup> Democracy is a way of thinking a problem together, group-wise. It is not a "planned economy" in the sense of a way of living imposed upon citizens from outside.

Society requires planning;...planning is the alternative to chaos, disorder, and insecurity. But there is a difference between a society which is planned and a society which is continuously planning--namely, the difference between autocracy and democracy, between dogma and intelligence in operation, between suppression of individuality and that release and utilization of individuality which will bring it to full maturity.<sup>117</sup>

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115. Art.(1939)<sup>3</sup>, 10. "Social instability and shock made equally pertinent and obvious [in ancient Greece] the remark that only intelligence can confirm the values which natural conditions generate, and that intelligence is itself nurtured and matured only in a free and stable society" [Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 5-6]. Cf. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 223-224. While intelligence and democracy mutually foster and sustain each other, intelligence is taken to be more basic [Bierstedt, Art.(1939), 13; Dewey, Art.(1928)<sup>3</sup>, 26].

116. Dewey and Watson, Art.(1937), 333. Cf. Geiger, Art.(1939), 363-364, where Dewey's argument is thought to be circular at this point.

117. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 72. "Co-operative activity, a controlled social environment, a freely active habit-making mind moved by the attitude of discovery, and a real sharing of social opportunities, make up the meaning of the democratic way of life"(Beach, GST, 204, summarizing Dewey's attitude).





Democracy is a state in which "free thinking" is characteristic.

A "community" is cooperative as well as democratic. This follows inevitably from the fact that scientific inquiry is social. In the past, inquiry has quite clearly not been social. In most endeavors,

the failure of cooperative and collective intelligence and effort to intervene was an invitation to immediate short term intervention by those who had an eye to their own profit.<sup>118</sup>

In the same way, education was a transmission of knowledge from one individual to another rather than a group activity. The result has been increasing selfishness and competitiveness.

So thoroughly is this the prevailing atmosphere that for one child to help another in his task has become a school crime. Where the school work consists in simply learning lessons, mutual assistance, instead of being the most natural form of cooperation and association, becomes a clandestine effort to relieve one's neighbor of his proper duties.<sup>119</sup>

This attitude was promoted by idealistic theories of knowledge with their picture of man as a "spectator."

Scientific methods require participation from men. Thus, in the school situation mentioned above, a radical change is effected by introduction of scientific methods.

Helping others, instead of being a form of charity which impoverishes the recipient, is simply an aid in setting free the powers and furthering the impulse of the one helped. A spirit of free communication, of interchange of ideas, suggestions, results, both successes and

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118. Art.(1945)<sup>2</sup>, 3.

119. SS, 13.





failures of previous experiences, becomes the dominating note of the recitation.<sup>120</sup>

Throughout society the same promotion of "collective and cooperative human behavior"<sup>121</sup> will occur. A "personal faith in personal day-by-day working with others"<sup>122</sup> will be effected. Notice that agreement is not required for co-operation. Expression of differences is a right of others and a way of enriching one's own experience.<sup>123</sup> The change is not mechanical but one that changes the participant as well as the society in which he lives.

It is not simply that the characteristic findings of thought cannot pass into knowledge save when framed with reference to social submission and adoption, but that language and thought in their relation to signs and symbols are inconceivable save as ways of achieving concerted action.<sup>124</sup>

No more profound change could be imagined.

The changes mentioned above--the improvement of communication and the removal of barriers, the creation of democracy and cooperative attitudes and actions--all constitute moral improvement. At the same time, moral theory would be revised. The current conception of right as a combination of justice and mercy would be replaced by a view in which

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120. SS, 13.

121. Art.(1945)<sup>2</sup>, 7.

122. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 225.

123. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 226.

124. Art.(1928)<sup>8</sup>, 174.





intelligence is the source of morality. Intelligent decisions are those which eventuate in a society in which morality predominates.

"The law" formulates remote and long-run consequences. It then operates as a condensed available check on the naturally overweening influence of immediate desire and interest over decision. It is a means of doing for a person what otherwise only his own foresight, if thoroughly reasonable, could do.<sup>125</sup>

The fact that the shared experiences have been limited in scope and formulated in terms of class differences, economic inequalities, and so on, has meant that morality is based in part upon a "fusion of sentimentalism and legalism."<sup>126</sup>

The modes of shared approval and disapproval are the origin of the distinction between good and bad.<sup>127</sup> In discussing the increasing emancipation of women, Dewey commented that this growing freedom would help produce a more realistic and more human morality, whereas in the past law has been basic in theories of morality and social arrangement until "marriage has become a contract and religion itself a covenant."<sup>128</sup>

A new and more effective morale and morality will have to be based upon "an exploration of the realities of human association."<sup>129</sup>

125. PIP, 56.

126. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 32-33.

127. Art.(1927)<sup>2</sup>, 35.

128. Smith, PWLA, 94.

129. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 32.





All men require moral sanctions in their conduct: the consent of their kind. Not getting it otherwise, they go insane to feign it. No man ever lived with the exclusive approval of his own conscience.<sup>130</sup>

The development of this personal "foresight" is the only means of making social morality internal to human beings rather than imposed.

A certain kind of associated or joint life when brought into being has an unexpected by-product--the formation of those peculiar acquired dispositions, sets, attitudes, which are termed mind.<sup>131</sup>

The development of human personality and the increasing use of scientific methods are closely related. Science is not impersonal. It operates

only in the medium of human desire, foresight, aim, and effort. Science and technology are transactions in which man and nature work together and in which the human factor is that directly open to modification and direction.<sup>132</sup>

A morality based on anything other than science would be either quixotic or dogmatic, and personal action is free only if one is able to control one's destiny in a predictable way.

Science is a religious instrument.

Faith in the power of intelligence to imagine a future which is the projection of the desirable in the present, and to invent the instrumentalities of its realization, is our salvation.<sup>133</sup>

Religious experience is intelligent action that eventuates

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130. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 25.

131. Art.(1917)<sup>10</sup>, 272.

132. Art.(1945)<sup>2</sup>, 3.

133. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 69.





in personal growth in the direction of inclusive and coherent ideals. Since intelligence is relevant to all experience and no circumstance is beyond its reach, all agencies and personal acts are seen to be concerned with religious experience. The possibilities of vast reaches of experience that have heretofore been routine, dull, and mechanical, are genuinely spiritual in character. All those factors of the environment which influence the individual in such ways as to help form his character--and the schools with their formal training are not the most important of these--are significant for religious living because their consequences include the way in which personality is to be shaped. The chief religious problem, as seen above, is the development of unified personalities, but this is not done in a vacuum. All of society is pertinent to the problem.

In addition, human society is a whole into which persons must fit. Personal integration involves integration into one's surroundings. The relationship is so close that the individual can never become more unified than the society in which he lives. It serves as an ideal which he consciously or unconsciously absorbs and makes part of himself. A division between economic and moral activities, then, is reflected in the personalities of members of the society. The split is overcome when it is seen that economic as well as moral events are potential means to the attainment of spiritual ideals. Even these experiences are not the whole





of religion, however. Nature also is significant. Material events occur within the same whole as, condition, and follow from spiritual events. Thus, no aspect of life is irrelevant to spirit. All experiences are educative, and all education is potentially religious education. Science is not external to religious experience, nor does it impose a limit upon the area which is concerned with the latter; instead, science or intelligence is seen to be the most effective instrument for the enlarging of religious aspects of experience.





## CHAPTER V

### THE CHURCH

The last three chapters have provided a brief summary of the religious philosophy of John Dewey. They have examined the development of his thought from its starting point, immediate experience, to its culmination in "shared experience" that belongs to anyone who is fully intelligent. All experience is thus disclosed as potentially religious, and religious living as action which allows the full integration of personality about ideals of intelligent cooperation. The key to the whole process is found in analysis of science (or intelligence). This is discovered to be a social enterprise in which communication of ideas is essential. It changes the communicant in relating him more closely to his fellow-investigators, increasing his incentive to work, giving him responsible freedom, and spreading the realm which he can directly appreciate. It also changes society by breaking down barriers that exist between persons, making social direction of group activities possible, introducing democratic ways of doing things, and pointing out the religious significance of all kinds of experience.

In this chapter Dewey's attitude toward the church will be investigated. He has long been considered an opponent of





the church and frequently makes statements that bear out such a contention. The first section of the chapter will therefore make clear the reason for Dewey's rejection of most churches. The second section of the chapter will seek to determine whether this argument affords sufficient basis for refusing to work through any church. The final section of the chapter will describe the church which might embody John Dewey's own religious ideal, shared experience.

#### A. Dogma

Dewey objects to past and present religions because they accept "a definite body of intellectual propositions, acceptance being based upon authority--preferably that of revelation from on high."<sup>1</sup> "Moral codes have been allied to... religious supernaturalism and have sought their foundation and sanction in it."<sup>2</sup> Philosophy and religion have both been dominated largely by search for a "supreme reality supposed to be beyond and beneath the things of experience."<sup>3</sup> This was true, for example, of "Roman Catholic theological philosophy"<sup>4</sup> and "Medieval Christian theological philosophy."<sup>5</sup>

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1. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 21.

2. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 23.

3. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 471.

4. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 5.

5. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 1.





This kind of faith means "adherence to a creed consisting of set articles. Such creeds are recited daily in our churches."<sup>6</sup> These established "truths" are dogmas, beliefs that have been established in the past and are supposed to hold true in the future regardless of the nature of the experiences that comprise that future. "The moment philosophy supposes it can find a final and comprehensive solution, it ceases to be inquiry and becomes either apologetics or propaganda."<sup>7</sup> The dogmatic attitude is the one which holds that "supreme in importance is what is taught"<sup>8</sup> rather than the transmission of a technique of self-direction which will make possible the solution of problems. Dogmas are beliefs accepted unintelligently; they are unscientific.

The chief factors accounting for dogmatism are insecurity and uncertainty in belief and practical activity.<sup>9</sup> In discussing "the Bertrand Russell case," the status of education, and the future of democracy, as well as that of religion, Dewey points out that liberal tendencies have been on the defensive throughout this century. Just a few months after fundamentalism had supposedly gasped its last at the Scopes Trial, Dewey referred to the "recrudescence of 'fundamentalism'

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6. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 21.

7. LOG, 35.

8. Turner, Art.(1930), 49. Cf. LOG, 50.

9. LSA, 28-29; ACF, 6.





in religion and politics,"<sup>10</sup> and nearly two decades later, in 1944, the Conference on the Scientific Spirit and the Democratic Faith<sup>11</sup> organized the addresses given at its annual meeting under the title, The Authoritarian Attempt to Capture Education.<sup>12</sup> This reaction was caused by the presence of a situation that in some ways resembled conditions in the Middle Ages. At that time "impermanence meant insecurity; the permanent was the sole ground of assurance and support amid the vicissitudes of existence."<sup>13</sup>

The experience which men had, as well as any which they could reasonably anticipate, gave no signs of ability to furnish the means of its own regulation. It offered promises it refused to fulfill; it awakened desires only to frustrate them; it created hopes and blasted them; it evoked ideals and was indifferent and hostile to their realization. Men who were incompetent to cope with the troubles and evils that experience brought with it, naturally distrusted the capacity of experience to give authoritative guidance. Since experience did not contain the arts by which its own course could be directed, philosophies and religions of escape and consolatory compensation naturally ensued.<sup>14</sup>

In the face of odds and perplexities too overwhelming to control by the ordinary techniques at their disposal, men choose dogma instead of intelligence.

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10. Art.(1927)<sup>4</sup>, xxiv.

11. The group was organized under the aegis of John Dewey; most of its members are closely connected in one way or another with him, and he gave the opening speech in 1944.

12. Their chief object of attack was the neo-scholasticism of Chancellor Hutchins and his followers.

13. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 25-26.

14. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 23. Cf. 25-26; Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 476; QC, 33; ACF, 56.





The result is a dualistic view of the world which pictures either man or God--or both--as removed from effective and rewarding intercourse with nature. Such a theory refuses to recognize that "life is development."<sup>15</sup>

The factors of the existing cultural situation, scientific, technological, and "social," are such that philosophic theories which in effect, even if not in intent, are products of pre-scientific and pre-technological, dominantly leisure class conditions, are now as obstructive as they are unnecessary.<sup>16</sup>

Dualisms and supernaturalisms blight religion by confining it to part of experience and making it static. Dewey makes his great contribution in discovering the common factors in all such philosophies and refuting their basic suppositions. Dogmatic religion is made possible by traditional logic, which "sets forth the results of thinking,...[and] has nothing to do with the operation of thinking."<sup>17</sup> Such a logic strengthens the fallacious belief that the problem of knowledge is one of conclusions rather than techniques. Dogmatism is one of the chief foes of truth. It is to be hoped that there will be a day when the word "heresy" will be "permanently embalmed in quotation marks."<sup>18</sup> Once dogmas find their way into a religion, all the details of that religion are altered.<sup>19</sup>

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15. MPE, 57.

16. Art.(1939)<sup>8</sup>, 525.

17. Art.(1924)<sup>5</sup>, 566. Cf. LOG, ch. 5.

18. CE, I, 84.

19. See ACF, 32, 34; CE, I, 86; Art.(1922)<sup>3</sup>, 64-65.





Truths of yesterday rarely apply to today's situations. The particular dogmas, therefore, might be countered one by one. They are so numerous, however, that this would be a tedious and endless job. Although Dewey finds evidence countering the conclusions of these philosophies of another day, it is not upon the specific conclusions that he is making his principal attack. Rather he is opposing the fixity and finality of those conclusions. He attempts to show that "trouble is eternally fresh trouble, and 'good' solutions are forever new."<sup>20</sup> Any belief which is established by other than scientific means is dogmatic in nature. Any belief may be dogmatic; it is the method which is definitive. Some beliefs are incapable of scientific justification and are therefore always dogmatic. Belief in supernatural beings, human and divine, is merely one of many dogmas. Experience is religious only and just in so far as it is scientific. Dewey criticizes dogmas just because they are unscientific. And further, just as nature is the object of scientific knowledge and action, so the supernatural is anything which is not subject to intelligent attitudes and dealings. The argument is definitional, tautologous, though the concept of science and the nature of religions are empirically discovered. The implications of the argument are far-reaching --so much so, in fact, as to illustrate vividly Dewey's thesis

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20. Allport, Art.(1939), 274n.





that religion pervades all of life. Both from the point of view of the religious person and of the religious institution (if there be such) the consequences of accepting beliefs dogmatically are great.

Since science and dogma are contradictories--all-inclusive and mutually exclusive alternatives--the consequences of one will be made impossible by use of the other. A mere enumeration of the personal disadvantages of dogmatic religious faith follows<sup>21</sup>:

1. When dogmas are accepted, the believer seeks certainty. This is dangerous religiously because (i) it diverts attention from the really religious attempt to direct experience so that it eventuates in consequences that are more nearly spiritual. (ii) It creates a demand for certainty when there is no certainty in factual matters.<sup>22</sup> (iii) The possession of certainty has little or no value in the control of experience. "When intelligence fixes fluctuating circumstances into final ideals, petrification is likely to occur."<sup>23</sup> (iv) The failure which inevitably attends "the quest for certainty" leads to emotional crises and skepticism.<sup>24</sup>
2. Dogmatic religion leads to a sense of personal isolation in its followers.<sup>25</sup> "The essentially unreligious attitude

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21. Documentation for most of the assertions made in this analysis has been given in other sections of the dissertation and will not be repeated here.

22. See, for example, Turner, Art.(1930), 48. It would be an extremely attenuated religious faith which regarded itself as less than factual.

23. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 9-10.

24. Art.(1903)<sup>2</sup>, 63.

25. "Everything that shuts the individual off, shuts his mind, his ideas off, from other things, ends by petrifying his mind and his experience and drying up the very source of happiness within him"[Art.(1930)<sup>6</sup>, 180].







is that which attributes human achievement and purpose to man in isolation from the world of physical nature and his fellows."<sup>26</sup> Dogmatists feel isolated because (i) Physical surroundings are not interpreted as potential means to the achievement of a more spiritual world. (They are sometimes regarded as the handiwork of a perfect or all-powerful being, but this theory does not lessen the feeling of isolation as does the theory that nature becomes an extension of personality through its use in working toward personal but socialized aims.) (ii) Dogmatists do not experience the cooperative activity which is the scientific search for truth and attempt to improve the world. (iii) Since the standard of religious experience is adherence to a dogma, anyone who does not agree is considered irreligious. Thus, whole groups of people, many of whom think themselves religious, are excluded from fellowship. "Conflict between truths claiming ultimate and complete authority is the most fundamental kind of discord that can possibly exist."<sup>27</sup> (This is the source of the negative conception of tolerance as "letting another think what he wants" rather than respecting another's thinking as an attempt to formulate truth.) (iv) Dewey calls that attitude fear which is withdrawal, "exclusiveness which shuts out the beauties and troubles of experience."<sup>28</sup> "Fear never gave stable perspective in the life of anyone. It is dispersive and withdrawing."<sup>29</sup>

3. Indifference, boredom, irreverence, and flippancy are familiar states of mind in dogmatic religions. This has at least two causes: (i) The least divergence between this authority and some other causes doubt in the mind of the believer with respect either to the importance or the truth of the dogma. (The conflicts between science and religion have been of this nature and are feared by religionists on this account.) (ii) Since truth is already established, there is no challenge offered to believers; they may be indoctrinated, but they have nothing to learn. (Notice that the first is stated passively and the second actively.) The result is a false sophistication<sup>30</sup> or

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26. ACF, 25. Cf. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 483-484; Whitehead, RM, 16; James, VRE, 31.

27. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 12. Cf. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 473; Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 20.

28. Art.(1930)<sup>2</sup>, 178.

29. ACF, 25. Cf. Art.(1930)<sup>6</sup>, 179; QC, 306; EN, 420; CE, II, 849-855.

30. Art.(1903)<sup>2</sup>, 63.







acceptance of convention.<sup>31</sup>

4. Dogmatic religions suppress the individuality and creativity of their followers and make a really adequate integration about ideals voluntarily chosen impossible. (i) Creation is not required in such a religion either in the sense of devising new hypotheses in searching for truth or in the sense of initiating new forms of activity in improving surroundings. (ii) Ideals are given to one by an authority external to him; the ordinary person never succeeds in internalizing these ideals. Conformity is substituted for unity.<sup>32</sup> "Routineers" are persons "interested in imposing mechanical uniformity."<sup>33</sup> (iii) Operations become meaningful only when their purposes are recognized, but this is rare when dogmas are current and for that reason. (iv) Integration is made around some function that the person has, but the majority of personal duties are restricted in scope in dogmatic religions. (v) Partial and incomplete ideals--those which exclude part of experience--can only lead to imperfect personal integration.
5. Personal freedom is denied by dogmatic religions. "Commitment to inevitability is always the fruit of dogma."<sup>34</sup> (i) Because ends are guaranteed or Gods all-powerful, personal freedom is an impossibility. (ii) When freedom is asserted in these theories, it is freedom within or limited by an external authority (e.g., law). (The freedom posited by science is only self-limiting.) Even when persons are conceived as supernatural, they are free in reference to physical laws but are still bound by an external authority such as moral law (Kant). (iii) The effect of these dogmatic theories is to reduce responsibility to nothing more than a demand for acquiescence or apprehension; it has nothing to do with the initiation or conduct of activity that results in an increase of values in existence.
6. Pessimism is fostered. A dogmatic faith is a lack of faith.<sup>35</sup> (i) No matter how much the dogmatic religion may

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31. Art.(1903)<sup>2</sup>, 64; Art.(1935)<sup>5</sup>, 475; Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 24.

32. Art.(1923)<sup>2</sup>, 451; Art.(1924)<sup>1</sup>, 280; Art.(1927)<sup>4</sup>, xxiv; Art.(1917)<sup>5</sup>, 206.

33. Art.(1915)<sup>1</sup>, 179. Cf. Art.(1918)<sup>3</sup>, 333.

34. LSA, 78; Art.(1922)<sup>3</sup>, 64-65.

35. ACF, 21-22.







assert that salvation is made possible through belief, it becomes evident that it is the product of the activity of someone other than the believer. This creates a sense of inadequacy or a feeling of frustration. "There is a strain of fear running through our American life which controls our activities to an untold extent."<sup>36</sup> This is the "great abdication" or "failure of nerve." (ii) Activity that is indulged in is thought to be mundane, economic, and inconsequential as compared with the realization of religious ideals. Men therefore derogate their own activity.

7. Emotionalism and sentimentalism gain currency. (i) Appeals that are made on another basis than that of rationality must be emotional--in the worst sense of that word. Propaganda is substituted for education.<sup>37</sup> (ii) Persons who do not train themselves to subject their ideals to reasonable examination end by accepting ideals that are impossible of realization, irrelevant to their circumstances, purely visionary. Gullibility is present because people "have acquired the habit of listening and of accepting, instead of that of inquiry."<sup>38</sup> (iii) Emotional appeals last only as long as they are stronger than other emotional appeals. Contemporary "falling away" in favor of movies, intoxicants, and sensationalism is to be expected because individuals have been trained to accept such appeals. (iv) This is closely related to the comment above [4: iv] about integration. Integrations that exclude large areas of life are vulnerable because of this fact and inferior spiritually because so many possible values are left out.
8. Health is poor. (i) Incentive is deadened because the ideals are selected in accordance with an abstract notion of right rather than on the basis of what is possible of achievement. Emotions are aroused more easily and for periods of longer duration when ideals are attainable. (ii) The virtues of obedience are negative and restrictive emotionally; cooperative activity releases emotions more generally. (iii) The identity of personal and social interest would relieve the fear which is so oppressive now.
9. Appreciation of much of experience is made difficult. Every aspect of experience is immediately present and hence

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36. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 271.

37. Art.(1930)<sup>5</sup>, 31-32; Art.(1935)<sup>8</sup>, 482.

38. Art.(1934)<sup>10</sup>, 62.





a possible object of attention or appreciation; it is also the cause of other events and must be considered in this respect. (i) The belief that religious objects belong to a realm that is beyond the reach of scientific control and therefore cannot be dealt with in ordinary ways makes worship a rare event; religious objects are not everyday objects. Worship is merely contemplation. (ii) Those objects that are part of daily life are not fully appreciated.<sup>39</sup> (iii) This is particularly dangerous when these objects may be modified by the attitude that we take toward them. This is obviously true in the case of other human beings.

This summary is not meant to be complete. It does, however, include most of those comments that are made by John Dewey in his criticism of religions that are dogmatic, unscientific, irrational. If this analysis may be taken as accurate, the condemnation of dogmatism is sweeping in so far as it affects individuals who believe the dogmas (whatever they may be). Incidentally, the objections are as valid against other dogmas (including those upheld in the name of science) as they are against religious ones. It may be concluded that John Dewey is implacable in his attitude of opposition to unscientific or dogmatic ways of thinking. His criticism is even deeper; dogmatism is not a way of thinking at all. It borrows the title without any shred of claim to it.

One objection to the complete rejection of authority is often made. It is claimed that dogmas serve a useful purpose in establishing acceptable attitude in persons who

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39. "Desires and interests produce consequences only when the activities in which they are expressed take effect in the environment by interacting with physical conditions" (TOV, 62).





are unable to think for themselves. At the present time, this is certainly true.<sup>40</sup> The only way to counter such an assertion is to try to find whether the current "boobery" or unintelligence is innate. The findings seem at the present time to indicate that sufficient intelligence is possessed but unused by nearly all men to enable them to think through most of their problems without the need of external authorities. As a matter of fact, the present analysis suggests that a very capable job is being done to make men unintelligent. The educational system alone could not effect the creation of men so dogmatic in their beliefs, and it turns out that the schools, with their persistence in seeking uniformity, are merely one group of institutions among many which value conformity more highly than unity. Individuals do not inherently seek to be told, but they can be changed so that they will do so. It is true, then, that at the present time there is conflict between authorities and some are better than others or better than the absence of any authorities whatsoever. But the advantage is only that over another authority or over no control at all. Scientific methods are possible for nearly all people, and authorities have no advantages over science when these two are compared--or rather, contrasted.

Dogmas have no advantages and many disadvantages when their effect upon individuals is assayed. What, though, of the effect that they have upon the institutions with which

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40. Sherif and Cantril, PEI, 69.





they ally themselves? This might be a considerably different story but turns out not to be so. Dewey's criticism is profound and thorough. The following is only a cataloguing of faults.

1. Churches that are dogmatic are partisan. (i) Supporters of one religion oppose supporters of all other religions.<sup>41</sup> (ii) Religious persons are set over against irreligious persons, so-called.<sup>42</sup> (iii) Partisanship that is determined by comparison of set beliefs rather than by attitudes toward cooperative activity is narrow, absolute, and often blind.
2. Churches that are partisan are incoherent in their view of the world. (i) The experiences of other people are arbitrarily excluded, and the world-view is consequently partial rather than all-inclusive.<sup>43</sup> (ii) Integration of adherents of the religion is less than adequate because it involves integration into only a part of society. (iii) The emotions of exclusion are restrictive rather than expansive; the spiritual aims involved are therefore less than they might otherwise be. "There is no separate body of moral rules; no separate system of motive powers; no separate subject-matter of moral knowledge."<sup>44</sup> (iv) Since religious activity is not intelligent, contradictions exist unnoticed.<sup>45</sup>
3. Just in so far as dogmatism is present, churches tend to be hierarchical.<sup>46</sup> This is true of thought even when not

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41. PM, 175; ACF, 84; Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 10.

42. ACF, 66.

43. LOG, 50.

44. Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 21. Cf. ACF, 61-68.

45. Art.(1935)<sup>5</sup>, 318.

46. "A division of labor characterizes all organized life. The present distribution of functions is patterned too much after the factory model. The coördination relating the various divisions of work is now itself largely a special and external division, carried on from above and not through the conscious ideas and emotions of those engaged in special occupations; and the isolation means that the division results in mechanical, uninterested activity"[Dewey and Watson, Art.(1937), 336-337].





true of official organization. Religion "becomes a matter of confirmation rather than transformation."<sup>47</sup> The thinking is done by a few "leaders" and the results given to the rest of the people.<sup>48</sup> Democracy cannot be achieved in the church any better than out of it unless thinking and action are both cooperative ventures in which everyone participates.

4. Legalism is present in any church that is dogmatic. (i) Truth is already present so does not need to be discovered or achieved. Dogmatic "religion is a part of the ordinances and routine of the day rather than a source of inspiration and renewing of power."<sup>49</sup> (ii) Truth is set up as a law and, like other laws dogmatically achieved, does not often or easily change.<sup>50</sup> (iii) Attention is quickly transferred from the spirit to the letter of the law; it is then external or formal. (iv) Literalism destroys perspective. One part is as much a part of the law as another and therefore, to most people, seems as important. Importance can be determined only by thinking, and this is not done.
5. Dogmatic religions are shunted to one side and compartmentalized. This is inevitable. (i) When dogmas are unchanging, they soon fail to meet all exigencies that present themselves and find themselves out-of-date. Thus, even when dogmas present themselves as pertinent to all of life, this cannot be truly said of them for very long. (ii) Intelligence is so necessary in life that it springs up outside of religions when it is suppressed within them.
6. Dogmatic religions are unchanging. Once the truth has been "found," it becomes unnecessary to seek further. "Traditional" problems are confused with "perennial" problems.<sup>51</sup> Thus dogmatic religions support the status quo<sup>52</sup> and are unable to "create new customs."<sup>53</sup> "The idea of movement

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47. Art.(1903)<sup>2</sup>, 64.

48. Art.(1930)<sup>5</sup>, 31-32; Schneider, Art.(1944), 88.

49. Art.(1903)<sup>2</sup>, 64.

50. Art.(1935)<sup>8</sup>, 482; Art.(1908)<sup>2</sup>, 26.

51. Art.(1923)<sup>8</sup>. Cf. SS, 6; Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 25, 28-29.

52. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 271. Cf. Art.(1925)<sup>6</sup>, 54.

53. Art.(1938)<sup>5</sup>, 475.





and change...has had comparatively little influence on the popular mind as the latter looks at religion, morals, economics, and politics."<sup>54</sup> "It is still supposed that our choice is between confusion, anarchy, and something fixed and immutable. It is assumed that Christianity is the final religion; Jesus the complete and unchanging embodiment of the divine and the human."<sup>55</sup> This creates a state of precariousness.<sup>56</sup>

7. Supernatural beliefs accrue to dogmatic religions. This is tautologous. Supernatural beings have been thought of in two ways: (i) Human beings have been thought supernatural, partly because they could apprehend "eternal truths." (ii) Ideals have been hypostatized and thought of as existent as facts rather than as ideals.
8. Dogmatic religions tend to become merely contemplative. Followers are asked merely to be "believers."

It will be seen that all of these traits interfere with the process of making the world more religious, either by diverting attention to non-essentials, excluding part of experience from spiritual activities, or preventing personal integration about coherent ideals and within cooperative societies. Dogmas harm not only individuals, but also the very institutions which they have often been devised to aid.

This last comment suggests an historical fact of some importance. Dogmas have been supported as helpful and beneficial because they have increased the influence of churches and other institutions whose aims have been good. Is this consideration sufficient to prevent rejection of all dogmas--

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54. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 26. Cf. Art.(1934)<sup>10</sup>, 61.

55. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 26.

56. "When valuations that exist at a given time are found to lack the support they have previously been supposed to have, they exist in a context that is highly adverse to their continued maintenance"(TOV, 59).





or any one dogma? The effectiveness of institutions that have relied upon dogmas is an historical fact that cannot be disputed. However, again, the effectiveness that is admitted is made possible by the fact that scientific techniques are not widespread. Once intelligence as a method is generally adopted, dogmatic assertion will lose its hold upon and appeal for vast numbers of people.

In both this argument and the one above to the effect that dogmas provide authority for people who do not think, the standard is conformity rather than unity.<sup>57</sup> Agreement is not achieved but imposed; ideals are not initiated but forced upon one.

Dogmas are attacked in every form by Dewey. The traditional American major parties adhere to outmoded and dogmatic beliefs and have distorted the meaning of "Americanism."<sup>58</sup> But, on the other hand, Communism and Socialism are unsatisfactory substitutes and recognized as such by American people because they substitute another "ism" for the current one.<sup>59</sup>

Democracy cannot obtain adequate recognition of its own meaning or coherent practical realization as long as antinaturalism [dogmatism] operates to delay and frustrate the use of the methods by which alone understanding and consequent ability to guide social relationships are attained.<sup>60</sup>

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57. Conformity is a demand that causes life to become "mechanical"[Art.(1928)<sup>1</sup>, 257]. Dewey attacks imitation as a poor educational device [Allport, Art.(1939), 280].

58. Artt.(1931)<sup>2,3,4,5</sup>.

59. Art.(1931)<sup>3</sup>, 178.

60. Art.(1944)<sup>1</sup>, 3.





"Dogma and blind custom are heavy, retarding burdens imposed on man by his own inertia or by institutions desirous of retaining their own power."<sup>61</sup> Dewey never has a good word to say for dogmas. He is implacably opposed to them in every form. Science or intelligence provides its own limits and is not bound by acceptance of any other method or set of conclusions.

#### B. "A Communion of Scientists"

Dewey's thinking about institutions is much more equivocal than that about dogmatism. It became evident above that dogmas are to be opposed in all forms and under any conditions. Dogmas are objectionable because they are unscientific and therefore unable to sustain spiritual longings and enterprises. If institutions necessarily are dogmatic, they too must be rejected.

It is easy to show that dogmas often do attach themselves to religious institutions. The tendency for institutions has been crystallization about beliefs and procedures which have been adopted in response to the problems of an earlier day and which are now retained, though they have become irrelevant.<sup>62</sup> Religious institutions have been even less amenable to change than have institutions of another sort. "Tradition and transmission operate perhaps nowhere else as powerfully

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61. Coons, ICDP, 49, summarizing Dewey's view, ION.

62. ACF, 6, 9, 30-32.





as they do in morals."<sup>63</sup> "In science and in industry the fact of constant change is generally accepted. Moral, religious, and articulate philosophic creeds are based upon the idea of fixity."<sup>64</sup> Philosophy is "unusually conservative--not, necessarily, in proffering solutions, but in clinging to problems."<sup>65</sup> It is not "apparatus" but "doctrinal apparatus"<sup>66</sup> which is definitional for "a religion."<sup>67</sup>

It is when Dewey remembers the dogmatic character of most religions that he writes pessimistically of the inevitable failure of any attempt to revitalize churches. His discussion of traditional religions includes both institutionality and dogmatism as features and never tries to distinguish the two.<sup>68</sup> The result is inclusion of passages which quite clearly reject all churches as bearers of religious values: "I am not proposing a religion."<sup>69</sup> "The opposition between

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63. Art.(1927)<sup>2</sup>, 24. Cf. LOG, 97-98.

64. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 25.

65. Art.(1917)<sup>1</sup>, 3.

66. ACF, 26.

67. Fitch, Art.(1943), argues that Dewey misunderstands churches in seeing their obvious faults and not their possibilities but is really more religious than religionists. This evaluation remains pious sentimentality until the reasons for the apparent paradox are revealed. In the present section it is discovered that this might be reasonably expected from Dewey because of his failure to distinguish clearly doctrinal and institutional aspects of churches.

68. ACF, 9-10.

69. ACF, 8. Dewey is here using the word "religion" technically as including dogmatic and institutional elements.





religious values as I conceive them and religions is not to be bridged."<sup>70</sup> Sectarianism is opposed in both his early and his late writings.<sup>71</sup> Dewey finds fault with religious institutions, churches.

However, this authoritarianism is sometimes taken to be no more than the sign of a "present depression in religion."<sup>72</sup> The difficulty is temporary. Religion has turned respectable. "Nowhere in the world at any time has religion been so thoroughly respectable as with us, and so nearly disconnected from life."<sup>73</sup> Unlike primitive Christianity, which was "a religion of renunciation and denunciation," present-day religion is largely "a sanction of what socially exists--a kind of gloss upon institutions and conventions."<sup>74</sup> In discussing this, Dewey asks whether Christians would still take seriously the warnings of the founder of their religion: "Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you"<sup>75</sup>; "Blessed are you when men shall revile you and persecute you."<sup>76</sup> As a matter of fact, then, Dewey himself has argued that churches are not necessarily dogmatic though they most often are and have been.

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70. ACF, 28.

71. CE, II, 504-516 (written in 1908); Art.(1939)<sup>8</sup>, 595.

72. ACF, 9.

73. Art.(1929)<sup>5</sup>, 271.

74. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 28-29.

75. Luke 6<sup>26</sup>.

76. Matt. 5<sup>7</sup>.





In this respect they are like any other type of institution.

All of Dewey's objections to institutions reflect his belief that dogmas easily attach themselves to institutions.

"Institutions...persist without being subjected to a systematic empirical investigation."<sup>77</sup> Dewey accepts Professor Randall's summary of his position: There is

one central conflict as the focus for understanding all western philosophies. It is the ever repeated struggle between the active force of scientific knowledge and technical power and the deflecting force of the lag and inertia of institutionalized habits and beliefs.<sup>78</sup>

The presence of institutions always strengthens the influence of traditions.<sup>79</sup> "The school, like other human institutions, acquires inertia and tends to go on doing things that have once got started, irrespective of present demands."<sup>80</sup> Like the early liberals who were opposed to "attaching undue importance to merely external institutional changes, to changes that do not enter into the desires, purposes and beliefs of the very constitution of individuals,"<sup>81</sup> Dewey "hopes to get rid of the habit of thinking of democracy as institutional and external and to acquire the habit of treating it as a way of personal life."<sup>82</sup> Communism and Fascism are objectionable

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77. TOV, 61.

78. Art.(1939)<sup>8</sup>, 522.

79. QC, 309.

80. SOT, 229.

81. LSA, 40.

82. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 226.





because "they have their established dogmatic creeds."<sup>83</sup>

Dogmas oppose scientific investigation and cause inertia and standardization. Nowhere does Dewey state that institutions are of such a nature that they must be dogmatic, though he offers much evidence that they often are dogmatic. Whereas the objection to dogmas was offered on logical grounds, the arguments against institutions are all of an historical variety. Institutions are sometimes defined as groups who "think alike." This conception assumes, of course, the presence of dogma. Dewey is more optimistic than this concerning the potentialities of institutions. They are to be defined as groups of persons who either "think alike" or "think together," and it is only the latter ones which are religious. Some institutions demand uniformity on the part of their constituents, but it is possible so to alter social life that institutions become communities whose communicants participate in a shared experience and so liberate spiritual energies for everyone in the group.

As a matter of fact, Dewey often makes statements that reveal him as a supporter of a regenerated church.

The historic increase of the ethical and ideal content of religions suggests that the process of purification may be carried further.<sup>84</sup>

The surrender of claims to an exclusive and authoritative position is a sine qua non for doing away with the dilemma

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83. PM, 175. Cf. CE, I, 426; Art.(1930)<sup>5</sup>, 31-32.

84. ACF, 8.





in which churches now find themselves in respect to their sphere of social action.<sup>85</sup>

The church as an institution...[is] confronted with the problem of adaptation to the intellectual and social realities of present life.<sup>86</sup>

The transfer of idealizing imagination, thought and emotion to natural human relations would not signify the destruction of churches that now exist. It would rather offer the means for a recovery of vitality. The fund of human values that are prized and need to be cherished, values that are satisfied and rectified by all human concerns and arrangements, could be celebrated and reinforced, in different ways and with differing symbols, by the churches. In that way the churches would indeed become catholic.<sup>87</sup>

Science and machinery have affected the traditional doctrines of the church.<sup>88</sup>

The intellectual content of religions has always finally adapted itself to scientific and social conditions after they have become clear. In a sense, it has been parasitic upon the latter.<sup>89</sup>

In these passages Dewey admits the weaknesses, the conservatism, and the dilemmas of modern churches but suggests that they may be overcome by a church which in certain ways is changed to meet modern conditions. The religious institution would have to be scientific. This is possible. Although there tends to be a lag in "institutional habits of thought," institutions can be improved.

Schools and other institutions are the source of many

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85. ACF, 83.

86. CE, I, 86.

87. ACF, 82.

88. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 53. Cf. ACF, 62-63.

89. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 28.





cultural values.

A genuine energetic interest in the cause of human freedom will manifest itself in a jealous and unremitting care for the influence of social institutions upon the attitudes of curiosity, inquiry, weighing and testing of evidence ....The main purpose of our schools and other institutions is to develop powers of unremitting and discriminating observation and judgment.<sup>90</sup>

The ideal is not the removal of institutions but the directing of their activities so that they, necessary accompaniments of group action, will be effective in reaching formulated social aims. "All the institutions, customs, and arrangements of social life shall contribute to....the fullest possible development of personality in all."<sup>91</sup>

As a matter of fact, institutions are not only capable of betterment, but also progress cannot be made without their reform. All activity is ultimately social. "Social institutions, the trend of occupations, the pattern of social arrangements, are the finally controlling influences in shaping minds."<sup>92</sup> In speaking of his own liberal fore-runners, Dewey calls attention to the fact that John Stuart Mill, apparently like himself, learned the importance of institutions from Coleridge. "He learned that institutions and traditions are indispensable to the nurture of what is deepest and most worthy in human life."<sup>93</sup> This is more than was learned by

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90. Art.(1928)<sup>3</sup>, 269.

91. Dewey and Watson, Art.(1937), 333.

92. ION, 128.

93. LSA, 30.





many liberals; liberalism has been relatively unconcerned with institutions,<sup>94</sup> and when concerned, fearful.<sup>95</sup> This may account for the fact that

when current theories are examined which, quite properly, relate valuation with desires and interests, nothing is more striking than their neglect--so extensive as to be systematic--of the role of cultural conditions and institutions in the shaping of desires and ends and thereby of valuations.<sup>96</sup>

The historical background which allows thinkers to ignore the importance of institutions is pointed out, but it is never suggested that this provides justification for the practice. Such thinking is apparently to be condemned for being unrealistic. The conclusion must be that, just in so far as his statements are anti-institutional, Dewey is not completely emancipated from liberal ways of thinking himself. He still exhibits some of its weaknesses; considering his close relationship to that movement, this is readily understandable. But it provides no adequate reason for rejection of institutions.

In Dewey's comments upon liberalism and the thinking of some of its outstanding representatives,<sup>97</sup> he accepts the

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94. Historically, liberalism was weak because there was no science of society (in the sense of a study of human beings and their institutions in order to lead to better social organization) with which to correct abuses that were pointed out (LSA, 44-47).

95. Democracy has been tied up with fear of government and with opposition to all other institutions (PIP, 86-87).

96. TOV, 64.

97. LSA, 22-23, 30.





fact that institutions are not going to disappear. In the same tone, he writes, "The only assurance of birth of better ones [churches] is the marriage of emotion with intelligence."<sup>98</sup> But, in Dewey's thought, acceptance of institutions as permanent adjuncts of civilization means that they are not evil, for to assert that something is evil is equivalent to saying that it should be changed or eliminated. It is, of course, true that specific traits of institutions are evil, but the institutions themselves are not necessarily so. Dewey's social philosophy is correctly called an "institutional social philosophy."

The chief effort of all educational reforms is to bring about a readjustment of existing scholastic institutions and methods so that they shall respond to changes in general social and intellectual conditions.<sup>99</sup>

"The only fundamental agency for good is the public school system."<sup>100</sup> It is true that his attitude toward schools is not the same as his attitude toward churches, but since he never proves that churches must incorporate supernatural beliefs, one wonders whether he is perfectly consistent in this respect.

It is hard to see why one who has thought and written so much about education--which is certainly no more an institutional or substantive unity than religion, and no more separable from the concrete details of life--should be as

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98. ACF, 80.

99. SOT, 229.

100. SOT, 313-314.





insistent that the religious should be relegated to the status of an adjective.<sup>101</sup>

As Fitch has Jahweh say to Dewey: "The failings of my church were none other than the failings of your universities."<sup>102</sup>

If institutions are subject to intelligent direction, the chief--and perhaps the only--objection to them has been removed. Institutions are agencies "for the increase in depth and area of the realized values of life."<sup>103</sup> Institutions are added to the armamentarium of objects which are used as means for realizing values. This is significant, for it has been emphasized throughout that the most mundane object may take on some of the attributes of the end to which it is related. It is appreciated for what it may do. Thus, even institutions may be objects of attention and regard if they are devoted to ideals of such inclusive nature that the personalities of their members become more unified. The ethical aim is in many cases subordinated;

yet as it profiteth a man nothing to gain the whole world and lose his own self, so indirectly and ultimately all these other social institutions must be judged by the contribution which they make to the value of human life.<sup>103</sup>

The relation here is dual, it is important to note. As long as institutions enable their members to become more integrated,

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101. Garrison, Art.(1934), 1281. Reference is to the distinction in A Common Faith between "religion" and "religious experience."

102. Fitch, Art.(1943), 16.

103. Art.(1900)<sup>1</sup>, 121.





they may serve as objects of worship and esteem--no longer. On the other hand, the direction and scope of the activity of any institution depends upon the effort and intelligence of those same members.

This may be put in another way. Churches (religious institutions) are nothing other than those groups which can be called communities because of devotion to common ideals and cooperative endeavor made possible by communication with one another. Institutional activity is shared experience at its best, if it is scientific. The difficulty lies, not with the institutions that are to be used for the attainment of ends but with the people who are to use the institutions. "The difficulty and doubt....concern the energy, the willingness for sacrifice and power of cooperation on the part of those who have vision and sympathy."<sup>104</sup> Churches may be used in increasing the effectiveness of such people. "The democratic conception implies a society in which individuals enjoy the status of ends, and institutions the status of means."<sup>105</sup>

Instead of thinking of our own dispositions and habits as accommodated to certain institutions we have to learn to think of the latter as expressions, projections, and extensions of habitually dominant personal attitudes.<sup>106</sup>

Churches are small societies and are not to be thought of as external to individuals. The relationship is internal.

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104. Art.(1931)<sup>4</sup>, 179.

105. Childs, Art.(1939), 44.

106. Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 222-223.





When so regarded, such institutions may become useful parts of the striving for social and personal unity. There is nothing magical about institutions; they do not replace effort, but they do serve to canalize and direct that effort in such ways as to make its benefits most impressive. At the same time, the institution itself serves as the repository for some of the identifications which objectify and expand personality.

The school in its capacity as a social center must make up in part to the child for the decay of dogmatic and fixed methods of social discipline and for the loss of reverence and the influence of authority.<sup>107</sup>

The church may serve this same function once it is divested of unscientific, unintelligent procedures and beliefs. This is the great vision for churches. They then become social centers of activity rather than bodies for the propagation of special beliefs.

Dogma is always and everywhere bad. It can never under any circumstances make religious living a more real possibility. Institutions, on the other hand, are not necessarily opposed to spiritual aims. Granted that many institutions (churches, schools, businesses, governments, or whatever) have been authoritarian, it is yet possible to modify them so markedly that they may contribute to spiritual growth. Thus it is incorrect to define an institution as a group of people all of whom "think alike." Such a definition would, as a

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107. Curti, SIAE, 524, summarizing Dewey's position.





matter of fact, comprehend most existing institutions, but it would exclude a scientific or religious institution, a "community." What is needed is a group of people who "think together" instead of alike. This is a "community of scientific workers."<sup>108</sup> Unity can replace conformity as an institutional ideal. For the "communion of saints" or believers can be substituted a "communion of scientists" or cooperative inquirers. Elimination of one set of functions and attitudes in the church must be coordinated, however, with the substitution of another set; otherwise the emotional appeal is lost. Only a brief glimpse of the attributes of a scientific church can be given here.

#### C. Needed: A Radical Religion

In the discussion presented above it became evident that supernaturalism is objectionable because it rejects intelligence or science as the sole method for discovering and creating truth. On the other hand, institutions are irreligious only when they become dogmatic. This has often happened but need not occur at all.

The separation of dogma from institutions frees the latter for use in spiritual undertakings. It remains to suggest some changes that might make churches greater aids to religious living. A Common Faith

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108. LOG, 20n.





was addressed to those who have abandoned supernaturalism, and who on that account are reproached by traditionalists for having turned their backs on everything religious. The book was an attempt to show such persons that they still have within their experience all the elements which give the religious attitude its value.<sup>109</sup>

Experience will become more religious as institutions are made scientific and transformed into communities. Only then will personal growth be assured and social action be spiritual.

This would be a radical change, but radicalism is required by the present situation.

Liberalism must now become radical, meaning by "radical" perception of the necessity of thoroughgoing changes in the set-up of institutions and corresponding activity to bring the changes to pass. For the gulf between what the actual situation makes possible and the actual state itself is so great that it cannot be bridged by piecemeal policies undertaken ad hoc.<sup>110</sup>

Radical alteration is required because present institutions are profoundly lacking when compared with the scientific ideal for them. New imaginative formulations are required to replace "stereotypes of spiritual life which were formed in old and alien cultures."<sup>111</sup> Any institution ceases to be "secular" and becomes religious as soon as it devotes itself to the task of sharing experience and rids itself of dogma.

Such an institution would amplify opportunities for intercommunicating, for sharing, for creating common goals, and

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109. Art.(1939) , 597.

110. LSA, 62.

111. ION, 149.





for identifying oneself with a cooperative group. Those social theorists who

fear that personal desiccation will result from any type of super-organization...urge a pattern which would permit greatest immediacy, immediacy of awareness and way of living.<sup>112</sup>

In creating this kind of group, the church would be replacing the many small groups that were available for social intercourse and shared experience before industrialization altered society. The change has been

from small shops, where men worked together in close companionship, to huge factories with their impersonal character and with subordination of the mass of "hands" to superintendents and bosses, and to the general adoption of a semi-military discipline.<sup>113</sup>

The advantages of the change have been great from the point of view of efficiency and production, but personal relations have, as has been frequently pointed out, deteriorated.

The churches can take up the slack if they are themselves so constructed as to make possible free interchange of ideas and group determination of ideals. This means that the church must in its organization be democratic. This goal has been sought in the past. Church groups have, for example, insisted upon electing their ministers, or refused to flock them, or denied them payment, or rejected them entirely. All of these movements were in part, though only in part, expressions of a hope that churches could be democratic. The

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112. Slochower, NVWL, 131.

113. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 48-49.





conception of the church as a "communion of saints" has been purified until at times it also has expressed a democratic ideal. Even when church doctrines were strongly supernatural, there have been democratic aspirations discernible within churches. Today the autocratic government of industry tends to make group relationships formal and external.<sup>114</sup> It is true, of course, that experience cannot be fully religious and dynamic if part of it is entangled in such an autocratic and hierarchical set-up as modern industry usually presents, but it is probably too much to expect that the change can be effected from within that institution itself. It is practicable, however, to suggest that other institutions be created or changed so that they illustrate the values and enjoyments available in democratic, intelligent groups. The enjoyments possible in these groups will provide sufficient motivation for changing others. The church comes to mind readily as one of the institutions most appropriate for the task. The "brotherhood of man" is an ideal that is frequently mouthed, but it would become generative of social improvement if it could be put into operation even in a small part of society.

Another change that might occur in churches comes to mind when one thinks of the interests of John Dewey. He has been concerned with education throughout his career. At the same time, he has said there should be no division between religious experience and the rest of experience. It follows

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114. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 58.





from this that religious education is not something to be set over against secular education. Religious experience is educational, is a form of corporate inquiry, when properly conceived; conversely, education becomes religious as its goals become coherent, social, and its methods become intelligent. Dewey has been speaking of religious education throughout his career as he stated his notions of what education could and should become.

If John Dewey's philosophy of education is compared with the writings of the leaders in the field of religious education, Dewey is an advocate of religious education. There is not a man in America today who through a long life has stood more consistently for the social, moral, spiritual values that religion emphasizes.<sup>115</sup>

Dewey has recognized that character education does not go on only--or even primarily--in the classroom. It is a process that encompasses the whole of life. Education is not and should not be, according to him, a monopoly of schools and teachers.<sup>116</sup> Thus, he speaks of "the educators whether in the schoolroom or pulpit or wherever."<sup>117</sup>

Dewey argues that religious knowledge develops gradually as does all other knowledge and that therefore religious educators should study "the whole record of the growth, in individual children during their youth, of instincts, wants, and interests from the religious point of view."<sup>118</sup> Science

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115. Brinkley, Art.(1935), 52.

116. Dewey and Watson, Art.(1937), 336-341.

117. Art.(1930)<sup>6</sup>, 179.

118. Art.(1903)<sup>2</sup>, 64-65.





must be brought to bear upon religious instruction.

It is possible to approach the subject of religious instruction in the reverent spirit of science, making the same sort of study of the problem that is made of any other educational problem. If methods of teaching, principles of selecting and using subject-matter, in all supposedly secular branches of education, are being subjected to careful and systematic scientific study, how can those interested in religion--and who is not?--justify neglect of the most fundamental of all educational questions, the moral and religious?<sup>119</sup>

Newlon points to improvements in religious education that have been brought about in part through the thinking and efforts of Dewey. Not only have directors of religious education been more and more generally accepted as necessary parts of the personnel of a well-equipped church, but "emphasis is being placed on activity, on service, on serious study of current social problems and individual responsibility."<sup>120</sup>

Education that is truly religious is activistic and ethical. To say that something is evil is to say that it should be removed or changed. Ethics is, therefore, a prescription for activity. Practical concerns are introduced. Improvements in religious education are possible under the following conditions: First, awareness of social forces for good and for evil must be increased. Information on what aspects of experience should be strengthened and what ones opposed is necessary.

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119. Art.(1903)<sup>2</sup>, 66.

120. Newlon, Art.(1929), 695. "Over and over again he has sounded the note of self-direction. One of the chief aims of education is to enable the individual through reflective thinking to direct his own life into socially useful channels"(695).





The philosophy of education must discover and ally itself with the social forces which promote educational aims, as well as uncover and oppose the vested interests which nullify ideals and reduce them to mere flourishes or to phrases on paper.<sup>121</sup>

Specifically, this means that religious education is realistic and concerned with current affairs in so far as they bear upon the problem of personal unity and social order. The Bible is not the sole source of information. It may well be relevant, but it must meet tests of coherence imposed upon it from outside; it is not its own authority for relevance.

In the second place, religious education must be conducted in such a way as to itself exhibit the traits that are desired as a result.

The tragic weakness of the present school is that it endeavors to prepare future members of the social order in a medium in which the conditions of the social spirit are eminently wanting.<sup>122</sup>

Recognition of the social character of inquiry as it has been described above and the importance for the discovery of truth of intercommunication and cooperation hints at the solution of the problem.

When the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guaranty of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious.<sup>123</sup>

Church, church school, and school may each and all serve as

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121. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 38.

122. SS, 12.

123. SS, 27-28.





examples of the process and advantages of experimental, social inquiry.

Third, there is required a social philosophy by means of which education may be guided, a "liberal faith."<sup>124</sup> There is a strong idealistic strain in American life, but it lacks direction.<sup>125</sup> The idealism is, therefore, latent. A social philosophy which is coherent can be developed only through the criticism of ideas already present. "Improved valuation must grow out of existing valuations, subjected to critical methods of investigation that bring them into systematic relations with one another."<sup>126</sup> Discussion of this order, exchange of ideas to discover weaknesses in those currently held and to originate substitutes for them, is another possible function of a church. It is readily seen that this would be possible only in a church which was scientific in part, but it would also increase intelligence in the future.

The present is marked by lack of social direction. This makes possible the turning of public knowledge to private ends.<sup>127</sup>

Useless display and luxury, the futile attempt to secure happiness through the possession of things, social position, and economic power over others, are manifestations of the restriction of experience that exists among those

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124. LSA, 2.

125. Art.(1931)<sup>4</sup>, 178.

126. TOV, 60.

127. Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 34-35.





who seemingly profit by the present order. Mutual fear, suspicion, and jealousy are also its products. All of these things deflect and impoverish human experience beyond any calculation.<sup>128</sup>

Irreligion is largely the result of accepting private aims as most important. The "old individualism" is the "individualism of economic self-seeking."<sup>129</sup> "The profit motive is the crux of the whole issue between capitalism and socialism."<sup>130</sup> One might go further and say that the crux of the whole religious problem is the issue of the profit motive versus the service motive. Selfishness depends for its plausibility upon a theory of inquiry which is now outmoded. Fully intelligent behavior is cooperative. It is the only way of "unharnessing the machine from the dollars" to which it has been hitched.<sup>131</sup>

Power groups are incompatible with religious ideals. Means are organically related to the ends, and these two do not mix. This is true in politics,<sup>132</sup> and it is also true in religious experience. Christian fellowship is not an ideal that is consonant with the existence of power groups.<sup>133</sup> Power groups and coercive methods can only be replaced by

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128. Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 30.

129. Coons, ICDP, 39, summarizing Dewey's position.

130. Coons, ICDP, 94, summarizing Dewey's position.

131. Cf. Coons, ICDP, 33-34.

132. Art.(1931)<sup>4</sup>, 177-178.

133. Cf. comments to this effect by Charles E. Merriam at Princeton University Bicentennial Conference, 1946.





other methods that are more attractive. The only adequate alternative is intelligence. As described above, it promotes the full interchange of ideas that leads to identification of individuals with one another and makes possible the working out of common goals with which each person may also identify himself.

The following specific goals and symbols might be suggested by the analysis of the present social order presented by Dewey.

- (i) The "brotherhood of man"--a "communion of scientists" marked by emotional ties made possible by communication and cooperation--may be presented as an ideal in place of national and class groups that tend to create barriers and prevent fullest shared experience.
- (ii) The "kingdom of God"<sup>134</sup> would be that situation in which personal unity would be furthered through the identification with coherent ideals held in common with others in a society which itself was ordered by that fact.
- (iii) Religious action would be political and economic because those forces are most important today; intelligent social action would be religious action. The current separation between the two fields is a sign of disorganization and failure to be coherently religious.
- (iv) Church organization would be democratic rather than, as it now often is, hierarchical. Religious truth cannot be discovered except through corporate inquiry and religious action depends upon the striving of each member of the community; consequently every member would have a positive contribution to make.
- (v) Religious education would become one with all education.

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<sup>134</sup>. Note that this figure of speech is undemocratic. Such figures are gradually being replaced by others founded upon more intimate relationships. Dewey does not resent use of the word "God" as applied to his view unless it is taken to refer to a supernatural entity.





There is no other aim for religion besides education, and coherent educational ideals are religious.

In these and other ways churches may promote and exemplify shared experience. The goal is the creation of a community experience with goals common to all and coherently conceived through the use of intelligence. It would be reached by the use of science, which is dependent upon full communication of ideas among inquirers who identify themselves with each other as well as with the goal toward which they are working. Personal integration and social order are but two faces of this one ideal. Institutions must become religious communities before experience can be shared. This is a realistic goal.





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- A. Books by John Dewey
- B. Articles by John Dewey
- C. Books by other authors
- D. Articles by other authors

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# ABSTRACT

This dissertation has as its purpose the formulation of John Dewey's philosophy of religion. In it Dewey's religious ideal is discovered to be the "shared experience" which appears in intelligent living.

Although education, logic, and social philosophy have been considered by various authorities to have been basic subject-matters for Dewey, the thesis presented here is that none of them is more important to an understanding of his thinking than is his religious theory. The religious ideal was called "the principle of coöperative association" in Dewey's early writings and "shared experience" in later ones.

Dewey's religious theory accepts as its starting point "immediate experience," which is a locus in which men are agent-patients. Such experience is full of feeling and the source both of religious ideals and of hindrances to their achievement. Personal unity and freedom are less ultimate than experience, being ideals which are possible of attainment within the latter. They are, in fact, products of religious striving rather than its sources.

The religious problem is the re-ordering of experience in such ways as to replace confusion with coherence. The only way in which this can be done is by the use of science (viewed as a method rather than as a set of conclusions) or,





what is the same thing, "creative intelligence." The scientific attitudes are those of open-minded and socialized inquiry, and the scientific method is the use of present experience as a clue to and a basis for future experience. It involves anticipation, prediction, control, communication, and cooperation.

Ends and means are organically related. Ends must be adopted in light of available means and exist in the same continuum with them; separation of the two divorces practice from ideals. The relationship is so close that ends and means are interchangeable, and thus it is not inconsistent to say that John Dewey, whose writings have been concerned chiefly with method, is primarily interested in intrinsic values. All values are both conditions and consequents of other experiences, but some of them are unique in being immediately enjoyed.

"Shared experience" is the religious ideal pictured by John Dewey. It is nothing other than science considered as end rather than as means. It has several traits: (1) It is a social ideal; the solving of group problems involves re-ordering the group. (2) It is social discussion because inquiry is a social project in which communication is requisite. (3) It is social action, for group problems are solved by group activity which is intelligent. (4) A community is created in which participants identify themselves with and share the experiences of other persons who





are cooperating with them. (5) Shared experience involves personal growth because participants identify themselves with the social ideal and take on its characteristics.

(6) Appreciation is broadened and deepened by being directed toward any object or tool used in achieving religious ideals as well as toward persons who participate in and are concerned about this achievement.

The "communicant" or "participant" in "shared experience" is radically changed. This is so important that John Dewey refers to "the unity of the human being" as one phrasing of the religious ideal. Personal integration is diminished or prevented today by the presence at the same time of practices which stimulate competitive tendencies in human nature and moral standards that condemn competition in behalf of brotherly attitudes. The result is conflict and tension that in turn leads to pessimism about human possibilities and fractionization of personal interests. Especially disturbing results are the separation of theory from practice and nature from values.

The integration that is needed involves character changes that are truly educative. Thus it is possible to consider "education as a religion" when the former introduces persons into scientific practices and attitudes. Adoption of intelligent modes of behavior sets the stage for a new morality. It furthers personal unity by integrating the individual with his group. This change in human nature and morality





is possible when intelligence is accepted as both method and goal.

The person who participates in shared experience receives many benefits. His health is improved, not only because scientific discoveries are made available to him, but also because his interests and emotions are aroused and centered about coherent ideals. His individuality is increased so that he becomes more energetic, more original, and more creative. He is able to direct his experience toward ideals which he himself, along with other members of his community, formulates and adopts. In this way he becomes free but not licentious, self-directed but not selfish. Participation introduces genuine social consciousness and enjoyment of other persons in the same "shared experience."

"The social as a category" is basic metaphysically because any thing is known by the way in which it acts upon and responds to other things. Human society is important in addition because it makes possible communication and the sharing of experience. Human nature is social in being a product of and an influence upon its environment. There is no sharp demarcation between an individual and his group. As condition and consequent of personal changes, society is relevant to the religious aim. Spiritual life requires the creating of "communities."

Science is oftentimes considered to have opposing purposes because it has been used almost exclusively in the





investigation of physical nature and the improvement of industrial techniques. It has, however, not been barren of religious results, because it has made human intercourse easier and has brought about the detection of industrial evils as evil. Further progress will be possible when intelligent attitudes and procedures are introduced into human societies.

The scientific society or "community" is made possible by communication among inquirers. Thus the religious ideal involves removal of barriers between social and economic classes and nations. Likewise, cooperative activity demands the removal of coercion and substitution of a democratic method and spirit. A community is a "planning society." It replaces an ethics which combines legalism and sentimentality with one in which the good is that which contributes to intelligent inquiry.

Dewey objects to most past and present churches because they are dogmatic. Dogmas are beliefs tested in unscientific ways. Dogma is made possible and fostered by insecurity, which demands certitude, by traditional logic, which isolates the results of thinking from its operation, and by a "failure of nerve" which causes individuals to rely upon earlier solutions to problems. Just in so far as it is dogmatic, experience is irreligious. In every respect the presence of dogmas harms persons who believe in them and churches which depend upon them.





For a "communion of saints" who promulgate dogmas should be substituted a "communion of scientists" who adopt intelligence as both a means and an end. Since it is an integral part of science that it is cooperative social action, it is consistent with the rest of John Dewey's thinking to say that churches may become religious. Although they usually accept and depend upon dogmas, churches may free themselves and become religious by becoming fully intelligent. When speaking of schools and some other institutions, Dewey himself presents an "institutional social philosophy." It is therefore an inconsistency in his philosophy which allows him to speak so disparagingly of the religious possibilities of churches.

A scientific church would make "the brotherhood of man" a more real likelihood by creating emotional ties among the "communicants" and by involving them in cooperative activity directed toward coherent social ideals. The organization of such a church would be democratic. Religious education would involve all of life and religion itself would become a project central to life.

### Conclusions:

1. Intelligence (science) is the only effective means of directing experience so that religious ideals may be introduced into it.

2. Spiritual aims, in fact, must be judged realistic





according to whether they are attainable by this technique.

3. Intelligence is a social activity which makes possible "shared experience" as the religious ideal.

4. Shared experience involves cooperative activity devoted to the task of ordering society about coherent ideals. It requires communication among persons who accept "a common faith" and who as a result appreciate nature, identify themselves with their fellow scientists, and adopt religious aims for their own lives.

5. The participant in such experience is healthy, free, self-directed, socially conscious, and creative.


6. The community which originates in sharing is free from social barriers and coercion, cooperative, and democratic.

7. Dogmas are beliefs tested in unscientific ways. They stunt religious growth.

8. Churches are capable of becoming "communities" in which "shared experience" is characteristic. This is possible only as their dogmas are replaced by intelligent action. In so far as Dewey fails to visualize religious possibilities for institutions he is inconsistent with the basic principles of his philosophy.







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